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The American Chamber of Commerce to the EU (AmCham EU) is delighted to sponsor a new, World Trade Insti-
tute-led study, “TTIP and the EU Member States.” This study, which brings together the expertise of prominent 
academics from across Europe, has a simple goal. It seeks to assess what a transatlantic free trade agreement will 
mean for EU countries. It concludes that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is likely to 
bring a range of economic and social benefits to business, consumers and citizens across the EU.
Reducing the remaining barriers to transatlantic trade and investment could result in permanent income increas-
es and significant export growth for the EU Member States to the US. Wages for high- and low-skilled workers are 
expected to increase, while consumers could also benefit from lower prices for their products and services. These 
gains would provide a much needed boost at a time when growth in Europe remains sluggish and investment 
remains relatively weak.
TTIP is likely to be particularly important for SMEs, who make up 99 percent of companies here in the EU. Un-
like big companies, they lack the resources to overcome the burdensome costs and requirements necessary to 
“go transatlantic”. Unleashing the potential of small businesses and entrepreneurs in the EU to export to the US 
could transform the European economy and the lives of millions of its citizens.
But TTIP is about more than just economics. An ambitious transatlantic free trade agreement containing robust 
social and environmental provisions can serve as a model for future trade agreements and for the rest of the 
world. It would enable Europe to play a leading role in shaping globalisation, at a time when the rules and norms 
that govern trade and investment are being challenged more than ever before. It could also promote a “race to the 
top” in Europe on standards, by giving EU and US regulators more time and resources to protect the health and 
well-being of their citizens.
As a business association representing US companies committed to growth and prosperity in Europe, AmCham 
EU welcomes the broad debate on TTIP taking place in towns and cities across the EU. We hope that this study 
will provide a positive contribution to this discussion, helping European business and citizens to develop an in-
formed opinion of what TTIP could mean for them. It will also help EU policymakers as they seek to construct 
an ambitious and balanced agreement that encourages trade, investment and growth in Europe. We believe that 
this, ultimately, is in everyone’s interest.
 
Susan Danger 
Managing Director
AmCham EU
Foreword
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takeaways
In macro-economic terms, TTIP is expected to lead to GDP increases for all but one EU Member 
State. It should also lead to export increases, to wage increases, to consumer price decreases for 
the majority of EU Member States, and to a small decline in income inequality.
Economic gains are not equally spread between EU Member States and come in different forms: 
through export and production increases, investments, through lower consumer prices, or a 
combination of these factors.
At the sectoral level, there are gains for sectors like manufactures, water transport, insurance 
services, processed foods, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and motor vehicles across the EU 
Member States. Electrical machinery, metals and metal products, and transport equipment are 
expected to decline.
 
 
TTIP is expected to safeguard the EU’s high provisions for social, environmental and consumer protection.
The deeper the existing (direct and indirect) economic relationship between an EU Member State 
and the US, the higher the expected income level benefits from TTIP.
 
TTIP is expected to have especially positive effects for SMEs if it focuses on addressing practical 
barriers to trade.
 
 
TTIP is not expected to harm the EU Internal Market, and could even give it a significant boost.
 
Increased trade may lead to a rise in overall emissions, but any increases could also be partially 
mitigated in the long-run by enhanced trading practices.
 
 
TTIP provides an opportunity to create a “gold standard” in trade agreements for investment protection.
 
For consumers, TTIP could lead to lower prices and increased consumer choice. 
 
Limited labour mobility is expected between sectors.
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a. Permanent increases in GDP levels for 27 out of 
the 28 EU Member States, ranging from -0.3 percent 
to +1.6 percent;
b. Permanent increases in exports for all 28 EU 
Member States, ranging from +5 percent to +116 per-
cent; 
c. Permanent increases in wages in all EU Member 
States for high-skilled workers of up to +1.4 percent, 
and increases in wages for low-skilled workers in 25 
out of 28 Member States of up to +1.5 percent;
a. The biggest gains in terms of output include the 
manufactures, water transport, insurance services, 
processed foods, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and 
the motor vehicles sectors; 
a. Countries including Lithuania, Austria, Belgium 
and Ireland gain most, while countries including 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia gain less. Malta 
could experience a marginal contraction in GDP;
b. Economic gains can come from more production 
and exports (for producers), from more investments, 
from lower consumer prices (for consumers) or from a 
combination of these factors.
a. In order to maintain citizens’ rights, the regulato-
ry cooperation chapter in TTIP will focus on reducing 
regulatory barriers to trade, making regulation of an 
equivalent standard more compatible, and enhancing 
cooperation between regulators;
a. This implies that there is an incentive for the EU 
to enact policies that would further deepen the EU 
Internal Market in parallel to TTIP;
a. Lower regulatory burdens and improved market 
access through exports matter more for SMEs who 
are less able to overcome the costs and obstacles to 
trading with the US than are big companies;
d. A small decline in income inequality in the 
majority of EU Member States, with wages for low-
skilled workers expected to grow marginally faster 
than wages for high-skilled workers;
e. Decreases in consumer prices in the large majori-
ty of EU Member States of up to -0.9 percent.
b. Some sectors that are expected to decline in 
terms of output include electrical machinery, metals 
and metal products, and transport equipment.
b. The regulatory cooperation chapter does not 
intend to directly or indirectly influence legislation;
c. Significant benefits could accrue from improved 
mutual equivalence that would lead to increased 
cooperation between regulators and the opportunity 
to promote a “race to the top” on standards globally.
b. It also suggests that EU governments that seek 
to enhance their economic relationships with the 
US through complementary domestic policies would 
amplify the potential for enhanced economic growth.
b. For SMEs, trade facilitation and other very prac-
tical barriers to trade in the value chain matter most.
In macro-economic terms, a comprehensive TTIP agreement is expected to lead to:
At the sectoral level, there are different impacts for a range of sectors across the EU Member States:
Economic gains are unevenly distributed and come in different forms:
TTIP will include robust safeguards for social, environmental and consumer protections: 
The deeper the existing (direct and indirect) economic relationship between an EU Member 
State and the US, the higher the expected income level benefits from TTIP: 
TTIP is expected to have especially positive effects for SMEs: 
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a. Trade diverted from the EU Internal Market to 
the US will be minimal because tariffs are already low 
(except in the case of agriculture);
a. The overall effect of TTIP on the environment 
is not easy to quantify, hinging on the net balance of 
three effects – additional emissions, sectoral effects, 
and improvements in efficiency and technology;
a. Modern trade agreements retain the Inves-
tor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism as a 
safeguard for investors, but also explicitly detailing 
states’ right to regulate in certain legitimate public 
interest areas, providing more objective arbitrage, and 
acting against frivolous claims;
a. With increased trade, a greater range of products 
and services will be available to consumers; 
b. Given that the EU Internal Market is still 
fragmented in key TTIP areas (e.g. services, public 
procurement), TTIP cannot erode EU preferences that 
barely exist.
 b. However, preferential outcomes in TTIP, such 
as enhanced regulatory practices, increased trade in 
environmental and renewable goods, and strong en-
vironmental protection provisions could mitigate the 
effects of increased trade and create the conditions for 
a positive long-term net balance.
b. An Investment Court System (ICS) in TTIP that 
balances the interests of states, businesses and the 
public interest could become a model for investor 
protection around the world;
c. To address public concerns and to ensure that 
the mechanism is utilised effectively, investor pro-
tection and ICS provisions in TTIP should be clear, 
unambiguous and well-defined.
b. Consumers will also benefit from lower prices 
for goods and services in the transatlantic market, as 
a result of the reduction or elimination of tariffs and 
duties, and other improvements in the trading envi-
ronment. 
TTIP is not expected to harm the EU Internal Market, but rather may give it a significant boost:
Increased trade may lead to a rise in overall emissions, but any increases can be mitigated in 
the long-run by enhanced trading practices:
TTIP provides an opportunity to create a “gold standard” in trade agreements for 
investment protection:
For consumers, TTIP could lead to lower prices and increased consumer choice:
7
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10 a. Certain sectors are likely to grow in the EU as a 
result of TTIP (e.g. other manufactures, water trans-
port), while some may also contract (e.g. electrical 
machinery), encouraging the movement of labour 
from declining to growing sectors; 
b. Any TTIP-induced mobility will be marginal 
(around 2 percent only) in comparison to the effects 
of other external developments, such as technological 
progress or social policies initiated by EU Member 
State governments.
 
The “pull factor” for employment to move into 
growing sectors with higher wages away from sectors 
with lower wages, is the dominant force for labour 
mobility; 
c. Meanwhile, regulatory cooperation is focused on 
measures that directly affect goods and services traded 
between the EU and US. Domestic policies will re-
main the exclusive domain of the EU Member States.
Limited labour mobility should be expected between sectors: 
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reCommendations
We therefore recommend the following to 
the EU Member States: 
→ Pursue a TTIP agreement that will boost growth 
and investment, increase competitiveness, and 
enhance consumer choice in the EU, while resolutely 
upholding and where appropriate enhancing 
standards;
→ Conduct thorough research on the effects of 
TTIP on their countries, so that they can reap the 
many potential benefits of TTIP and mitigate any 
possible negative impacts;
→ Play an active and constructive role in the 
negotiations by providing continued guidance, 
suggestions for ways forward, and feedback to the EU 
negotiators;
→ Actively engage with and make the case to their 
citizens about TTIP and the benefits, challenges and 
opportunities of the agreement, so that they can 
make informed, fact-based decisions about what the 
agreement means for them;
→ Implement domestic policies that supplement 
the goals of the EU-wide negotiations to maximise 
the expected positive economic effects that TTIP will 
bring to their countries;
→ Implement domestic policies that accommodate 
anticipated changes in the labour force from TTIP 
such as tailored labour market and education policies.  
 
 
 
 
We recommend the following to 
the European Commission:
→ Ensure greater access to the US market; in 
certain sensitive sectors, tariffs should be phased out 
gradually to minimise trade diversion effects;
→ Deepen the Internal Market in parallel to the 
trade negotiations, since the more integrated the EU 
Internal Market, the greater the positive effects from 
TTIP;
→ Maximise the potential gains from regulatory 
convergence, including by emphasising the 
importance of a “living agreement” that will continue 
to promote enhanced regulatory practices in the 
future;
→ Define clear provisions and guarantees in TTIP 
to uphold, and, where appropriate, enhance standards 
on both sides of the Atlantic;
→ Prioritise opportunities for SMEs, who could 
benefit the most from increased access to the 
transatlantic market and who lack the resources of big 
companies to overcome barriers to trade;
→ Use TTIP as an opportunity to reform the ISDS 
mechanism, safeguarding investors’ rights, protecting 
the public interest, and creating a gold standard for 
these instruments in trade agreements globally;
→ Make TTIP as open a trade agreement as possible 
with very few Rules of Origin provisions and with the 
possibility for third countries to join in the future;
→ Maintain an ambitious transparency agenda 
and explore further opportunities to engage with the 
public to produce an agreement that best meets the 
needs of EU citizens and business.
“To maximise its economic, political and social impact, 
TTIP should be as open a trade agreement as possible, and 
should offer the opportunity for third countries to join in 
the future.”
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•	 TTIP	is	a	new-style,	comprehensive	21st	century	
trade agreement that goes beyond traditional market 
access issues (i.e. tariffs) and could set a new gold 
standard for future trade agreements. 
•	 Besides	eliminating	tariffs	on	goods	and	services	
traded between the EU and the US, TTIP also focuses 
on aligning regulatory regimes and creating a rules-
based international framework. 
•	 TTIP	provides	an	opportunity	for	the	EU	and	the	
US to lead by building upon what is already the largest 
and deepest trade and investment relationship in 
the world. Ties between the EU and the US in goods, 
services, jobs and investments are broad and deep and 
can be expanded further through TTIP.
exeCutive summary
“The proposed TTIP agreement being negotiated by the 
EU and the US has generated widespread public debate on 
its potential impact for citizens, consumers and businesses 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Our findings demonstrate 
that TTIP should bring a range of economic, social and 
geostrategic benefits to the EU and to the US. Importantly, 
TTIP should not be mischaracterised as a project that is 
promoted exclusively by advocates of free markets. TTIP 
aims to reduce the costs for businesses of all sizes associated 
with complying with two separate regulatory regimes, 
which in many cases have comparable levels of protection.”
Many EU citizens and legislators do not realise how 
deep the links between EU Member States and the 
US already are, nor do they realise the differences 
in the depths of these economic relationships 
across European countries. The economic impact 
of TTIP is likely to be particularly significant in 
those EU countries where the trade, investment 
and employment relationship with the US is strong. 
Nevertheless, by increasing trade with the EU’s 
biggest trading partner, TTIP could also bring a host 
of benefits to those EU countries with more limited 
economic ties with the US. 
This study concludes that TTIP could be a game-changer and 
represents a strategic opportunity for the EU and the US.
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and Quinlan also conclude. Finland, Sweden and 
Germany send over 40 percent of their investments 
to the US. Meanwhile, over half of investments into 
Luxembourg and the UK come from the US. These 
services and investment links form a core strength of 
the transatlantic economy. 
 
Transatlantic jobs: 
an EU Member State perspective
In 2011, total jobs in the EU of US-controlled firms 
numbered 6.0 million. Many of those six million jobs 
were created in the UK (28.4 percent), Germany (13.9 
percent), France (10.8 percent), Poland (8.5 percent) 
and Italy (6.7 percent). The US is by far the largest 
extra-EU foreign job creator in the EU. In Ireland, 
40.0 percent of all foreign (non-EU) jobs derive from 
US-controlled companies. In the UK, this number is 
31.4 percent, in Italy 23.3 percent, and in France 23.3 
percent. 
Expected TTIP effects for
EU Member States
Under an ambitious and comprehensive TTIP agree-
ment, expected effects for individual EU countries 
are positive and far-reaching. All but one EU Member 
State will see increases in GDP, and all 28 EU Mem-
ber States should see clear to very significant export 
increases. Our conclusions proceed from and build 
upon the most reliable methodological approach to 
date according to a European Parliament study (CEPS, 
2014), a combination of gravity analysis with a Com-
putable General Equilibrium model. This method is 
used by Ecorys (2009), CEPR (2013), and CEPII (2013) 
to look at TTIP and it is also employed by UNCTAD 
and the ILO. 
TTIP effects on national income levels (GDP)
TTIP is likely to boost EU income levels by an addi-
tional 0.5 percent on average. Member State income 
levels are expected to increase in all EU countries, 
with the exception of Malta (-0.3 percent). The highest 
gains accrue in Lithuania (+1.6 percent), Ireland (+1.3 
percent), Belgium (+1.1 percent), and Austria (+0.9 
percent). Changes in income levels from TTIP are 
also encouraging for several EU countries that have 
been recently affected by the financial crisis in Europe, 
including Ireland, Cyprus (+0.6 percent), Italy (+0.5 
percent) and Greece (+0.4 percent). In addition, the 
deeper the existing economic relationship between an 
EU Member State and the US, the higher the expect-
ed income level effects. This implies that there is an 
incentive for the EU to enact policies that deepen the 
EU Internal Market, and for EU national governments 
to enhance their economic relationship with the 
US through complementary domestic policies. Such 
measures would amplify the potential for economic 
growth from TTIP.
TTIP effects on exports
TTIP is expected to lead to export increases to the US 
for all EU Member States. Export increases range from 
+5 percent in the case of Cyprus, to +116 percent for 
Slovakia’s economy. EU countries that are the most 
integrated horizontally in global value webs with 
other EU countries and the US, and that have sizeable 
trade flows in sectors such as automotives, chemicals 
or machinery, see the largest increases in exports.
TTIP effects on wages
EU wages for both low-skilled workers (+0.51 percent) 
and high-skilled workers (+0.50 percent) are expected 
to increase. Wage inequality in the EU is projected 
to decrease marginally because wages for low-skilled 
workers are expected to grow a little bit faster than 
wages for high-skilled workers. Wages for high-skilled 
workers rise between 0.03 percent (Czech Republic) 
and 1.4 percent (Ireland). That is, for Irish high-skilled 
workers, TTIP should yield the equivalent to a 1.4 
percent salary raise. Low-skilled wages in Romania, 
Czech Republic and Estonia are expected to decrease 
marginally.
TTIP effects on consumer prices
An ambitious TTIP agreement is expected to lead to 
lower costs for EU and US producers, by reducing 
unnecessary differences in regulatory regimes, by 
enhancing information exchange, and by aligning 
conformity assessments and certification procedures. 
Firms will pass these lower costs on to consumers if 
the latter are price sensitive, for example, in automo-
tives, certain pharmaceutical products, and travel and 
tourism services. This yields a drop in consumer pric-
es in two-thirds of all EU Member States. Lithuania 
(-0.9 percent) is expected to see the largest decrease 
in consumer prices. In Poland, Malta, Latvia, Luxem-
bourg and Finland, consumers will also pay signifi-
cantly less for their daily goods and services. 
TTIP and third countries
Distinct from traditional free trade agreements, TTIP 
could also lead to positive economic effects for third 
countries – due primarily to the agreement’s regula-
tory cooperation pillar. Gains are, however, only ex-
pected to materialise if TTIP is relatively open to third 
countries – with few Rules of Origin, open MRAs, and 
the option in the future for third countries to join. 
Our analysis of spill-over effects from TTIP also sug-
gests that domestic policies enacted in the EU, the US 
and third countries could amplify the possible positive 
impacts of TTIP and mitigate any potential negative 
effects, for example through domestic education and 
labour policies.
Transatlantic goods and services: 
an EU Member State perspective
In 2011, the EU sent 18.5 percent of all its goods 
exports to the US; the US being the main (extra-EU) 
goods export destination for EU goods. Within this 
figure, there is a wide differentiation in export figures 
among the EU Member States. Ireland exports 56.7 
percent of all its goods to the US. Meanwhile, Cyprus 
is far less dependent on goods trade with the US – it 
exports just 3.2 percent to the US. Our findings show 
that TTIP is expected to lead to significant export in-
creases for many EU countries, in particular in sectors 
such as chemicals, automotives, and machinery.
In 2011, the EU as a whole sent 25.9 percent of all 
services exports to the US. Again, the US is its biggest 
(extra-EU) export destination. EU countries with the 
largest services export shares to the US are Ireland, 
with 43.5 percent of all exported services going to the 
US, Luxembourg with 37.7 percent, and the UK with 
33.5 percent. These are also the EU Member States 
with the most important financial and insurance ser-
vice industries, two key sectors linking the transatlan-
tic economies.
Transatlantic investments: 
an EU Member State perspective
The EU-US relationship is particularly strong in 
terms of investments. The EU and US are by far each 
other’s main investment markets – as Hamilton 
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introduCtion Purpose of the Study
Given the expected complexity and scope of a 
transatlantic free trade agreement between the EU 
and the US, an open and frank debate on the potential 
effects of TTIP on citizens on both sides of the Atlantic 
is critical. Negotiations for a TTIP agreement have 
entered an important phase, and a wide range of 
issues are being discussed by negotiators that could 
have a profound impact on EU and US citizens. The 
strong level of public and political engagement – 
especially in certain EU Member States – illustrates 
this fact, especially because TTIP touches upon a 
number of industries and regulatory issues that are 
politically sensitive. As Cecilia Malmström, EU Trade 
Commissioner, put it: “This [TTIP] is not just another 
trade negotiation. And we should not present it to people 
that way. It's a negotiation with our own largest trading 
partner. It's a negotiation between the world's two largest 
economies who share many common values. And most 
importantly it’s a negotiation that goes beyond traditional 
trade issues like market access for goods and services. Most 
importantly, but not only, about regulation”.2
The vigorous debate on TTIP that is taking place across 
Europe on the merits of TTIP should help to produce 
a balanced agreement that is attentive to the needs of 
the public, business, and consumers. It is also likely 
to provide the model for future EU trade agreements. 
Engagement between the European Commission 
and key stakeholders, in regular consultations with 
Member States, the European Parliament, and with 
civil society, and in publicising negotiating documents, 
has resulted in an unprecedented level of transparency 
and engagement in the TTIP negotiations. As 
European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly – who is tasked 
with holding the EU institutions to account – stated in 
her analysis of the European Commission’s role in the 
negotiations in May 2015, “The Commission is leading 
by example…The ambitious transparency agenda it has 
set for TTIP augurs well for future trade and investment 
negotiations.” 3
In this context, AmCham EU commissioned a broad 
consortium of European universities, research and 
policy institutes, and think tanks to explore the 
potential effects of TTIP on each individual EU 
Member State, as well as to scrutinise some of the most 
important TTIP-related issues impacting upon EU and 
US citizens. Reports such as this study and many other 
forms of analysis add a further level of engagement to 
the debate. 
Coordinated by the World Trade Institute (Switzerland), 
the Centre for Economic Policy Studies (Belgium), 
Sciences Po (France), Ekenberg & Andersson (Sweden), 
the IFO Institute (Germany), Leiden University 
(The Netherlands), Halle University (Germany), 
University of Rome (Italy), Cambridge University 
(UK), LEI Wageningen UR (The Netherlands) and 
CASE (Poland) have all contributed to this study. This 
study is the enhanced EU mirror-image of “TTIP and 
the Fifty States” for the US that was published in 2013 
by The British Embassy Washington, Bertelsmann 
Foundation, and Atlantic Council.4
This study is based on a methodological combination 
of the Ecorys Non-Tariff Measure (NTM) database, 
the GTAP database, and the most recent data and 
information available from Eurostat, BEA, and 
Hamilton and Quinlan. From a methodological 
standpoint, this study is unique in that it extends and 
enhances the most reliable methodological approach 
to-date: Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
modelling. This CGE approach is benchmarked in 
a European Parliament study as the best method 
currently available, and is used in various TTIP impact 
studies as well as by the UNCTAD and the ILO who 
use the technique in their institutional FTA analyses 
and trade policy advice to members.5 CGE modelling 
outcomes have been used to measure effects in each 
Member State, using tariff liberalisation and non-tariff 
measures alignment (See Annex II). A complementary 
analysis of important TTIP-related issues including the 
effects of TTIP on the environment, social protection, 
SMEs, food safety, investor protection, the EU Internal 
Market and regulatory cooperation is also included.
Contributions of this study
This study contributes to the TTIP debate in three 
ways:
•	 It	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 current	 economic	
relations between each EU Member State and the US;
•	 It	 examines	 the	 effects	 of	 TTIP	 on	 each	 EU	
Member State;
•	 It	 provides	 expert	 analysis	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 key	
TTIP-related issues.
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Infographic 1: TTIP’s GDP and trade effects for the EU and US
Bilateral US Exports
37%
€ 160 bn
Bilateral EU Exports
28%
€ 187 bn
Economic Gains
(annually)
GDP
(annually)
Increase in total 
US exports
Economic Gains
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(annually)
Increase in total 
EU exports
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The importance of TTIP
A successful TTIP could be a game changer for both 
the transatlantic economy and for the rest of the 
world. First, TTIP is a “new style” comprehensive trade 
agreement that could set the standard for 21st century 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Second, TTIP 
covers the largest and deepest trade and investment 
relationship in the world. Third, TTIP is likely to yield 
significant economic benefits for the EU and the US, 
and possibly also third countries. Last but not least, the 
strategic opportunities presented by TTIP for the EU, 
the US, and the global trading system as a whole are 
potentially far-reaching.
TTIP is a new style, 21st 
century, trade agreement
TTIP aims to remove trade 
barriers across a wide range of 
sectors. An ambitious agreement 
will consist of three main pillars: 
market access (including tariff 
reductions); aligning regulatory 
regimes and non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) without lowering the levels 
of protection; and rules (such as 
customs and trade facilitation, and 
IPRs). Given that tariffs between 
the EU and US are already quite 
low, negotiations will mainly 
focus on reducing the regulatory 
barriers to trade that exist between 
the two countries. This shift from 
tariff-only agreements to include 
regulatory and behind-the-border 
barriers, and rules, is an important 
innovation because there is 
mounting evidence that differences in regulatory 
regimes can significantly increase operating costs 
in different markets, obstructing bilateral trade. 
Narrowing regulatory differences will allow for cost 
reductions for EU and US companies of all sizes, which 
means that an ambitious TTIP will not be subject to the 
same economic dynamics as tariff-only agreements. 
Third country effects from TTIP are likely to be more 
positive than under a tariff-only FTA, because the 
potential for regulatory alignment will positively affect 
the cost structures of third country producers vis-à-vis 
both the EU and US markets. The actual effect in third 
countries will hinge critically on whether the approach 
to regulatory alignment is deliberately discriminatory 
or not.
The “new style” elements of TTIP arise primarily from 
a stronger focus on regulatory alignment and a rules-
based interpretation of international trade. In this area, 
challenges are significant. Analysis of the differences in 
“regulatory philosophies” across the Atlantic between 
the EU and US have highlighted in particular the 
supposed diverging approaches to risk analysis and the 
application of the precautionary principle. It has been 
argued, for example, that “European regulators are more 
inclined to act in the face of insecurity [in their regulatory 
assessments], whereas American regulators would only 
act if there is at least some evidence available”.7 The EU 
and US have sought to overcome these differences in 
regulatory philosophies through various mechanisms 
that promote cooperation and understanding. These 
efforts date back to 1990, at which time the EU 
and the US issued the “Transatlantic Declaration” 
which included an implicit reference to transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation. The declaration promised 
that the EU and US would “inform and consult each 
other on important matters of common interest, both 
political and economic, with a view to bringing [their] 
positions as close as possible, without prejudice to 
their respective independence”.8
the state oF play in ttip
“TTIP is a ‘new style’ comprehensive trade agreement
that could set the standard for 21st century
bilateral and multilateral agreements that
focus on regulatory cooperation.”
The Transatlantic Declaration was subsequently 
followed by a range of complementary regulatory 
initiatives. These include The New Transatlantic 
Agenda (1995), The EU-US Joint Statement on 
Regulatory Cooperation (1997), The Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership and Action Plan (1998), The 
EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement (1998), The 
EU-US Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and 
Transparency (2002), The European Court of Justice 
Judgement (2004), The EU-US Positive Economic 
Agenda (2002), The EU-US Economic Initiative (2005) 
and High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum (2005), 
The Transatlantic Economic Council (2007), The High 
Level Working Group for Jobs and Growth (2011), and 
now TTIP (2013 - present). A more elaborate view on 
the importance of regulatory cooperation in TTIP is 
provided in Insert 3 (p. 78) and in Annex III.
 
TTIP covers the broadest and deepest trade
and investment relationship in the world
The EU-US economic relationship generates over €4.4 
trillion in total commercial sales per year and employs 
some 15 million workers in mutually “onshored” jobs 
on both sides of the Atlantic.9 The total size of these 
combined economies exceeds 40 percent of world GDP 
in value terms. Though down from 2012, total EU-
US trade was around €680 billion in 2013 – over 100 
percent more than at the turn of the century. Whereas 
the US ran a trade deficit with the EU in terms of 
goods trade of €109 billion (of which over 50 percent 
was accounted for by Germany), it ran a services trade 
surplus of €44 billion with the EU. Some 45 out of 50 
states in the US export more to the EU than to China.10
Transatlantic services, also referred to as the “sleeping 
giant” of the transatlantic economy (Hamilton and 
Quinlan), have seen a decline in trade since 2012. 
Nevertheless, the EU still accounted for 38 percent of 
total US services exports and 42 percent of US services 
imports in 2012 – at a value of around €210 billion. 
In the pages that follow, we will present transatlantic 
EU Member State-level trade and services statistics. 
Transatlantic services trade becomes even more 
impressive if we acknowledge that the more important 
link actually runs via foreign direct investments (FDI) 
and foreign affiliate sales. Sales of US foreign affiliates 
in the EU were two-and-a-half times higher than US 
services exports. In fact, the EU has received 56 percent 
of US foreign direct investment (FDI) since the turn of 
the century, with the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland 
together accounting for around 80 percent of this total. 
This amounts to an estimated structural increase in 
the level of GDP of roughly 0.5 percent annually for 
the EU and 0.4 percent for the US. In contrast to other 
trade agreements, TTIP should not have to come at the 
expense of third countries, because aligning regulatory 
regimes has the potential to reduce production costs 
for third country producers. This third-country effect 
is not guaranteed however, and hinges on the approach 
taken to regulatory alignment. If the approach to 
alignment is not discriminatory by construction, third 
country welfare gains could add up to €100 billion 
annually. Exports of the EU Member States to the 
US would increase by 28 percent, equivalent to €187 
billion per year, and wages and job opportunities are 
expected to increase as the potential of larger markets 
is unlocked. Finally, consumer prices are expected 
to decline for many products because EU and US 
companies could reduce production costs when 
unnecessary regulatory overlaps are removed and scale 
economies in production can be further utilised. 
Lowering tariff barriers and aligning regulatory regimes 
would produce two key economic benefits. Firstly, 
businesses of all sizes would face lower production 
costs when regulatory barriers to trade are reduced 
and certification systems and conformity assessments 
are aligned. Since TTIP does not seek to legislate, this 
will not affect EU or US standards unless explicitly 
approved by their respective legislative bodies. This 
process would increase the competitiveness of EU and 
US companies, not only in the transatlantic market but 
also vis-à-vis third countries. Secondly, market access 
for EU firms on the US market and US firms on the 
Because of two-way FDI flows and the resulting local 
presence through foreign affiliates, the EU and the US 
are the two regions that generate by far the most jobs 
in each other’s economies. Detailed statistics on the 
number of jobs created by US affiliates per Member 
State are also provided in the pages that follow.
Economic importance of TTIP for 
the EU and US economies
Many studies have been carried out to look at the 
potential effects of trade agreements in general and 
TTIP in particular.11 Outcomes of these studies vary 
– in part because of assumptions about the level 
of ambition under TTIP and because of differing 
approaches. While respecting all different points of 
view, and while engaging actively in the academic 
methodological debate, we believe that some 
approaches are better suited to analysing the potential 
effects of TTIP than others. As already highlighted, the 
European Parliament has also concluded that general 
equilibrium models are the best tools available at 
present to do such work.12
While this study analyses the potential effects of TTIP 
on individual EU Member States, the expected gains – 
detailed in the CEPR (2013) study – for the EU and the 
US as a whole from an agreement encompassing tariff 
elimination as well as non-tariff measure alignment 
are significant. This study – which makes moderate 
assumptions about the level of ambition under TTIP 
compared to other studies – estimates that TTIP 
could lead to the creation of €119 billion in annual 
welfare gains for the EU and €95 billion for the US. 
EU market would increase, creating new opportunities 
and increased competition. At a time of ongoing 
economic uncertainty in Europe, the prospect of lower 
production costs and increased market access through 
TTIP provides a compelling incentive for EU countries 
to conclude an ambitious agreement with the US.
TTIP: a strategic opportunity 
for the EU and US
Beyond its economic potential, TTIP also represents 
a strategic opportunity for the two negotiating 
parties. As Hamilton and Quinlan (2015) note, “as 
globalization proceeds and emerging markets rise… 
transatlantic markets are shifting from a position of pre-
eminence to one of predominance—still considerable, 
but less overwhelming than in the past”.15 In light of 
this shift and the pressures arising from growth in 
emerging economies, TTIP could benefit the EU and 
US by helping their economies remain competitive 
and innovative. Moreover, TTIP – with its focus 
on regulatory convergence and the advancing of a 
global rules-based trading system, and leaning upon 
the combined weight of the EU and US economies – 
could set the 21st century standard for a rules-based 
international trade arena. This is particularly relevant 
since TTIP is envisaged to be a living agreement: the 
Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) is proposed to be 
established through TTIP to continually identify areas 
for improved transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
consistent with the high levels of protection for 
workers, consumers and the environment enjoyed in 
both the EU and the US. In doing so, they would also 
be able to raise the bar in these areas for the rest of the 
world to follow. 
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Introduction
This section assesses the current status of the 
transatlantic economic relationship and the extensive 
links that exist between EU Member States and the 
US. This will provide the context for an assessment 
of the expected effects of TTIP on EU Member States. 
To calculate our findings, we use a methodology that 
extends and enhances the most reliable approach 
to-date: Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
modelling. Utilising the ambitious scenario from the 
CEPR study – comparable to the limited scenario in 
the Ecorys study – we assume a 100 percent mutual 
reduction in tariff rates between the EU and US, 
a 25 percent reduction (on average) in regulatory 
divergences and behind-the-border non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) (i.e. assuming that over a 10-15 year period the 
US could move one quarter towards the level of the EU 
Internal Market), as well as a 50 percent reduction in 
barriers to procurement. The EU and US have stated 
that they agreed to remove around 97 percent of tariffs, 
with the ambition to remove more. This implies that 
the actual level of ambition in the negotiations is very 
close to what we model in this study. In addition, as 
a deviation from the aforementioned two studies, we 
assume NTMs in agriculture, and have them reduced 
marginally through TTIP – marginally, because of the 
highly sensitive nature of these kinds of differences 
in regulatory systems including, but not limited to, 
touching upon food and consumer safety issues.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transatlantic links between
EU Member States and the US
The EU and the US are closely linked in a variety of 
ways, particularly from an economic standpoint; 
a fact not all Europeans may be fully aware of. 
The US is, after all, the main (extra-EU) export 
destination for EU goods and services, and is by far 
the most important source of and destination for FDI. 
The transatlantic economy as a whole sustains some 15 
million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. The depth of 
job creation from the transatlantic economy is much 
higher between the EU and the US than with any other 
economic partner. However, the scope for further 
integration is still significant. A recent SME survey by 
Ecorys and the European Commission on the value of 
EU SME participation in the transatlantic economy, 
conducted as part of the Trade Sustainability Impact 
Assessment, finds empirical evidence of some 1,200 
barriers for EU SMEs seeking to trade with the US. It 
concludes that EU SMEs could benefit substantially 
from the reduction of regulatory barriers through 
TTIP, opening up the US market to many of these 
small firms.16
Transatlantic goods and services:
an EU Member State perspective
In 2011, the EU as a whole sent 18.5 percent of its goods 
exports and 25.9 percent of its services exports to the 
US. For each Member State, these percentages vary, as 
Map 1 shows for goods exports. Most dependent on 
the US in terms of exports of goods are Ireland (56.7 
percent), the UK (24.5 percent), The Netherlands (22.0 
percent), Austria (19.7 percent), and Denmark (19.4 
percent). Germany (17.1 percent), Italy (16.5 percent), 
and France (16.1 percent) are also heavily integrated 
with the US. Bulgaria and Cyprus have relatively the 
lowest ratio of goods exports to the US.
When we look at services exports from the various EU 
Member States to the US (see Map 2), we see that Ireland 
(43.5 percent), Luxembourg (37.7 percent), the UK (33.5 
percent), Belgium (30.1 percent) and Italy (26.5 percent) 
have the highest services export shares. Bulgaria (6.6 
percent) and Finland (6.0 percent) have the lowest 
shares. We also observe that the depth of services trade 
with the US is greater than that of goods trade relative 
to other countries in the world – testimony to the 
so-called “sleeping giant” that services represent for 
the transatlantic economy. Moreover, variance across 
EU Member States is not as high in services trade as 
it is in goods trade. In services trade, we see a group 
of EU Member States with high relative service trade 
shares (many of them linked to large financial and 
insurance service industries), namely, Ireland, the UK, 
Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium.
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Services exports per EU Member State to the US
(% of total services exports)
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figure 2  
EU Member State inward FDI from the US (% of total inward FDI)
figure 1  
EU Member State outward FDI to the US (% of total outward FDI)
Transatlantic FDI: 
an EU Member State perspective
Foreign direct investment flows and related foreign 
affiliate sales constitute the deepest element of the 
transatlantic economy. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate 
that the EU-US relationship is extraordinarily strong 
in this regard. For Finland, Sweden and Germany, over 
40 percent of total outward FDI goes to the US. For 
Luxembourg and the UK, over 50 percent of FDI comes 
from the US. In 2012, Greece also saw over 50 percent 
of FDI come from US firms investing there. It is clear 
that EU firms in most Member States have relatively 
deep investment ties with the US and US firms with 
EU Member States.
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figure 3
Individual EU Member State shares of jobs created by 
US-controlled firms in the EU
Transatlantic jobs: 
an EU Member State perspective
In 2011, some 6.0 million jobs were created in the 
EU by US-controlled firms. Figure 3 shows how 
these jobs are split across Member States. The UK 
is host to 28.4 percent of the total number of jobs 
generated by US-controlled enterprises in the EU, 
followed by Germany (13.9 percent), France (10.8 
percent), Poland (8.5 percent), Italy (6.7 percent), The 
Netherlands (5.1 percent), and Spain (4.4 percent). 
In Italy and Spain, two periphery Member States who 
currently have relatively high unemployment rates, the 
numbers of jobs created by US-controlled firms matter 
– some 400,000 and 265,000 respectively.
UK
Germany
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The Netherlands
Spain
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Rest EU
28.4 %
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8.5 %
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5.1 %
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Figures 4 and 5 show the jobs generated across the At-
lantic in EU Member States. In Figure 4, we present, 
per Member State, the share of jobs created by US-con-
trolled firm jobs as part of the total number of jobs gen-
erated by foreign-controlled firms (100 percent). From 
Figure 4 we draw two main conclusions. First, the EU’s 
Internal Market is the most powerful foreign affiliate 
job engine: the bulk of foreign jobs in each Member 
State comes from firms from other Member States. 
 
Second, for most EU countries, the number of jobs 
created by US-controlled enterprises is the largest for 
all firms from non-EU countries – in most cases larger 
than the total sum of jobs created by all other countries 
combined. For Ireland, 40.0 percent of all jobs from 
foreign-controlled firms come from US-controlled 
companies, for the UK this number is 31.4 percent, for 
Italy 23.3 percent, France 23.3 percent, The Netherlands 
23.0 percent, Germany 20.9 percent, Belgium 20.4 per-
cent and Greece 18.5 percent. Croatia (2.9 percent) and 
Cyprus (3.9 percent) have the lowest shares.
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Jobs per EU Member State created by US controlled firms 
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Jobs per EU Member State producing exports to US 
(as percentage of total number of jobs, 2011)
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Map 3 shows the number of jobs in each EU Member State that 
is affiliated with exports to the US. If we keep in mind that the 
large majority of jobs is employed for domestic production, these 
job shares are highly significant. A significant 14.8 percent of all 
Irish jobs are employed to produce exports to the US, followed 
by Luxembourg (with 3.5 percent), Malta (2.8 percent) and 
Denmark (2.5 percent).
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TTIP effects on national income (GDP)
Having gone through the Global Financial Crisis and 
subsequently the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis, the 
level of economic activity in the EU is still depressed. 
This can be seen in recent growth estimates, high 
unemployment rates (especially in some Member States) 
and deflationary pressures. TTIP, with an expected 
positive impact on EU national income levels of 0.5 
percent each year, provides an important opportunity to 
boost GDP in this context. 
The expected results in terms of GDP and economic 
growth gains are often misunderstood. TTIP (as with any 
trade agreement) is expected to generate a permanent 
level increase in GDP. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Without TTIP, income (GDP) in the long run is expected 
to slowly increase (on average) as depicted by (dotted) 
line  A - A - A . Without TTIP, we would expect income 
to reach this level by 2030 or beyond. If, however, at 
time t=0 (let’s say 2016 – for argument’s sake only), 
TTIP is signed into effect, economic effects take place. 
First, tariffs are (gradually) removed and some NTMs 
are tackled – having an immediate effect on income 
levels (solid line  A  -  B ). Beyond 2016, a “living TTIP 
agreement” continues to address other NTMs until 25 
percent of them are aligned. This is seen in the gradual 
increase in GDP between t=1 (2016) and t=2 (2030) – 
solid line  B - C . From 2030 onwards – when all TTIP 
effects are assumed to have taken effect – income levels 
have risen by 0.5 percent (blue vertical line at t=2). From 
t=2 (2030) onwards, solid line  C  -  C  increases in parallel 
to  A - A – with the same growth rate, but with higher 
income levels, each year again. This means that when 
the effects of TTIP have been fully implemented, income 
levels in the EU in a post-TTIP world are expected to 
be 0.5 percent higher in the EU (on average) and 0.4 
percent in the US, as compared to a future without 
an agreement. This implies that TTIP can create €119 
billion in extra welfare gains each year for the EU, and an 
extra €95 billion each year for the US.
The slopes of the lines  A - A - A  and  A - A - B - C 
- C indicate the growth rates. From 2016 until 2030, 
the EU and US will experience – temporarily – higher 
growth rates ( A - B  and  B - C ) leading to (permanent) 
higher income levels. After 2030, growth rates are 
again the same as before 2016 (i.e. C - C  is parallel to 
A - A again) but the EU and US have become richer. 
When the overall EU GDP effect of 0.5 percent is 
disaggregated to the level of the individual EU country, 
the Member State expectations for increases in income 
vary, from an expected increase in economic activity 
of +1.6 percent for Lithuania to -0.3 percent for Malta. 
TTIP impact on EU Member States – a macro-economic perspective
The reason for the national income decline for Malta is that it is 
situated along the Chinese-Western European trade route and 
trades more with China and Canada. As such, some small trade 
diversion effects away from China and Canada – who are not in 
TTIP – could explain this decline. The changes in income levels 
are especially encouraging for recent crisis-hit countries including 
Ireland (+1.3 percent), Cyprus (+0.6 percent), Italy (+0.5 percent) and 
Greece (+0.4 percent). Map 4 shows the findings for all EU Member 
States.
When analysing the differences in income level gains between 
the different Member States, it becomes clear that the Member 
State economies that benefit the most from an ambitious TTIP 
agreement are those that are most integrated economically 
with the US. We find that the deeper the economic relationship 
between a Member State and the US, the higher the expected 
positive income level effects. This implies that EU governments 
can positively affect the degree to which TTIP will impact on them 
by enhancing the depth of their country’s level of integration 
with the US.
map 4
Estimated income level increases in EU Member States following TTIP
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Estimated export increases in EU Member States from TTIP
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TTIP effects on exports
Tariff reductions and alignment of regulatory regimes 
in TTIP lower barriers to trade. As such it should not 
come as a surprise that an ambitious TTIP would 
increase exports for all EU countries. Unlike the 
relatively small differences in income level effects 
between the Member States, export effects from TTIP 
vary a lot from country to country. Nevertheless, one 
constant is that for all Member States, exports are 
expected to increase. The range of estimated export 
increases ranges from Slovakia’s +116 percent and 
Austria’s +64 percent, to Croatia’s +9 percent and 
Cyprus’ +5 percent. The results for all Member States 
are presented in Map 5. 
Map 5 also unveils a pattern in the export effects of 
TTIP when comparing across Member States. EU 
Member States trade the most with other EU countries 
– a consequence of the EU Internal Market, relatively 
the most integrated free trade area in the world. What 
drives the results presented in Map 5 is that those 
Member States that are most integrated horizontally 
in global value chains with the US – i.e. those that 
have the deepest horizontal FDI relationship – see 
the largest increases in exports. This is especially true 
for EU countries that have sizeable trade flows in the 
largest tradable goods sectors, such as motor vehicles 
and chemicals. This is why we see the aforementioned 
export increases for Slovakia and Austria, and +48 
percent for Sweden, +38 percent for Germany, +36 
percent for Hungary, +35 percent for Bulgaria, +27 
percent for Belgium, +26 percent for Poland, and +23 
percent for France.
Croatia
Cyprus
9%
5%
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TTIP effects on wages
EU citizens understandably want to know what the 
real consequences of TTIP will be for them once it 
has taken effect. The model we have used allows us 
to analyse wage effects at the aggregate economy 
level, and effects on employment at the sectoral level. 
We have made this model choice for three reasons. 
First, the wage-version of the CGE model that we use 
assumes that economies are at full employment. This 
means that we do not attribute to TTIP any massive 
positive employment effects from the current high 
unemployment rates. As such, this type of CGE model 
leads to a more conservative estimate of the potential 
impact of TTIP. Second, if EU citizens want to 
understand what the effects of TTIP could be for them, 
the way TTIP affects their wages is one of the most 
direct ways to show this. Third, in looking at the TTIP 
effect on wages, we can look at how TTIP affects wage 
inequality (i.e. differences in wage increases between 
low- and high-skilled workers in each Member State) – 
something we could not do otherwise. 
CEPR (2013) has shown that on average wages in the EU 
for low-skilled workers will go up by 0.51 percent and 
wages for high-skilled workers by 0.50 percent. This 
means that wage inequality in the EU – on average – 
is not expected to increase when comparing wages of 
high- and low-skilled workers – as Figure 6 also shows. 
Across different EU Member States, however, there are 
divergences in wage effects. Irish, Lithuanian, Belgian 
and Austrian citizens are expected to experience the 
highest relative wage increases. For example, for high-
skilled Irish citizens, TTIP is equivalent to a 1.4 percent 
salary raise, while for low-skilled Irish citizens this 
number is 1.5 percent. For Romania, Czech Republic 
and Estonia, we find that low-skilled workers’ wages 
are expected to decrease marginally.
 
TTIP effects on consumer prices
Consumers are rightfully concerned with the level of 
prices for the products they buy – from cars and train 
tickets to prices for their groceries. An ambitious TTIP 
agreement that focuses on regulatory alignment and 
coherence in areas of equivalent standards will lead to 
lower costs for EU and US producers, since unnecessary 
overlaps in regulatory regimes are reduced. If 
companies pass these costs on to consumers – which 
they do if consumers are sensitive to the prices for 
these goods and services – the consequences of TTIP 
can be a mix of lower prices for consumers and more 
profit and turnover for companies.
Map 6 on the next page shows the expected average 
consumer price effect of TTIP at EU Member State 
level. We see that Lithuania, with a -0.9 percent 
decrease, is expected to see the largest drop in 
consumer prices. This is due mainly to a drop in prices 
for motor vehicles (-3.8 percent), food products (-1.3 
percent) and business services (-0.7 percent). A total of 
18 out of 28 EU Member States will experience a drop 
in consumer prices, including in Poland (-0.3 percent), 
Malta (-0.2 percent), Latvia (-0.2 percent), Luxembourg 
(-0.2 percent), and Finland (-0.2 percent). 
 
For the remaining Member States, consumer price 
increases are small, with only Ireland (+0.1 percent), 
Austria (+0.2 percent) and Bulgaria (+0.2 percent) 
witnessing price increases of 0.1 percent or more. In 
Bulgaria and Austria, the price increases derive from 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries price increases (+1.4 
percent and 0.4 percent respectively), and processed 
foods (+0.5 percent and 0.4 percent respectively). 
Overall, consumers are expected to pay 0.1 percent 
less for their products following the implementation 
of TTIP.
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Estimated wage increases in EU Member States from TTIP
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Estimated consumer price effects in EU Member States following TTIP
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summary
TTIP is expected to yield positive effects on GDP and probably on jobs. This 
is a welcome effect, but it is not correct to portray TTIP as just a “growth 
and jobs machine”. TTIP is expected to have slightly positive effects for 
third countries, but this is because the negative effect of trade diversion 
due to tariff elimination is more than compensated by positive spill-over 
effects (although how sizeable the latter are exactly is unknown). Reducing 
the costs of Technical Barriers to Trade drives most of the economic gains, 
so the regulatory part of TTIP is critical. Export growth is strong both ways, 
which leads to gains from scale economies and specialisation. When we 
compare the different studies carried out on TTIP, we conclude that several 
studies are outliers and not very plausible. The GED Bertelsmann study is too 
optimistic because it assumes that the depth of the economic relationship 
in the Transatlantic Economy post-TTIP will be as deep as the EU Internal 
Market. That is highly unlikely. A very sombre macro study by Capaldo is 
simply not credible, methodologically flawed and misleading: proven trade 
effects are assumed not to take place, assumptions assume away likely 
effects, and the drivers of the results have nothing to do with TTIP per sé. The 
studies done by CEPR, Ecorys and CEPII use the most appropriate method 
and yield the most plausible results for potential TTIP effects. In-depth 
papers addressing “worrisome” aspects of TTIP are increasingly available 
on for example, consumer protection levels and public services. Documents 
available suggest that “fears” in these areas have been overplayed.
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an overview and Comparison 
oF ttip studies
By Prof. dr. Jacques Pelkmans1
1 Prof. Dr. Jacques Pelkmans is Professor of Economics at the College of Europe and 
Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Studies (CEPS).
“TTIP is expected to yield positive effects on GDP and
probably on jobs. This is a welcome effect, but it is not
correct to portray TTIP as just a growth and jobs machine.”
The innovative approaches that form the core of TTIP 
are fascinating, in part because of their extraordinarily 
complex and wide ranging nature. For this reason, any 
position on economic effects has to be formulated 
with care and some reticence. Studying the economic 
effects of regulatory change of the instruments, 
methods of enforcement or redundant “red tape” (not 
the regulatory objectives, as they are not at issue) is 
extremely demanding for economic methodologies 
and data. Here are a few considerations which need to 
be taken into account if one wishes to understand the 
TTIP economic debate: 
a. Empirical economic analysis of trade 
liberalisation, multilaterally or bilaterally, rarely 
yields more than modest effects on GDP. To expect 
high percentage changes of GDP for the EU and the 
US from TTIP is unrealistic, the more so as both the 
US and the EU are already quite open economies. 
b. This has direct consequences for how one “reads” 
TTIP in economic policy terms. Although TTIP is likely 
to have (net) positive effects on the economies of the 
US and the EU in terms of GDP, to present TTIP as 
a “growth and jobs machine” is not appropriate. This 
is for two reasons. First, economists think in terms 
of economic policy alternatives to generate economic 
growth, and there is little doubt that upskilling of 
parts of the labour force, certain structural reforms 
(including deleveraging), reversing the decline of 
infrastructural investments in Europe or pursuing the 
further deepening of the EU internal services market 
would all be candidates for higher growth effects over 
the medium term than TTIP. This point should not 
be misinterpreted, however: TTIP can generate an 
addition of the EU and US earning capacity including 
in times of zero or slow growth. This of course would 
be welcome. Second, with respect to jobs, TTIP is a 
medium to long run policy initiative and therefore 
the effects on jobs, especially regionally and in some 
sectors, have to be assessed against a “natural degree” 
of job change that takes place every day. If effects 
on exports are positive, as we expect, then net job 
creation, too, should be expected overall. This is not to 
say that localised or sectoral job effects will not occur, 
and indeed some might even be negative, but these are 
likely to be minimal and spread out over time. Other 
factors driving job change will have a much more 
significant impact on labour mobility than any TTIP 
effect. The Commission notes that the average job 
change in the EU is approximately 37 per 1000 citizens 
per year, whereas the CEPR study 
on TTIP can be expected to yield 
7 job changes per 1000 citizens 
over a ten year period (or a mere 
2 percent of the former). Such a 
marginal effect on labour mobility 
will be easily absorbed in the labour 
market and would become invisible 
once one also takes technical and 
structural efficiency changes over a 
(say) 10 year period into account.17 
c.      Another debate that has emerged 
focuses on the likely effects of TTIP 
on third countries; unsurprising 
given that a transatlantic free trade 
agreement between two economic 
giants is not likely to be irrelevant 
for third countries. It is therefore 
important that TTIP is, or must 
become, “open”. Traditionally, in economics, the Third 
country effects in economics are traditionally referred 
to as “trade diversion” effects, having a negative effect on 
economic welfare. Several studies have included trade 
diversion effects and some, mostly moderate, negative 
effects in third countries have been found. If and in so 
far as TTIP will be successful in addressing regulatory 
barriers (mainly, TBTs), however, such trade diversion 
may well be compensated by so-called “cross-border 
spill-overs”. Direct spill-overs emerge from regulatory 
harmonisation or facilitation under Most Favoured 
Nation, and thereby would also benefit third countries 
without any further action. For instance, if a Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (MRA) is agreed in TTIP that 
is comparable to the one in CETA (Chapter 27), and 
also excludes origin rules, third countries may benefit 
from using designated conformity assessment bodies 
(CABs) in one TTIP partner only, for exports to both. 
The reduced costs for them contribute to the positive 
spill-over effects. Indirect spill-overs do require action, 
namely, domestic alignment in (selected) regulatory 
domains that benefit from the (more) common rules or 
standards in TTIP. Direct and indirect spill-overs are 
bound to occur if a comprehensive TTIP is concluded 
that benefits the negotiating partners, compensating 
for the negative effect of trade diversion. 
Section 1. The economic effects of TTIP from a policy perspective
The empirical findings of major studies differ in minor 
and major aspects. Therefore, the CEPR study of 2013 
will serve as the benchmark. The results of the CEPR 
study will then be compared with three alternative 
studies: the CEPII study by Fontagné et al.18, the GED 
Bertelsmann study by Felbermayr et al.19 and the 
Capaldo study20. As an additional measure, the author 
will then briefly refer to other empirical work. 
The CEPR Study (Francois et al., 2013)
Apart from tariff reductions (mainly to zero), the 
economic gains are driven by the estimates of TBT 
costs for market access to the partner, and their 
expected reductions due to TTIP. This estimation of 
TBT costs has proven exceptionally difficult. Ecorys 
has provided the basis upon which other research is 
subsequently based.21 According to the CEPR study, 
an ambitious TTIP agreement (with 25 percent of the 
TBT costs removed) will increase EU GDP by nearly 0.5 
percent per year and US GDP by 0.4 percent. Bilateral 
EU exports to the US would go up by 28 percent and 
overall EU exports would increase almost 6 percent 
(see infographic 1). The main driver of these gains is 
the reduction in TBTs. CEPR assume considerable 
spill-overs (both direct and indirect), which directly 
impact on the result. For example, exports to the rest 
of the world also increase for both countries and this 
is a secondary consequence of positive spill-overs. 
There is likely to be some job creation of probably 
several hundred thousand jobs or more, however, 
this is not assessed in the CEPR study (the European 
Commission, meanwhile, projects several millions of 
US-export related jobs).22 Wages are expected to rise 
about 0.5 percent. For specific sectors, EU bilateral 
exports rise strongly (in percentage terms) in motor 
vehicles (+149 percent), metal products (including 
pressure vessels, +68 percent), processed foods (+45 
percent), and electrical machinery and chemicals (each 
some +35 percent). But export growth is typically two-
way: US exports in motor vehicles rise some 347 percent 
(from a lower base), followed by metal products (+88 
percent), processed foods (+75 percent), and electrical 
machinery (+44 percent). However, when it comes to 
sectoral output changes, the one sector not benefitting 
is electrical machinery: its output declines both in 
the US and in the EU. This is odd given that the EU 
electrical machinery sector is a highly competitive 
sector. On the whole, one observes that TTIP will have 
a net positive effect at the sectoral level, especially 
for certain sectors, and that this permeates through 
the economy as well as supporting services trade. 
The CEPII study (Fontagné et al., 2013)
Contrasting the CEPR study with the CEPII study 
is interesting because the latter is more modest in 
cutting TBT costs, but also finds much higher TBT 
costs estimates. Two opposite effects may play a role: 
with much lower spill-overs and less TTIP ambition, 
results are likely to be more modest, but with much 
higher TBT costs, their lowering is bound to be 
relatively more effective. The conspicuous difference 
is seen in estimates for the agriculture sector: bilateral 
exports of both the EU and US are in the range of 140 
to 160 percent for the industry in the CEPII analysis, 
compared to a much more modest 15 to 20 percent 
range in the CEPR study. 
Section 2. The economic effects 
of TTIP in the literature
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The Capaldo study (2014)
A study by Capaldo fi nds only negative results, 
whether for GDP, employment or income distribution, 
etc.23 However, this study suff ers from a profound 
credibility problem, both for methodological reasons, 
assumptions, and the insertion of two policy responses 
which have nothing to do with TTIP. Trade eff ects 
that we know occur in practice (e.g. gains from scale 
economies) are assumed away upfront, trade costs 
are not measured and what ought to be measured, is 
“borrowed” from the CEPR study (which is a typical 
multi-sectoral multi-countries CGE model designed 
for assessing trade eff ects). What is said to be studied 
in macro-economic terms is infl uenced by two ad-hoc 
assumptions about policy that are unrelated to TTIP.
A strong rebuff  of the Capaldo study was given by ECIPE 
in a detailed assessment of its methodology.24 Leading 
economist Dani Rodrik subsequently published a blog 
post on May 4, 2015 maintaining that the methodology 
utilised by Capaldo in his study was unsuitable for 
assessing expected long-run TTIP eff ects.25 The fact 
that Capaldo works for the ILO has meant that his 
study is mistakenly taken for an offi  cial ILO-study. In 
fact, the ILO has distanced itself from authoring this 
study and uses in its own economic assessments also 
the same CGE model approach used by CEPR, CEPII 
and Ecorys. 
Other studies
There are a wealth of diff erent studies that explore 
the various alleged “worrying” aspects of TTIP. 
Thorough reviews of expected eff ects on consumer 
protection levels and objectives are provided by Diels 
and Thorun26  and by Woolcock, Holzer and Kusmu.27 
Both conclude that such fears of a negative impact 
from TTIP on consumer protections are unfounded. 
Another debate has emerged with respect to “public 
services”. The intention of the EU negotiators has been 
consistently clear: to “safeguard EU governments’ right 
to run public services as they wish” (The European 
Commission published this in a TTIP factsheet28). New 
TTIP texts should strike a balance between the requisite 
level of legal clarity and the necessary legal fl exibility. 
Krajewski and Kynast29 off er remedies in textual 
proposals that would provide suffi  cient protection 
where needed. According to Heydon and Woolcock30, 
there are indications that US negotiators would fi nd a 
general exclusion of public services acceptable.
The GED Bertelsmann study (Felbermayr et al., 2013)
Felbermayr, Heid and Lehwald reach very diff erent 
conclusions. The authors fi nd a 5 percent increase 
in EU GDP and no less than a 13 percent increase in 
US GDP. It would seem as if this study is confi rming 
the concept of TTIP as a “growth and jobs machine”. 
Unfortunately, these super-gains are not plausible. The 
13 percent fi gure is 25 times the increase found by the 
other two leading studies. For the EU, the 5 percent 
increase in GDP is about ten times what the CEPR 
study fi nds. In addition, trade diversion is assumed 
to be very high. For Canada, the negative impact on 
GDP would be incredibly high (- 9 percent), while a 
signifi cant negative eff ect on the EU Internal Market 
is also predicted. The main reason for these results is 
that the authors (erroneously) assume a transatlantic 
market as if it were similar to the EU Internal Market 
and NAFTA. This is not the case.
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Capaldo
2014
Results:
- Moderately negative
- Minus 0.5% GDP
- 600.000 job losses
Results:
- Moderately positive 
- EU GDP +0.7% 
(+€122bn); US +0.3% 
(+€41bn)
- Wages up by 0.8% 
in EU; 0.4% in US
- Bilateral exports up 
– EU exports up by 
2.1%; US by 6.1%
Ecorys
2009
Results:
- Moderately positive
- EU GDP +0.5%
(€ 120 bn); US +0.4% 
(€ 95 bn)
- Wages up by 0.5% in 
EU; 0.4% in US
- EU exports to US up 
by 28% (agri: +15-20%)
- For US side: jobs 
(more +600.000)
CEPR
2013
Results:
- Moderately positive
- EU GDP +0.3%
($98bn); US +0.3% 
($64bn)
- Bilateral trade up by 
50%; agri trade: up by 
150%
CEPII
2013
Results:
- Very positive
- EU GDP +5%;
US +13%
- 1.000.000 jobs US / 
1.300.000 jobs EU
- Very high level of 
trade diversion
GED
Bertelsmann
2013
Infographic 2: Economic studies on TTIP
European Parliament study comparison of methods (CEPS & CPB)
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Austria and the US – The current situation
Austria is predominantly a services economy. Just 
under 100.000 Austrian jobs come from US controlled 
fi rms active in Austria. The US is the main (extra-EU) 
goods export destination (20 percent of goods exports)
and services export destination (20 percent of services 
exports) for Austria. The main export sectors for Austria 
to the US are machinery, motor vehicles, chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, and insurance services.
For Austria, by reducing tariff  and non-tariff  
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The motor vehicles, construction, water 
transport, insurance and processed foods 
sectors are expected to grow most, but 
electrical machinery and metal produc-
tion may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of car parts and 
components by firms in Austria (+19.9 
percent) and exports in this sector are ex-
pected to increase by €2.5 bn;
•	 For Austrians the price for an average car 
could go down by 1.6 percent because of 
TTIP.
Austria and TTIP – Expected effects
Austria has a strong economic relationship with the 
US, and TTIP would contribute to additional income, 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers, 
and more investments.
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.9 per-
cent. Exports to the US are expected to increase by 64 
percent. 
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Changes in Belgian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Belgium
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Belgian economy (%)
Belgium and the US – The current situation
Belgium is predominantly a services economy, but 
it also has a significant manufacturing base. Around 
162.000 Belgian jobs come from US controlled firms 
active in Belgium. The US is the main (extra-EU) goods 
export destination (16 percent of goods exports) and 
 
services export destination (30 percent of services 
exports) for Belgium. The main export sectors for 
Belgium to the US are chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
manufactures, machinery, and business and ICT services.
For Belgium, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, chemicals, manufactures, 
construction and water transport sectors 
are expected to grow most, but electrical 
machinery may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of machinery (+2.2 
percent) in Belgium. Belgian exports in 
the automotive sector (+€2.0 bn) and 
chemicals (+€1.9 bn) could increase signif-
icantly also;
•	 For Belgians, prices for especially cars and 
car parts (-1.1 percent) and chemical prod-
ucts (-1.1 percent) are expected to go down 
because of TTIP.
Belgium and TTIP – Expected effects
Belgium has a strong economic relationship with the 
US, and TTIP would contribute to significant additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, more investments, and lower consumer prices. 
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 1.1 
percent. Exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 27 percent and consumer prices will go down 
marginally by 0.1 percent.
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31
13.15%
Changes in Bulgarian
production for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Bulgaria
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Bulgarian economy (%)
Bulgaria and the US – The current situation
Bulgaria is predominantly a services economy. Around 
24.000 Bulgarian jobs come from US controlled firms 
active in Bulgaria. The US is the 4th most important 
(extra-EU) goods export destination (6 percent of goods 
exports) and also the 4th most important (extra-EU) 
 
 
services export destination (7 percent of services 
exports, after – for example – Russia with 13 percent) 
for Bulgaria. The main export sectors for Bulgaria to 
the US are machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
business and ICT services and clothing.
For Bulgaria, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The water transport, machinery, personal 
services and manufactures sectors are ex-
pected to grow most, but the motor vehi-
cles sector may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of water transport 
services (+0.9 percent) and machinery 
(+0.7 percent). Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries are poised to see the largest ex-
port increase (of +€85 m) and wage in-
creases (+0.8 percent). For Bulgarians, the 
price for an average car could go down by 
1.2 percent because of TTIP.
Bulgaria and TTIP – Expected effects
Bulgaria does not have a very strong economic 
relationship with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would 
contribute to additional income, higher wages for both 
low- and high-skilled workers, and more investments.
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, and exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 35 percent.
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Changes in Croatian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Croatia
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Croatian economy (%)
Croatia and the US – The current situation
Croatia is predominantly a services economy, but the 
Croatian agricultural and food and manufacturing 
sectors are also important. Around 5.000 Croatian jobs 
come from US controlled firms active in Croatia. The US 
is the 2nd largest (extra-EU) goods export destination 
(12 percent of goods exports) and main (extra-EU) services 
export destination (15 percent of services exports) for 
Croatia. The main export sectors for Croatia to the US 
are chemicals and pharmaceuticals, other transport 
services, machinery, and business and ICT services.
For Croatia, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, water transport, air trans-
port, financial services and personal ser-
vices (e.g. tourism) sectors are expected to 
grow most, but electrical machinery and 
motor vehicles are poised for a decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of water and air transport 
services. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
account for the largest export increase 
(+€56 m);
•	 For Croatians prices are expected to de-
crease most for motor vehicles (-0.7 per-
cent), and chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(-0.3 percent).
Croatia and TTIP – Expected effects
Croatia does not have a very strong economic 
relationship with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would 
contribute to additional income, higher wages for both 
low- and high-skilled workers, and more investments.
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.2 percent 
and exports to the US are expected to increase by 9 
percent, while consumer prices will remain the same.
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summary
What are the expected potential effects of TTIP for the EU Internal Market? 
This is an important question, given that the EU Internal Market forms the 
cornerstone of the EU in both concept and practice. TTIP is unlikely to have 
a negative effect on the EU Internal Market for two key reasons. First, most 
EU industrial tariffs with the US are already low. This means that – although 
TTIP will lead to some trade diverting away from the EU Internal Market to 
the transatlantic market (i.e. the classic trade diversion argument) – this 
effect will be minimal. The risk is somewhat higher in agriculture (where 
tariff peaks for sensitive products currently remain) but nevertheless still 
manageable. Second, when we consider the effects of enhanced regulatory 
cooperation and a reduction in barriers to trade in services through TTIP, 
limited effects should also be expected. The EU Internal Market is still 
fragmented, in particular in key TTIP areas such as goods, services, market 
regulation, and public procurement. If the EU Internal Market is itself 
fragmented, it means that there is only a modest preference for intra-EU 
trade in goods and services compared to trade with third countries (i.e. the 
US). TTIP therefore cannot erode preferences that exist only moderately. 
In fact, TTIP could actually contribute to liberalising the EU Internal Market 
as well as the transatlantic market to some degree. Such an outcome might 
have the significant positive knock-on effect of pushing the EU towards 
greater integration.
insert 2:
ttip and the eu internal market
By Prof. dr. Patrick Messerlin2
2 Prof. Dr. Patrick Messerlin is professor of economics (emeritus) at Sciences Po, Paris.
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“TTIP could actually contribute to liberalising the EU Internal 
Market as well as the transatlantic market to some degree. 
Such an outcome might have the significant positive knock-
on effect of pushing the EU towards greater integration.”
Section 1. The disappointing 
results of the EU Internal Market 
While the EU Internal Market program for goods has 
led to substantial progress in goods-related trade (built 
around Cassis de Dijon and related principles), for two 
key areas at the core of TTIP negotiations: services and 
public procurement; the EU Internal Markets remain 
very fragmented to this day. In addition, levels of 
enforcement of the regulatory systems differ across EU 
Member States.
Services
Regarding services, we can measure the degree to 
which competition and market access are distorted 
by regulatory barriers – for example through legal 
and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, 
state control of business enterprises, and protected 
professions. The OECD Product-Market Regulation 
Indicators strongly suggest that despite massive 
integration efforts (such as the more than 600+ EU 
Internal Market laws or “Directives”) huge differences 
between EU Member State regulatory barriers remain.31 
This implies that the degree to which trade with third 
countries (i.e. the US) is competing with the EU Internal 
Market is actually much smaller than often thought. 
Enforcement
Enforcement is essential in regulatory matters. In 
particular, “harmonising” regulations will have little 
impact (if any) if enforcement procedures are not har-
monised at the same time. So, do we observe the same 
“regulatory enforcement quality” across EU Member 
States? Table 1 is a preliminary attempt to determine 
this. The World Bank’s ranking of countries for “ease 
of doing business” is used as an estimate. The EU 
Member States are grouped together by the year in 
which they acceded into the EU. The Table also com-
pares some countries with which the EU negotiates 
trade agreements. In 2012, the US was ranked fourth.
EU Member States by group
Table 1.  Ranks for “Ease of doing business”
(selected countries, 2012)
Rank
7
19
24
41
50
58
66
Partner
Singapore
US
Korea
Canada
Malaysia
Japan
Chinese Taipei
China
Argentina
Russia
Brazil
India
Rank
1
4
8
13
18
20
25
91
113
120
126
132
EU partners
EU Member State
EU-1973
EU-1995
EU-2004B
EU-1958
EU-2004A
EU-1980s
EU-2007
Notes: EU-1973: UK, Denmark, Ireland. EU-1995: Austria, 
Finland, Sweden. EU 2004b: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. EU 
1958: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands. EU 2004a: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. EU-1980s: Greece, Portugal, Spain. 
EU 2007: Bulgaria, Romania. Source: Doing Business, World 
Bank.
Government procurement
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) allows us to 
calculate the importance of foreign goods and services 
in domestic government procurement compared to the 
total demand in government procurement – the higher 
the share of foreign goods and services, the more 
open the public procurement market.32 A comparison 
of the level of openness among EU Member States 
(i.e. intra-EU openness) with 
the level of openness towards 
third countries (i.e. extra-EU 
openness) shows that the intra-
EU and extra-EU degrees of 
openness to foreign goods and 
service providers are roughly 
the same until the late 2000s. 
Subsequently, they find that 
for those countries extra-EU 
openness has increased further, 
including when compared to 
intra-EU openness. This implies 
that if TTIP were to open 
further the EU and US public 
procurement markets, the 
negative impact for the intra-
EU procurement market would 
be modest.
Table 1 shows that Member States that have recently 
joined the EU (Baltic countries, EU 2004b) are easier 
to do business with than the founding Member States 
(EU-1958). In short, the EU Member State ranking 
shows no correlation with how long an EU Member 
State has been a member of the EU. This implies that 
even a “deep” regional trade agreement such as the 
EU’s Internal Market has little impact on the regulato-
ry quality of its members. In other words, regulatory 
quality is above all a domestic issue. A vitally impor-
tant conclusion drawn from this is therefore that 
countries or sub-federal states – whether EU Member 
States or US States – with better regulatory quality 
should gain much more from TTIP than countries or 
sub-federal states with lower regulatory quality.
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Regulatory competition and innovation
Mutual equivalence requires joint evaluation of what 
is declared equivalent. This is a critical element, in 
particular because it allows for trust-building between 
the two parties. A good illustration of this was the 
recent joint evaluation exercise on seat belts in the 
automotive industry.36 In addition – with respect to 
the rest of the world – mutual equivalence substitutes 
a “norm attracting” approach to the “norm-setting” 
approach advocated by some. This is because mutual 
equivalence induces the regulator of a country to be 
innovative by “producing” the best norms possible 
while continuing to be trusted by its partner’s 
regulators (in order to still pass the test of the joint 
evaluation). The more innovative a regulator is, the 
more attractive the regulations it designs are not only 
for its own domestic firms, but also for those of its trade 
agreement partner and for the rest of the world. In 
other words, a mutual equivalence approach has built-
in motives for regulators to include a “multilateral” 
dimension from the start when they plan to reform 
domestic regulations. 
That said, would an “equivalence approach” erode the 
EU Internal Market in relation to the transatlantic 
one? This again is highly doubtful, if only because TTIP 
is very unlikely to cover as many norms and services 
sectors as in the EU Internal Market.
Second, if we treat the US in a similar disaggregated 
way, we would probably get the same possibility of 
some limited preference erosion: some US States 
should be expected to increase their trade with some 
Member States and reduce their trade with other US 
States. Third, NTMs raise a separate issue. In services 
the risk of pressure on the EU Internal Market is limited 
because the intra-EU preferences are already low – a 
consequence of the rather fragmented EU Internal 
Market. In that case, an FTA would not only provide 
the opportunity to reduce services barriers with the 
trade partner, but also between the EU Member States.
Negotiation techniques – equivalence needed
Our analysis indicates that TTIP is not likely to have a 
negative impact on the EU Internal Market. However, 
this is not the whole story. The impact of TTIP on 
the Internal Market will also depend critically on the 
negotiating techniques used. If these techniques are 
based only on harmonisation (or its weaker form, 
mutual recognition), the TTIP chapters on regulations 
(norms in goods, services markets) are bound to deliver 
only benefits “at the margin”. TTIP will only be truly 
significant if a new approach – “equivalence” – is used.
Deeper integration
The motor vehicles sector serves as a good example. 
The EU’s five-decade-old harmonisation approach 
in the motor vehicles sector recently ran into a 
remarkable obstacle: automotive company Daimler 
refused to enforce a new, less polluting harmonised 
norm for its car coolant because it found that this new 
coolant was more flammable. This example illustrates 
the increasing difficulty in defining a norm that is 
better than any alternative from all the conceivable 
criteria (pollution vs. safety in the Daimler case). The 
“harmonisation-approach” runs into difficulties when 
conflicting goals need to be met.35
In sharp contrast, under a new approach called 
“mutual equivalence”, two countries decide, after a 
joint evaluation by their relevant regulatory bodies 
that these norms or regulations are “different but 
equivalent”. In such cases, producers are allowed to 
produce the good or service under the regulations of 
their own country and sell it to the consumers of the 
other country without any other formality. Mutual 
equivalence is emerging as the best way to truly realise 
a “deeper” integration of the two economies since it 
does not generate the costs that harmonisation and 
harmonised enforcement inevitably impose. 
Section 2.  The impact on the EU 
Internal Market to be expected
The above conclusion is critically important in 
assessing two key questions related to TTIP’s impact 
on the Internal Market. 
Most of the existing studies on TTIP’s impact 
look at the EU as a single entity, without making 
any distinction among Member States. The GED-
Bertelsmann study which finds very strong potential 
effects of TTIP as explained in Insert 1, and this 
WTI study are the two main exceptions.33 The GED-
Bertelsmann study suggests that each Member State 
will substantially increase trade with the US, and 
decrease trade with other EU Members. In short, TTIP 
is seen as eroding intra-European trade and replacing 
it with transatlantic trade. The concept of erosion of 
preferences is a well-established result of international 
trade theory, and as such to some degree this effect 
should be expected to take place. 
However, the magnitude of this effect is overestimated 
by the GED-Bertelsmann study for three reasons.34 
First, most EU industrial tariffs on imports are already 
low. This means that the degree to which these tariffs 
give preference to intra-EU trade is very limited. The 
more substantial preference erosion to be expected 
in agricultural products (especially for those with 
high tariff peaks), could raise problems that should 
be addressed by appropriate measures, such as longer 
transition periods or better income-support in the EU. 
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Changes in Cypriot production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Cyprus
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Cypriot economy (%)
Cyprus and the US – The current situation
Cyprus is predominantly a services economy, with 
significant value added in the manufacturing sector. 
Just under 1.000 jobs come from US controlled firms 
active in Cyprus. Cyprus is only integrated with the 
US to a limited extent. The US is not in the top-5 of 
 
the main goods export destinations, but is the 2nd most 
important services export destination (11 percent of 
services exports). The main export sectors for Cyprus 
to the US are business and ICT services, insurance 
services, and financial services.
For Cyprus, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The manufactures, insurance services, 
machinery and construction sectors are 
expected to grow most, but electrical ma-
chinery may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of manufactures and insur-
ance services. These two sectors are both 
poised for an export increase of €3 m;
•	 For Cypriots, prices for motor vehicles 
(-1.2 percent) and transport equipment 
(-0.6 percent) could decrease because of 
TTIP.
Cyprus and TTIP – Expected effects
Cyprus does not have a very strong economic 
relationship with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would 
contribute to additional income, higher wages for both 
low- and high-skilled workers, and more investments.
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.6 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
5 percent and consumer prices will remain the same.
Total (extra-EU) Cypriot goods exports (%)
Total (extra-EU) Cypriot services exports (%) Investments between Cyprus and the US 
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Changes in Czech production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Czech Republic
due to TTIP (%)
Czech Republic and the US – The current situation
Czech Republic is predominantly a services economy. 
Almost 150.000 Czech jobs come from US controlled 
fi rms active in the Czech Republic. The US is the 2nd 
most important (extra-EU) goods export destination 
(13 percent of goods exports) and most important 
(extra-EU) services export destination (17 percent of 
services exports) for the Czech Republic. US fi rms have 
consistently invested in the Czech Republic. The main 
export sectors for the Czech Republic to the US are 
machinery and chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
For the Czech Republic, by reducing tariff  and 
non-tariff  measures in TTIP, without lowering 
standards:
•	 The machinery, personal services, water 
and air transport and manufactures sec-
tors are expected to grow most, but electri-
cal machinery may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of machinery products by 
fi rms in the Czech Republic (+2.1 percent) 
and exports in motor vehicles (+€241 m);
•	 Sector specifi c price reductions are ex-
pected to come from motor vehicles (-0.9 
percent), transport equipment (-0.6 per-
cent), and chemicals (-0.4 percent).
The Czech Republic has a strong economic relationship 
with the US, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for high-skilled workers and 
lower prices for consumers.
Czech Republic and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.1 percent, 
exports to the US are expected to increase by 23 percent 
and consumer prices will go down marginally by 0.1 
percent. Investments are expected to decline.
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Changes in Danish production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Denmark
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Danish economy (%)
Denmark and the US – The current situation
Denmark is predominantly a services economy but 
with relatively the largest value added of all EU 
Member States in manufacturing. Around 75.000 
Danish jobs come from US controlled fi rms active in 
Denmark. The US is the main (extra-EU) goods export 
destination (19 percent of goods exports) and services 
export destination (17 percent of services exports) for 
Denmark. The main export sectors for Denmark to the 
US are chemicals and pharmaceuticals, machinery, and 
air transport services.
For Denmark, by reducing tariff  and non-tariff  
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wa-
ter transport, and machinery sectors are 
expected to grow most, but electrical ma-
chinery and motor vehicles may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a signifi cant increase 
in production of chemicals and pharma-
ceuticals and water transport by fi rms in 
Denmark (both +0.9 percent), and the 
value of chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
exports could go up by €801 million;
•	 For the Danes, prices for cars (-1.0 per-
cent) and transport equipment (-0.8 per-
cent) are expected to decline because of 
TTIP.
Denmark has a strong economic relationship with the 
US, and TTIP would contribute to additional income, 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers, 
and more investments, with no eff ect on prices.
Denmark and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 13 percent while consumer prices will remain the 
same.
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Changes in Estonian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Estonia
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Estonian economy (%)
Estonia and the US – The current situation
Estonia is predominantly a services economy, but 
with significant value added in manufacturing. 
Around 15.000 Estonian jobs come from US 
controlled firms active in Estonia. The US is 
the 2nd most important (extra-EU) goods export 
 
destination (14 percent of goods exports) and services 
export destination (10 percent of services exports) for 
Estonia. The main export sectors for Estonia to the US 
are office machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
and machinery.
For Estonia, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, manufactures, water and 
air transport and personal services sectors 
are expected to grow most, but the motor 
vehicles sector may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of machinery (+1.9 per-
cent). Exports are expected to increase, 
mostly for electrical machinery (+€62 m);
•	 The expected decrease in consumer pric-
es is driven by many sectors, but the main 
ones are motor vehicles (-1.0 percent) and 
transport equipment (-0.6 percent). 
Estonia does not have a very strong economic 
relationship with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would 
contribute to additional income, higher wages for 
high-skilled workers, and lower consumer prices. 
Estonia and TTIP – Expected effects
Low-skilled wages and investments would, however, 
decline. GDP is expected to increase permanently by 
0.1 percent, and exports to the US are expected to 
increase by 13 percent.
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summary
Regulatory cooperation – in some organised form – has taken place 
between the EU and the US for over two decades. The activity has largely 
been carried out on a voluntary basis through various horizontal and sector-
based initiatives. With the onset of negotiations for a TTIP agreement, 
increased attention has been given to regulatory cooperation, and for good 
reason: reducing barriers to trade caused by unnecessary differences in how 
goods and services are regulated on each side of the Atlantic will be one of 
the most important ways that TTIP can benefit the EU and US economies. 
Studies have shown that up to 80 percent of the gains from a future TTIP 
could come from regulatory convergence. It is therefore hugely important 
to get this aspect of the agreement right, if the two parties are to reap 
the potentially vast benefits. Both sides should be able to agree on good 
regulatory practices, and also eliminate unnecessary burdens in several 
sectors. They should also be able to agree on a process that, if properly 
applied, ultimately will result in more informed and similar approaches 
across the Atlantic. The extensive experience gained in the past in this area 
can help in constructing a balanced and lasting agreement.
insert 3:
ttip and regulatory Cooperation
By Jan E. Frydman3
3 Jan E. Frydman is special advisor to EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and a 
partner of the law firm Ekenberg & Andersson in Stockholm, Sweden. He was until re-
cently the European Commission’s Head of Unit for International Regulatory Affairs at 
its Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry and was, for many years, in charge of 
transatlantic relations, notably of the development of the EU’s regulatory cooperation 
efforts for goods with the US, Canada and other non-EU countries. 
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“With the onset of negotiations for a TTIP agreement, 
increased attention has been given to regulatory cooperation, 
and for good reason: reducing barriers to trade caused 
by unnecessary differences in how goods and services are 
regulated on each side of the Atlantic will be one of the
most important ways that TTIP can benefit the EU and
US economies.”
There are many similarities but also fundamental 
differences between the two systems. Understanding 
both is essential to bridging the gaps between the two 
markets and moving towards a more transatlantic 
approach. It is also important to realise from the 
outset that once the relevant political choices and 
decisions have been made, implementing them 
will be challenging given the obvious technical 
and legal complexities involved, but by no means 
insurmountable and comparable to domestic efforts by 
both sides to create their own single markets.
Lessons learned
Based on the lessons derived from prior EU-US 
regulatory cooperation efforts, three issues should be 
taken into consideration: 
First, the EU and the US have different and separate 
legal and institutional frameworks, and these are 
not likely to change as a result of TTIP. A common 
misconception is that regulations for goods undergo 
the same adoption process in the EU as in the US. In 
reality, the processes are rather different. In the EU, 
regulations usually take the form of legislation (adopted 
by a legislative procedure in which the European 
Commission proposes and then the European 
Parliament and European Council jointly adopt); 
meanwhile in the US, regulations are often adopted by 
administrative agencies acting under mandate from the 
legislative branch, following the procedure established 
by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Moreover, 
some sectors may be regulated on different levels in the 
EU and the US, such as at the federal level in the US 
and by Member States in the EU, or vice versa.
Second, a clear and specific agenda should be 
created, covering the areas and sectors where there is 
genuine political support for harmonisation, mutual 
recognition, or any other form of regulatory alignment. 
For example, is the objective to:
1. Harmonise all requirements, conformity 
assessments and enforcement procedures that a 
product is covered by, so that that product (for example, 
a car) can be bought and sold as easily between the EU 
and the US as domestically?
2. Or, to mutually recognise as equivalent the 
regulations, conformity assessment and enforcement 
procedures with the same goal as in (i)?
3. Or, to focus only on some of those requirements 
(say, on door locks and seat belts, but not on the whole 
car)? 
4. Or, to maintain the status quo, but instead try to 
reduce costs from duplicative administrative burdens, 
such as data collection, testing requirements, etc.? 
Third, it is important to manage expectations on 
what an ambitious TTIP agreement will ultimately be 
able to achieve. For example, if objectives are chosen 
that will require new, or amendments to existing, 
regulations (likely in examples (i), (ii) and (iii), but 
less so in (iv)), these objectives will be subject to the 
legislative mandates and/or administrative procedures 
required in the US regulatory system, and to the 
appropriate legislative procedure and possible related 
standardisation required in the EU system. And these 
two independent processes would have to arrive at the 
same result. The same will be true also with respect to 
any future changes. 
Considering that existing tariffs between the EU and 
the United States are for the most part already low and 
in any case are easier to address, and while traditional 
trade issues such as access to public procurement 
markets and agriculture remain as important as ever, 
regulatory differences are probably the most significant 
impediment to trade and investment between the 
two negotiating parties. While a certain degree of 
discrepancy is probably unavoidable, many differences 
in regulatory systems impacting transatlantic trade are 
unnecessary and can be overcome. A more integrated 
and streamlined transatlantic regulatory environment 
can contribute to higher levels of safety, increased 
consumer choice and significantly reduced costs 
for producers and consumers on both sides of the 
Atlantic. This could have a significant positive effect 
on the competitiveness of the EU and US economies in 
today’s globalised world.
Regulatory cooperation:
progress and actionability
The concept of regulatory cooperation is not new. For 
over two decades, the EU and the US have gradually 
increased efforts to achieve greater convergence in 
regulation. Some argue that, for all these efforts, there 
has been a lack of real progress, and moreover that 
this lack of progress is evidence that further enhanced 
cooperation through TTIP cannot be achieved. This 
assumption is wrong on both counts.
First, there is substantial evidence to illustrate 
that progress has been made. A solid structure for 
cooperation has gradually been developed over time, 
along the lines of the objectives originally formulated by 
the two parties at the 2002 EU-US Summit: “to pursue, 
as appropriate, harmonised, equivalent or compatible 
solutions, and take appropriate steps to minimize or 
eliminate unnecessary divergence in regulations”.37 
These achievements provide a solid basis to support 
the ambitious goal of regulatory cooperation in TTIP. 
A set of Guidelines on Regulatory Co-operation and 
Transparency, annually adopted Road Maps intended 
to implement the Guidelines, a High Level Forum 
for Regulatory Co-operation, and a body of political 
oversight, the Transatlantic Economic Council, are all 
tangible evidence of this enhanced cooperation.
If a structure for cooperation has been gradually 
and successfully developed over time, what has been 
lacking is the actual implementation of the concepts 
developed. It should nevertheless be stressed that 
common solutions have still been achieved in specific 
areas through voluntary cooperation between the EU 
and the US, for example in the areas of marine safety 
equipment (by mutually recognising regulations 
as equivalent based on a common international 
standard) and organic goods (by mutually recognising 
organic programs as equivalent). The EU and the US 
also successfully concluded a Mutual Recognition 
Agreement on conformity assessment activities. 
However, with EU and US legal, institutional, cultural 
and social heritages being different, the systems, 
procedures and regulations are also often different, not 
least because they were developed with only domestic 
concerns in mind. Legally binding provisions under the 
TTIP agreement will mark a considerable achievement 
in support of the long aspired-for transatlantic 
regulatory convergence – and one that could yield 
significant positive effects for industry and consumers 
on both sides of the Atlantic.
Second, enhanced transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
should be viewed as both attainable and desirable. 
Similar internal cooperation has already been achieved 
separately, both in the EU and in the US, albeit 
under different logics and frameworks. In the EU, a 
Treaty and other legislation, common executive and 
legislative institutions and a Court to enforce what 
has been agreed have created what is now the single 
market among the 28 EU Member States. In the US, 
with its commerce clause in the Constitution and 
the dormant commerce clause doctrine and other 
legislation, similar institutions and efforts have created 
a “single market” among the 50 States.
8180 TTIP and The eU MeMber STaTeSTTIP and The eU MeMber STaTeS
Recommendations for a regulatory agenda
So, what could be the way forward under TTIP? 
First, the negotiating parties should be able to agree 
on horizontal issues in support of more coherent 
approaches, such as what constitutes good regulatory 
practices. Both sides share a common vision when it 
comes to rule of law, the need for transparency, impact 
assessments, public consultation, etc. Secondly, for 
some identified sectors, it should be possible to agree 
in TTIP on ways to reduce costs from unnecessary 
administrative burdens, data collection, duplicative 
testing requirements, etc. 
But what about harmonisation and mutual recognition? 
While tariffs and other “classic FTA chapters” can be 
negotiated, it will be more difficult to “negotiate” 
regulations, not least because of the legislative and 
administrative requirements and procedures involved 
in regulating on each side. A common misconception is 
that TTIP somehow by itself would change regulations, 
and even lower safety requirements or standards, 
but this is not possible: only regulators and standard 
setting organisations can establish those levels. By 
contrast, improved cooperation between regulators 
in the EU and the US, who are likely among the best 
in the world, would rather result in more informed 
outcomes, which should translate into enhanced 
regulation and safer products.
On the other hand, TTIP could establish a cooperative 
structure with a process, tasked to work towards 
achieving a certain outcome to ultimately be decided 
by the regulators/legislators. This structure could 
be inspired by what has been developed in the past 
(with the important difference being the benefits 
that a legally binding agreement can bring), including 
(i) an agreed general text/chapter establishing the 
basis for cooperation on regulatory issues and how 
to address transparency, scope, objectives, methods 
etc. (perhaps inspired by the EU-US Guidelines on 
Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency); (ii) an 
annual/periodically updated and agreed Roadmap/
Agenda, setting out which areas to cooperate on, 
the extent of harmonisation/mutual recognition 
or simplification sought, and what it would take to 
get there; (iii) a supporting body, perhaps inspired 
by the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum 
established in 2005, sufficiently resourced to support 
cooperation, to compare regulatory work programmes 
and identify new areas of cooperation, set the agenda, 
steer the process, share best practices, and solve issues 
as they arise; (iv) genuine political oversight by the 
relevant decision making bodies on both sides, and 
(v) transparency and opportunities for stakeholders 
to give useful and robust input. While recognising 
that each side ultimately decides on its regulations, 
if sincerely implemented the negotiating parties will 
have confirmed a way of regulating that will gradually 
lead to more informed and, where possible, similar 
approaches across the Atlantic.
There is no “one size fits all” solution to addressing 
or bridging the gap between EU and US regulation. 
Therefore, a variety of “tools” will have to be used to 
support convergence depending on the nature of the 
regulatory differences to be addressed in each sector. 
Nonetheless, the two sides could be inspired by the 
so-called “new approach” to regulation developed by 
the EU to harmonise regulations among the Member 
States. Under this approach, governments “only” decide 
on what should be the essential safety requirements 
for a product. Stakeholders (including industry) then 
establish the standards that satisfy those requirements 
through standard-setting organisations. This keeps 
regulation relevant and supports innovation by 
ensuring that standards are flexible and reactive to 
technological change. Applied to the transatlantic 
context, and grossly simplified, should the EU and US 
agree on what ought to be the essential requirements 
for a good (including the related conformity assessment 
and market surveillance procedures), and if the 
transatlantic stakeholder community as a whole can 
agree on the standards to satisfy those requirements, 
then similar “regulation” should be possible. At the 
very least, this should be attempted in sectors where 
new regulations are developed, or where old ones are 
being amended.
What is regulatory cooperation about?
•	 exchanging information between regulators: 
about regulations and violations of these regu-
lations. this leads to better and more effective 
cooperation, a joint focus on maintaining and 
enhancing the highest levels of protection, and 
information about best practices.
•	 working together via other international agree-
ments to which both the eu and the us are 
party – e.g. at the ilo.
•	 reducing regulatory overlap and burdens.
•	 exploring opportunities for mutual recognition 
of conformity assessment procedures and 
results and of functionally equivalent technical 
requirements.
What is regulatory cooperation not about?
•	 a tool for deregulation.
•	 an attempt to harmonise all standards and 
regulations.
•	 an attempt to weaken eu standards or disman-
tle eu regulations.
•	 a way of introducing a us-style litigation cul-
ture in europe.
Infographic 3: What Regulatory Cooperation is and is not about
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Changes in Finnish production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Finland
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the Finnish economy (%)
Finland and the US – The current situation
Finland is predominantly a services economy with 
a significant manufacturing sector. Over 50.000 
Finnish jobs come from US controlled firms active 
in Finland. The US is the 2nd largest (extra-EU) 
goods export destination (12 percent of goods 
 
exports) and 4th most important (extra-EU) services 
export destination (6 percent of services exports) for 
Finland. The main export sectors for Finland to the US 
are machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and 
wood and paper products.
For Finland, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The motor vehicles sector, transport 
equipment, and machinery sectors are 
expected to grow most, but electrical ma-
chinery production may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of motor vehicles 
(+3.7 percent) and transport equipment 
(+3.1 percent). Export values are going up 
most for chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(+€260 m) and metals and metal products 
(+€227 m);
•	 For Finns, the price for an average car 
could go down by 2.0 percent because of 
TTIP.
Economic relations with the US are important for 
Finland, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, and lower consumer prices.
Finland and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.2 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 25 
percent and consumer prices will down by 0.2 percent. 
Investments are expected to decrease marginally.
Total (extra-EU) Finnish goods exports (%)
Total (extra-EU) Finnish services exports (%) Investments between Finland and the US 
(€ bn)
Investments from
the US to Finland
Investments from
Finland to the US
Jobs in Finland from
foreign controlled firms 
Top Finnish export sectors to US (€ m)
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Changes in French production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in France
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the French economy (%)
France is predominantly a services economy, but with a 
sizeable value added share for manufacturing. Around 
active in France. The US is the main (extra-EU) goods 
 
 
exports) for France. The main export sectors for France 
to the US are chemicals and pharmaceuticals, transport 
equipment, machinery, and beverages and tobacco.
For France, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
• The transport equipment, machinery, 
manufactures, and transport sectors are
expected to grow most, but electrical 
machinery and motor vehicles may
decline. Agriculture output also goes up; 
• TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of transport equip-
ment (+1.8 percent). The main export 
increase for France is expected to come 
from chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(+2.3 bn) and other transport equipment 
(+1.9 bn);
• In France, the price of transport equip-
ment will decrease by 1.5 percent.
France   has   a   strong   economic   relationship   with 
the US, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, more investments, and lower consumer prices. 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
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Total (extra-EU) French services exports (%)
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Investments between France and the US 
(€ bn)
Investments from
the US to France
Investments from
France to the US
2009
2010
2011
2012
Year
68.0
61.5
57.0
62.2
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147.9
186.2
These estimates are based on NTB estimates from Ecorys (2009) and an ambitious scenario from CEPR (2013)
France and the US – The current situation France and TTIP – Expected effects
Changes in German production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Germany
due to TTIP (%)Structure of the German economy (%)
Germany and the US – The current situation
Germany is predominantly a services economy, 
with signifi cant value added in the manufacturing 
sector. Around 835.000 German jobs come from US 
controlled fi rms active in Germany. The US is the main 
(extra-EU) goods export destination (17 percent of 
goods exports) and services export destination (24 
percent of services exports) for Germany. The main 
export sectors for Germany to the US are machinery, 
motor vehicles, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and 
business and ICT services.
For Germany, by reducing tariff  and non-tariff  
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The motor vehicles sector, water trans-
port, machinery, insurance services and 
manufactures sectors are expected to grow 
most, but electrical machinery and metal 
production may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of motor vehicles by firms 
in Germany (+2.4 percent) and exports in 
this sector are expected to increase signif-
icantly (+€33 bn);
•	 For Germans the price for an average car 
could go down by 2.7 percent because of 
TTIP.
Germany has a strong economic relationship with the 
US, and TTIP would contribute to additional income, 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers, 
and more investments. 
Germany and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.6 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
38 percent and consumer prices will remain the same.
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Changes in Greek production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Greece
due to TTIP (%)
Greece and the US – The current situation
Greece is predominantly a services economy, with also 
significant value added coming from the manufacturing 
sector. Just under 18.000 Greek jobs come from US 
controlled firms active in Greece. The US is the 2nd 
largest (extra-EU) goods export destination (12 percent 
 
of goods exports) and 4th largest (extra-EU) services 
export destination (9 percent of services exports) for 
Greece. The main export sectors for Greece to the 
US are transport services, business and ICT services, 
distribution services and processed foods.
For Greece, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, water transport, insurance 
and personal services sectors are expected 
to grow most, but electrical machinery and 
motor vehicles may decline. Agricultural 
output also goes up;
•	 TTIP could facilitate an increase in pro-
duction of machinery by firms in Greece 
(+0.9 percent). Exports in the metals 
sector are poised to increase by €119 m. 
Moreover, exports in the processed foods 
sector are expected to increase by €99 m;
•	 For Greeks the price for an average car 
could go down by 1.5 percent because of 
TTIP.
Economic relations with the US are important for 
Greece, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, and more investments.
Greece and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, and exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 13 percent.
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summary
TTIP will affect environmental outcomes through different channels that 
may have offsetting effects. First, the agreement will amplify environmental 
pressures due to increased production and transport. This effect can 
partly be counterbalanced by efficiency improvements and exchange of 
environmental technology induced by TTIP. The effects of the agreement on 
third countries’ production, trade, and regulation can also have positive and 
negative environmental implications. The effects of regulatory cooperation 
on environmental outcomes are most likely to be relevant in the long run and 
depend in part on whether the agreement has an impact on environmental 
standards in the US, Europe, and the world.
insert 4:
ttip and environmental proteCtion
By: Prof. Dr. Gabriel Felbermayr4, Ms. Marie-Theres von Schickfus5
“The agreement will increase environmental pressures
due to increased production and transport. This effect can 
partly be counterbalanced by efficiency improvements and 
exchange of environmental technology induced by TTIP.”
Institute
4 Prof. Dr. Gabriel Felbermayr is director at Ifo Center for International Economics and 
Professor for Economics at University of Munich (LMU). 
5 Ms. Marie-Theres von Schikfus is economist at Ifo Center for Energy, Climate and 
Exhaustible Resources.
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Current issues regarding trade
and the environment
Trade agreements generally influence the environment 
due to the increase in economic activity that the 
reduction of trade costs brings about. These effects can 
go in different directions, as trade can at the same time 
lead to more transport (with more emissions), more 
production (with more emissions – “scale effect”), 
a change in the relative importance and structure of 
certain industries (leading to more or less emissions 
depending on the industries involved – “composition 
effect”), and to improvements in efficiency and 
technology (reducing emissions – “technique effect”).38
The changing nature of trade agreements requires 
adding further dimensions to the trade and 
environment nexus, including through enhanced 
regulatory cooperation and provisions on investment 
protection. So-called “deep” preferential trade 
agreements aim at lowering non-tariff barriers to 
trade through regulatory cooperation – also on the 
environmental front; this has led to the worry of 
“regulating downwards”, a concern not supported by 
existing empirical evidence.39 Additionally, agreements 
such as TTIP address investment as well as trade, and 
include an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
mechanism. Concerns have been raised that the 
possibility for firms to sue states over new regulation 
could lead to “regulatory chill”; this can potentially 
affect all areas of (environmental) regulation. 
made public on 6.11.2015 – or elsewhere reference will 
be made to multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), reiterating the parties’ commitments to their 
goals. It is unclear to what extent agreements will be 
mentioned which the US has not ratified or which are 
sensitive to US domestic political concerns, such as 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, or the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
It is also likely that the TTIP text will mention the 
aim to increase trade in environmental goods. The 
EU wants to eliminate local content requirements 
for energy industry equipment, and facilitate 
trade in these products through better regulatory 
coherence. In the context of raw materials and energy, 
the EU has stressed that it aims at the removal of 
existing export restrictions on US gas and crude oil. 
The agreement will have to be ratified by the European 
Parliament and probably the national parliaments in 
the EU and by Congress in the US. Therefore, it is in the 
obvious interest of negotiators to include provisions 
which increase the likelihood of ratification. However, 
the intention to make TTIP a “living agreement” with 
ongoing consultations and cooperation on regulatory 
issues of course means that the environmental impacts 
of TTIP could go beyond the terms of the negotiated 
agreement at the point of ratification. In order to 
prevent a “regulatory race to the bottom”, the EU 
has proposed on 6.11.2015 to include an article on 
“upholding levels of protection” after the conclusion 
of TTIP.47
What are the potential effects of TTIP
for environmental protection?
The effects of TTIP on environmental outcomes 
depends on the assumptions and the type of model 
used. For instance, an aspect mentioned in a study 
by Aichele (et al.) is that TTIP particularly increases 
trade in intermediate goods;48 in that case, for each 
unit increase in value added it brings, the required 
additional transport is significantly more. On the other 
hand, if productivity differences within industries 
are accounted for, then an opening of trade leads to 
a drop-out of the least efficient firms; this improves 
average technology and thus can be assumed to 
decrease environmental impacts. Also, through 
simplified customs and shipping procedures, transport 
can become more efficient and thus require fewer 
resources.
Additionally, lowering the barriers to trade and FDI 
also affects the risk of carbon leakage, i.e. the shift 
of CO2-intensive production and investment from a 
more emission-constrained area (such as the EU) to 
a less constrained one (such as the US).40 Moreover, 
global environmental outcomes are also affected by 
the third-country effects of bilateral trade agreements. 
Changing trade relations particularly between two 
large players as the EU and the US changes global 
trade and production patterns, and thus also creates 
environmental effects in other countries, which may 
influence or run counter to the effects observed in the 
participating countries.
What provisions for or relevant to
the environment will be negotiated 
under TTIP?
Tariff reductions as well as NTM reductions (in the form 
of regulatory cooperation) will lead to environmental 
impacts through worldwide changes in production 
and transport. Regulatory cooperation, however, 
could also affect environmental standards. Apart 
from emission standards in the automotive industry 
(where it is unclear whether they will be addressed in 
the agreement), the chapters on SPS and TBT (which 
can be relevant for consumer protection issues)42 are 
of particular importance as well as the chapter on 
services, which may address environmental services.43 
It is likely that the investment chapter will include an 
ISDS/ICS mechanism. However, this will not affect 
the parties’ right to regulate: the EU’s negotiating 
mandate stresses that the investment protection 
provisions should be “without prejudice to the right of 
the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce 
[…] measures necessary to pursue legitimate public 
policy objectives”44, including environmental ones. 
Both the EU and the US aim at narrow definitions of 
direct and indirect expropriation.45 Together with the 
EU proposal to create an appellate mechanism and to 
introduce the “loser pays” principle, such wording will 
aim to make a misuse of ISDS/ICS more difficult and 
thus reduce the risk of “regulatory chill”.46
Specific clauses referring to environmental issues and 
commitments can be seen as an effort to limit negative 
effects, and/or to support positive effects. For example, 
it is likely that in a sustainable development chapter 
– as exemplified in the latest EU negotiating proposal 
So far, the effects of TTIP on the environment have 
hardly been quantified comprehensively. The CEPR 
study49 and the corresponding Impact Assessment 
Report by the European Commission50 present effects 
of TTIP on emissions of CO2 and material use. 
These results combine the scale and composition 
effects as well as impacts from increased transport. 
CO2 emissions are expected to increase both in the EU 
and the US as a result of the agreement. Nonetheless, 
the estimates can be seen as upper limit estimates 
because TTIP could possibly bring about stronger 
facilitation of environmental goods, enhance trade 
facilitation, lower transportation times, etc. In the case 
of CO2 emissions, it is especially important to look at 
global effects because the geographical source of the 
emissions is irrelevant for their climate impact. The 
CEPR study calculates a worldwide emission increase 
of 4 million tonnes or 11.3 million tonnes in the less 
ambitious and more ambitious liberalisation scenarios 
respectively; this is equivalent to 0.02 percent and 
0.07 percent respectively, compared to the baseline 
scenario annual emissions.51 These results are based 
on the assumption of high (20 percent) direct spill-
overs, i.e. positive effects of regulatory coherence on 
foreign exporters to the EU and the US. Apart from the 
composition effect, the calculations do not take into 
account potential technique effects of TTIP, which 
may reduce emissions, such as facilitating exchange 
of emission reduction technology and equipment. 
On the other hand, compared to other studies, the 
analysis by CEPR presents conservative effects of TTIP 
on output. Studies reporting higher output effects 
could entail larger changes on CO2 emissions. One 
must also recognise that TTIP, in large part, is about 
boosting productivity (by reducing higher costs linked 
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to regulatory convergence, for example).To the extent 
higher output follows from greater efficiency in use 
of inputs (including energy), such effects can offset 
otherwise higher expectations on emissions.
Another interesting case in a global view of TTIP is 
energy, in particular the aim to reduce US export 
barriers for fossil fuels. This is relevant especially 
for shale gas because of the related environmental 
concerns – gas is a relatively low-emitting fossil fuel, 
but shale gas is more emission-intensive than current 
EU imports (both because of the extraction method 
and because of the liquefying process for gas). How 
US shale gas will be used is hard to predict. If it is 
indeed imported by the EU, this would mean, in the 
short run, a cheaper supply of natural gas in its more 
emission-intensive version. From the perspective of 
the dynamic development of the EU energy system, 
this would make gas more competitive and it is feared 
that this would reduce efforts of moving away from 
fossil fuels and lead to a further “lock-in” of fossil-
based technologies, (although natural gas is expected 
to play an important role for the system integration 
of renewables). However, given demand and prices in 
other parts of the world, particularly Asia, it is unclear 
whether the EU will be the preferred export destination 
of US gas.52 Finally, increased investment opportunities 
through TTIP may also lead to cost-seeking FDI of 
European CO2-intensive industries, and thus to a 
shift of emissions from the EU to the US, challenging 
the effectiveness of European climate policy due to 
“investment leakage”53. In summary, it is difficult to 
say whether the TTIP energy trade provisions will lead 
to additional use of fossil fuels and thus to additional 
global emissions. However, TTIP could increase trade 
in environmental goods such as renewable energy 
equipment and thereby contribute to a development 
towards less carbon use in the energy sector.
Coming to the potential effects of regulatory 
cooperation and ISDS/ICS, a couple of points are 
relevant. For the reasons outlined above, it is unlikely 
that any environmental standards will be lowered 
significantly within the agreement. The European 
Commission has repeatedly stressed that it will 
not accept an agreement which affects the EU’s 
environmental and consumer policy and regulation 
(the precautionary principle, GMO legislation, etc.). 
It should also be noted that TTIP on the whole 
may contribute to a strengthening of regulation 
(“regulating upward” where appropriate on the US 
and sometimes on the EU sides).54 However, TTIP 
is designed as a “living agreement” with continued 
consultation on regulation.55 It is hard to foresee how 
these consultations will affect future environmental 
law-making. Moreover, the level playing field that 
TTIP creates by lowering trade barriers may be more 
important than direct regulatory coherence in the 
TTIP text: with freer trade, countries will encounter 
disadvantages due to stricter regulation, and will have 
an incentive to lower regulation.56 Both the EU and 
the US intend to limit this effect by including wording 
that “it is inappropriate to attract trade or investment 
by weakening or reducing the levels of protection […] in 
domestic environmental […] laws”.57 Third country effects 
are also relevant in the regulatory context. If regulatory 
spill-overs occur, they might even contribute to more 
stringent regulation worldwide – but this depends on 
the regulatory effects within TTIP as well as on the 
areas where the spill-overs occur. Without regulatory 
spill-overs, there is no such effect, but also less 
production and trade with developing and potentially 
more polluting countries.58 The impact on worldwide 
emissions is unclear.59 Finally, the potential effect of 
TTIP through ISDS/ICS depends crucially on the exact 
provisions of the mechanism. If the above-mentioned 
EU and US proposals to safeguard regulatory space go 
through and lead to a coherent agreement, the risk of 
regulatory chill would be very small. 
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the Current situation and 
expeCted ttip eFFeCts 
For 
 
 
hungary 
ireland 
italy
latvia
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Changes in Hungarian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Hungary
due to TTIP (%)
Hungary and the US – The current situation
Hungary is predominantly a services economy. 
Around 135.000 Hungarian jobs come from US 
controlled firms active in Hungary. The US is 
the 2nd main (extra-EU) goods export destination 
(13 percent of goods exports) and the main 
 
(extra-EU) services export destination (16 percent of 
services exports) for Hungary. The main export sectors 
for Hungary to the US are machinery, office machinery, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals and business and ICT 
services.
For Hungary, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery and personal services sec-
tors are expected to grow most, but electri-
cal machinery may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of machinery by 
firms in Hungary (+1.9 percent). Exports 
are poised to increase most for motor ve-
hicles (+€264 m); 
•	 For Hungarians the price for an average 
car could go down by 0.8 percent because 
of TTIP and the price of transport equip-
ment is expected to go down by 0.6 per-
cent.
Hungary has a strong economic relationship with the 
US, and TTIP would contribute to additional income, 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers, 
and lower prices for consumers.
Hungary and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.1 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 36 percent and consumer prices will go down 
marginally by 0.1 percent. Investments are not affected.
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Changes in Irish production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Ireland
due to TTIP (%)
Ireland and the US – The current situation
Ireland is predominantly a services economy, but 
also has a sizeable manufacturing sector. Just under 
170.000 Irish jobs come from US controlled fi rms 
active in Ireland. The US is by far the main (extra-EU) 
goods export destination (57 percent of goods exports) 
and main (extra-EU) services export destination (44 
percent of services exports) for Ireland. The main 
export sectors for Ireland to the US are chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, insurance services, machinery and 
business and ICT services.
For Ireland, by reducing tariff  and non-tariff  
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The insurance and chemicals sectors are 
expected to grow most, but the production 
of electrical machinery, motor vehicles 
and agriculture may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production and export of insur-
ance services (+4.4 percent, +€651 m) and 
chemicals (+2.6 percent, +€8.2 bn).
•	 For Irish companies the price for trans-
port equipment is expected to decrease by 
2.1 percent and Irish consumers will pay 
1.1 percent less for a car because of TTIP.
Ireland has a very strong economic relationship with 
the US, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, and more investments.
Ireland and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 1.3 
percent, and exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 19 percent.
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Changes in Italian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Italy
due to TTIP (%)
Italy and the US – The current situation
Italy is predominantly a services economy, but with 
significant value added in manufacturing and other 
primary products as well. Around 400.000 Italian 
jobs come from US controlled firms active in Italy. 
The US is the main (extra-EU) goods export destination 
 
(17 percent of goods exports) and main (extra-EU) 
services export destination (27 percent of services 
exports) for Italy. The main export sectors for Italy to 
the US are machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
transport equipment and business and ICT services. 
For Italy, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The manufactures, machinery, transport 
and processed foods sectors are expected 
to grow most, but electrical machinery and 
motor vehicles production may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of manufactures by firms in 
Italy (+1.3 percent). Exports are poised to 
increase most for manufactures (+€ 2.9 bn);
•	 For Italians the price for an average car 
could go down by 1.1 percent because of 
TTIP.
Italy has a strong economic relationship with the US, 
and TTIP would contribute to additional income, 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers, 
and more investments.
Italy and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.5 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
21 percent and consumer prices will not change.
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Changes in Latvian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Latvia
due to TTIP (%)
Latvia and the US – The current situation
Latvia is predominantly a services economy but with 
significant value added in manufacturing as well. Just 
under 7.000 Latvian jobs come from US controlled 
firms active in Latvia. The US is the 3rd most important 
(extra-EU) goods export destination (11 percent of 
 
goods exports and the 2nd main (extra-EU) services 
export destination (12 percent of services exports) for 
Latvia. The main export sectors for Latvia to the US are 
beverages and tobacco, machinery, and chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.
For Latvia, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 Mainly the manufactures sector, but also 
the machinery, water and air transport 
sectors are expected to grow most, but mo-
tor vehicle production may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of manufactures by 
firms in Latvia (+1.3 percent). Exports are 
poised to increase most in the processed 
foods sector (+€35 m);
•	 For Latvians, the prices would be low-
er for motor vehicles (-2.2 percent) and 
transport equipment (-0.5 percent).
Latvia does not have a very strong economic relationship 
with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would contribute to 
additional income, higher wages for both low- and high-
skilled workers, more investments, and lower prices. 
Latvia and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
15 percent and consumer prices will go down by 0.2 
percent.
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summary
SMEs are the employment backbone of both the EU and US economies. 
In the EU, the more than 20 million SMEs represent 99 percent of all 
businesses. It is clear that a successful TTIP can only be one that fosters 
the competitiveness of smaller firms. At present, SMEs are still confronted 
with significant barriers when trading across the Atlantic, and the ongoing 
economic crisis in the EU has hit SME exports disproportionately hard. 
Research also shows that the non-tariff measures between the EU and US 
are disproportionately prohibitive for SMEs. Barriers exist through costs of 
adjustment to different regulatory systems, costs of customs procedures, 
rules of origin certifications, tax requirements and immigration 
procedures, and difficulties accessing information on opportunities to 
do business in other countries. These barriers are especially problematic 
for SMEs who lack the resources of large enterprises to overcome these 
regulatory differences. There is therefore a significant untapped potential 
for deeper integration of SMEs in transatlantic value chains and for 
boosting competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world – a potential TTIP 
could help to unleash. In the market access pillar of the negotiations every 
effort should be made to eliminate the remaining tariffs. In the regulatory 
cooperation chapter, regulatory burdens and overlaps in regulations, 
and certification should be addressed and removed. In the rules pillar, 
the issues of patents and IPR should be addressed. It is welcome that 
the agreement is set to include a dedicated SME chapter in order to 
provide SMEs with easily accessible and adequate information on how to 
expand their business, and to support SMEs in identifying and securing 
international business opportunities.
insert 5:
ttip and small- and medium size
enterprises (smes)
By: Dr. Umberto Marengo and Prof. dr. Andrea Renda6
“At present, SMEs are still confronted with significant barriers 
when trading across the Atlantic, and the ongoing economic 
crisis in the EU has hit SME exports disproportionately hard.”
6 Prof. Dr. Andrea Renda is professor at Rome University and senior research fellow 
at CEPS. Dr. Umberto Marengo is post-doc researcher at Cambridge University.
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SMEs and transatlantic trade
SMEs form the backbone of both the EU and US econ-
omies – in the US, firms with less than 500 employees 
account for almost half of all non-agricultural GDP 
and employment;61 meanwhile, in Europe, SMEs ac-
count for 99 percent of all businesses, 67 percent of all 
employment and 58 percent of gross value added.62 A 
successful TTIP therefore will only be one that fosters 
the competitiveness and employment growth of small-
er firms.
TTIP has the potential to boost SME internationalisa-
tion to an unprecedented extent. A recent paper pub-
lished by the European Commission reports that “US 
and EU negotiators are working to ensure that SMEs are 
in a position to take full advantage of the opportunities 
that an agreement would provide”, and that “as part of 
this effort, negotiators are discussing the inclusion of a 
chapter dedicated to SME issues”, which would inter alia 
“establish mechanisms for both sides to work together to 
facilitate SMEs’ participation in transatlantic trade after 
TTIP takes effect”.63 At the same time, concerns are be-
ing raised on possible negative impacts that TTIP, es-
pecially in specific chapters, might end up exerting on 
SMEs, as well as on the existing disconnect between 
the trade talks and the real needs of smaller firms.64 
Such negative impacts mostly take the form of compli-
ance costs and administrative burdens, which typically 
affect smaller firms more than large firms. In a separate 
in-depth report by the European Commission based on 
a survey of EU SMEs conducted by the European Com-
•	 Costs	related	to	immigration	procedures;
•	 Difficulties	in	collecting	information	on	the	op-
portunities offered by doing business across borders;
•	 Uncertainty	and	limited	access	to	public	procure-
ment markets.
Additional burdens occur through the significant 
regulatory differences that exist between the EU and 
the US that differentiate the two economic blocs. For 
example, each of the fifty US States features different 
and specific limitations to foreign companies wishing 
to access state-level public procurement. In Europe, 
the EU has established a harmonised system of tar-
iffs but its Member States still have different custom 
procedures in place. The Word Bank “Trade across 
Barriers” index reports significant diversity in market 
access within the EU. Denmark, Estonia, and Sweden 
are among the ten most efficient countries in terms of 
import/export procedures (i.e. number of documents 
required, days, and costs). On the contrary, countries 
including Italy, Spain, Greece, and Poland have more 
complex and lengthy import/export procedures. As a 
result, harmonisation of customs procedures would 
have particularly positive effects for those countries 
with more complex procedures and could support 
their international market penetration. Differences in 
service market regulation across both the EU Mem-
ber States and US states also pose challenges to SME 
market access. Not surprisingly, the recently published 
factsheet of the European Commission on the SME 
chapter states that: “Anything that will be achieved in 
TTIP to remove customs duties, simplify customs proce-
dures, reduce the cost of diverging standards, and improve 
protection of intellectual property rights will be particular-
ly good for small businesses”.70
The opportunities for SMEs 
created by TTIP
TTIP offers an opportunity to support the internation-
alisation of SMEs through the development of all three 
pillars currently under discussion: market access, regu-
latory cooperation, and rules.
On market access, TTIP should focus on removing 
transatlantic tariffs, simplifying rules of origin certifi-
cation, and providing better information and access to 
public procurement. On average, EU and US weighed 
tariff barriers are already relatively low (3.3 percent for 
the EU and 2.2 percent for the US weighted average) but 
mission together with Ecorys65, Ecorys found a total of 
1200 perceived barriers facing SMEs seeking to trade 
with the US.66 TTIP aims to clearly address these issues 
and make trading easier for SMEs on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
Despite the fact that the EU and the US are already 
deeply integrated economies, SMEs are still confront-
ed with significant difficulties in trading across the At-
lantic. This problem is magnified because SMEs very 
often lack the resources that large enterprises can call 
upon to overcome these regulato-
ry differences. As a consequence, 
only 13 percent of SMEs in the EU 
export outside the EU Internal 
Market.67 Furthermore, the ongo-
ing economic downturn in Europe 
has contributed to a slowdown of 
SME-related trade whereas large 
enterprise trade and intra-firm 
trade have been less affected. How-
ever, trade between affiliates on 
both sides of the Atlantic has prov-
en to be more resilient during the 
crisis in comparison with SMEs, 
in particular from the EU side. 
Exports to the US among related 
parties increased by 12 percent in 
the period 2007-2012, while the 
remainder (unaffiliated exports) in-
creased by only 6 percent.68 There 
is therefore an untapped potential 
for deeper integration of SMEs in transatlantic value 
chains and for boosting competitiveness vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world. TTIP could be a tool to allow SMEs to 
reap the benefits from deeper integration.
Specific challenges faced by SMEs
SMEs face specific challenges in entering foreign mar-
kets compared to larger companies. The European 
Commission and the US International Trade Commis-
sion have run a series of consultations that highlighted 
six broad cross-sectoral factors that create dispropor-
tionate burdens to SMEs:69
•	 The	cost	of	adjusting	to	different	regulatory	
systems in different jurisdictions;
•	 Costs	related	to	the	protection	of	Intellectual	
Property Rights (IPRs), most notably patents;
•	 The	cost	of	customs	procedures,	rules	of	origin	
certifications, and tax requirements; 
selected products are still subject to high tariff peaks: a 
reduction could have significant positive effects for spe-
cialised SMEs in particular sectors. In addition, many 
SMEs cannot afford to change production processes 
to comply with different or divergent rules of origin 
certification. Further measures could be introduced to 
target and support SME exports. Duty-free exemptions 
for packages shipped by small businesses entering the 
US and EU could be raised to $800, the standard of-
fered to travellers arriving to the United States by air. 
Finally, TTIP could provide for a flexible system of visa 
solutions for SMEs that do not have a branch in their 
export market. In particular, European SMEs face sig-
nificant difficulties when undertaking, for example, 
installation work abroad due to strict visa regulations 
and labour restrictions. These effects would be benefi-
cial for both EU and US SMEs and thus potentially cre-
ate more competition in the transatlantic marketplace. 
One concern some SMEs have is that an expansion 
of transatlantic trade could also include the further 
expansion of large giant retailers and IT companies, 
further increasing the level of competition they face. 
The second TTIP pillar is perhaps the most complex 
and ambitious part of the agreement, involving the 
reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade. The cost of 
complying with different regulatory systems in the EU 
and the US is proportionally higher for SMEs than for 
larger companies. Regulatory cooperation across the 
Atlantic has the potential to unlock vast new market 
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opportunities, but the complexity of the issue requires 
negotiators to adopt an objective-driven functional 
approach rather than to focus on each case’s technical 
specifications. Regulatory alignment should follow the 
“Better Regulation” approach that in principle inspires 
EU legislation. Regulations should be justified by mar-
ket failures, be based on an evidence-based risk assess-
ment, and discussed through open consultations.72 
SME participation in the definition of regulations 
(and legislation) is a precondition for success. In the 
definition of the regulatory chapter, TTIP negotiators 
should introduce an “SME test” to assess with the af-
fected industry representatives, the potential impact of 
the agreement on SMEs (the EU Commission already 
introduced its own “SME test” in 2013).
The final pillar of TTIP negotiations, trade rules, should 
include ambitious provisions on IPRs and trade se-
crets. Trade secrets are particularly important to SMEs 
because, unlike patents, they can be protected without 
registration or filing formalities, and they are less ex-
pensive to maintain and enforce. In this instance, the 
US has more stringent policies on trade secrets than 
the EU. For example, customer disclosure obligations 
on cosmetics’ ingredients in the US are less stringent 
A dedicated chapter on SMEs
In addition to trade provisions, negotiators have pro-
posed to introduce a standalone chapter that would in-
clude specific “trade supporting” provisions for SMEs. 
The US and their ASEAN partners have included an 
SME chapter in the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), 
modelled after the work done under the APEC forum 
to support SME internationalisation. 
The objective of an SME chapter should be twofold. 
First, it should provide SMEs with easily accessible and 
adequate information on how to expand their business 
abroad. This would commit both parties to facilitate 
SMEs’ access to information on EU and US regulations 
(i.e. rules of origin, tariffs, customs policies, etc.), trade 
facilitation provisions, or exchange of information on 
best practices. This initiative could encourage SMEs to 
make full use of any future agreement, but it cannot 
be expected that it will have a transformative effect on 
SME exports. The second objective should be to sup-
port SMEs in identifying and securing international 
business opportunities. Traditionally, however, busi-
ness support services for SMEs have a low take up and, 
in the EU, internationalisation programs are managed 
by EU Member States. A European supply of services 
for SMEs in priority markets should thus be incorpo-
rated into existing national service providers. Overall, 
the expansion to foreign markets is a key priority for 
SMEs across the Atlantic and TTIP has the potential to 
support this process. In view of the complexity of the 
negotiation and the risk of regulatory capture, SMEs 
should be engaged at all stages of the negotiation to 
analyse the specific impact of TTIP on SMEs on a sec-
tor-by-sector basis. 
At the same time, it would be very useful to acknowl-
edge that SMEs are affected by all chapters of TTIP: 
simply devoting a dedicated chapter to SMEs in the 
TTIP negotiations would not be of sufficient help, if 
in all other chapters the agreement leads to provisions 
that will put SMEs at a disadvantage. Confining SMEs 
to an individual chapter, possibly leading to a plethora 
of dissemination and awareness-raising activities, is as 
commendable as it is risky. Adopting a thorough “SME 
test” for the various chapters under discussion would 
serve the interests of smaller companies as an addi-
tional effective method to ensure that SMEs best reap 
the benefits that TTIP could bring them.
than in the EU. TTIP will thus have to strike the right 
balance between consumer protection on the one side 
and IPRs protection on the other. Furthermore, an 
ambitious transatlantic agreement on IPRs could push 
for further integration and harmonisation within the 
EU on patent protection. The European Commission 
estimates that obtaining EU-wide patent protection 
costs approximately €36,000 per firm, mainly due to 
high translation costs and local fees in the EU Mem-
ber States, compared to approximately $2,600 in the 
US. The EU has recently taken steps to create a more 
cost-friendly EU-wide patenting system, and TTIP pro-
vides an opportunity to implement new measures to 
support this decision in a short period of time. Need-
less to say that this would also have significant positive 
repercussions on the EU Internal Market. Finally, the 
simplification of custom procedures is one of the main 
priorities for SMEs, especially security measures that 
duplicate controls or turn out to be particularly bur-
densome (e.g. the X-ray scanning of products).
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Infographic 4: Survey on SMEs and TTIP
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■ us is a priority or target market for smes
Share of SMEs for whom 
US is a priority market
Share of exporting SMEs
targeting the US market
Number of firms 
exporting to the US
Value of exports to US 
generated by SMEs (2013)
Four most often perceived US barriers
by EU SME goods exporters
Four most often perceived US barriers
by EU SME services exporters
511
452
273
244
times mentioned
Source: Ecorys (2015) SME Survey
1. Restrictions on the movement of people;
2. Discriminatory measures and standards;
3. Barriers to competition and public ownership;
4. Restrictions on foreign ownership of firms/companies   
 and other market entry conditions.
166
97
76
81
times mentioned
1. Differences in technical rules that affect the product;
2. US border crossing procedures;
3. Regulatory differences (human, animal and 
 plant health; biodiversity); 
4. Specific taxes and charges.
1
2
3
4
28%
26%
72%
88%
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Changes in Lithuanian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Lithuania
due to TTIP (%)
Lithuania and the US – The current situation
Lithuania is predominantly a services economy, 
but with relatively the largest share of valued 
added in agriculture and food compared to 
any other EU Member State. Just under 10.000 
Lithuanian jobs come from US controlled firms 
  
 
active in Lithuania. The US is the 2nd main (extra-EU) 
goods export destination (12 percent) and the 2nd main 
services export destination (13 percent) for Lithuania. 
The main export sectors for Lithuania to the US are 
petrochemicals, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
For Lithuania, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, wood and paper products, 
and personal services sectors are expected 
to grow most, but electrical machinery and 
motor vehicles production may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in the production of machinery (+4.2 per-
cent). Exports are poised to increase most 
in the manufactures sector (+€51 m) and 
the chemicals sector (+€45 m);
•	 For Lithuanians, the price for an average 
car could go down by 3.8 percent because 
of TTIP.
Lithuania does not have a very strong economic 
relationship with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would 
contribute to additional income, higher wages for both 
low- and high-skilled workers, more investments, and 
Lithuania and TTIP – Expected effects
significantly lower prices. GDP is expected to increase 
permanently by 1.6 percent, exports to the US are expected 
to increase by 18 percent and consumer prices will go 
down by 0.9 percent. Investments are expected to rise 
significantly by 1.7 percent.
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Changes in Luxembourg production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Luxembourg
due to TTIP (%)
Luxembourg and the US – The current situation
Luxembourg is predominantly a services economy, 
but with sizeable value added in the agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors. Around 13.000 jobs 
in Luxembourg come from US controlled fi rms 
active in Luxembourg. The US is the main (extra-
EU) goods export destination (18 percent) and
services export destination (38 percent) for 
Luxembourg. The main export sectors for Luxembourg 
to the US are fi nancial services, insurance services, 
communication services, and business and ICT services. 
For Luxembourg, by reducing tariff  and non-
tariff  measures in TTIP, without lowering 
standards:
•	 The insurance services, fi nancial services 
and manufactures sectors are expected to 
grow most, but the electrical machinery 
sector may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of insurance services 
(+5.2 percent) and fi nancial services (+3.6 
percent). The largest export expansion is 
expected in fi nancial services (+€384 m);
•	 For fi rms in Luxembourg the price for 
transport equipment could go down by 
1.0 percent because of TTIP, and the pric-
es for chemicals and pharmaceuticals by 
0.6 percent.
Luxembourg has a strong economic relationship with the 
US (especially in services), and TTIP would contribute to 
additional income, higher wages for both low- and high-
skilled workers, and lower consumer prices.
Luxembourg and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.7 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
10 percent and consumer prices will go down by 0.2 
percent.
Total (extra-EU) Luxembourg services exports (%) Investments between Luxembourg and the US
(€ bn)
Investments from
the US to
Luxembourg
Investments from
Luxembourg to 
the US
Jobs in Luxembourg from
foreign controlled fi rms 
Top Luxembourg export sectors to US (€ bn)
and remaining US tariff s (n/a)
Changes in Luxembourg exports to 
the US for top sectors (€ m)
to
ta
l s
e
rv
ic
e
s 
e
xp
o
rt
s
100%
5.2%
€4.0 bn 40%
€100 m
€0 m
u
s
in
su
ra
nc
e 
se
rv
ic
es
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
se
rv
ic
es
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
s
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
w
at
er
tr
an
sp
or
t
3.9
0.3
1.5% 1.3% 1.0%
in
di
a
6%
s
w
itz
er
la
nd
8%
s
au
di
 a
ra
bi
a
4%
s
in
ga
po
re
4%
re
st
Jobs from 
foreign eu 
fi rms
Jobs from 
foreign fi rms
total
Jobs from 
foreign us 
fi rms
Jobs from 
other foreign 
fi rms
Financial
services
insurance 
services
Communication 
services
business 
and iCt 
services
40%
89,830
this is 40% 
of the total 
number of 
224,800
jobs in
luxem-
bourg
2009
2010
2011
2012
Year
28,240
48,987
12,602
tr
an
sp
or
t
eq
ui
pm
en
t
C
he
m
ic
al
s 
an
d 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s
+88 +34
m
et
al
s 
an
d 
m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
in
su
ra
nc
e 
se
rv
ic
es
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
se
rv
ic
es
Luxembourg employment eff ects
for top sectors (%)
4.5%
0.0%
 low skill employment %  high skill employment %
in
su
ra
nc
e 
se
rv
ic
es
4
.1
%
4
.4
%
1
.0
%
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
s
3
.1
%
2
.8
%
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
se
rv
ic
es
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
pe
rs
on
al
se
rv
ic
es
5.2% 3.6%
+90
+384
-1.0%
tr
an
sp
or
t
eq
ui
pm
en
t
C
he
m
ic
al
s 
an
d 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
se
rv
ic
es
m
ot
or
ve
hi
cl
es
in
su
ra
nc
e
se
rv
ic
es
-1.0%
-0.4%
-0.3%
-0.5%
0.7%
g
d
p
0.7%
h
ig
h 
sk
ill
 w
ag
es
 
 l
ow
 s
ki
ll 
w
ag
es
 
0
.4
3%
0
.6
4%
0.2
-0.2%
Structure of the Luxembourg economy (%) Total (extra-EU) Luxembourg goods exports (%)
to
ta
l g
o
o
d
s
 e
xp
o
rt
s
100%
0%
u
s
a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 
an
d 
fo
od
C
hi
na
r
us
si
a
8%
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
17.3%
s
w
itz
er
la
nd
15%
o
th
er
 
pr
im
ar
y
5%
tu
rk
ey
5%
re
st
49%
s
er
vi
ce
s
100%
61.6%
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
0.0%
C
on
su
m
er
 
pr
ic
es
-0.2%
ex
po
rt
s
163.9
213.7
267.7
316.6
103.7
133.7
128.8
154.5
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 U
S 
ta
ri
ff 
s 
(n
/a
)
0.8
18%
38%
6.2%
Changes in Luxembourg consumer prices
for top sectors (%)
+19 1
.0
% 0
.6
%
0
.8
%
0
.8
%
0
.4
%
0.0%14.9%
-0.6%
↑
0.0%
0.0%
€0.0 bn 
123122 TTIP AND THE EU MEMBER STATESTTIP AND THE EU MEMBER STATES
Changes in Maltese production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Malta
due to TTIP (%)
Malta and the US – The current situation
Malta is predominantly a services economy but also 
has a significant manufacturing base. Around 2.000 
jobs in Malta come from US controlled firms active 
in Malta. The US is the 2nd most important (extra-
EU) goods export destination (12 percent of goods 
 
 
exports, after China with 36 percent) and also the 2nd 
most important (extra-EU) services export destination 
(14 percent, after Canada with 15 percent) for Malta. 
The main export sectors for Malta to the US are office 
machinery, financial services, and machinery.
For Malta, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The manufactures sector, financial and 
insurance services sectors are expected to 
grow most, but the motor vehicles indus-
try may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of manufactures (+2.6 per-
cent), and insurance services (+2.5 per-
cent). Electrical machinery is poised to 
see the largest export increase (+€38 m);
•	 For Maltese consumers, the price for cars 
could go down by 0.7 percent because of 
TTIP, and the price for chemicals by 0.6 
percent.
Malta does not have a very strong economic relationship 
with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would contribute to 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers 
and lower consumer prices, but Maltese GDP is 
Malta and TTIP – Expected effects
expected to decline by 0.3 percent. Exports to the US 
are expected to increase by 23 percent and consumer 
prices will go down by 0.2 percent.
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↑Changes in Dutch production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in The Netherlands
due to TTIP (%)
The Netherlands and the US – The current situation
The Netherlands is predominantly a services economy, 
but also has a sizeable manufacturing sector. Over 
300.000 Dutch jobs come from US controlled fi rms 
active in the Netherlands. The US is the main (extra-
EU) goods export destination (22 percent) and 
services export destination (21 percent) for 
the Netherlands. The main export sectors for 
the Netherlands to the US are chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, business and ICT 
services, and petrochemicals.
For The Netherlands, by reducing tariff  and 
non-tariff  measures in TTIP, without lowering 
standards:
•	 The machinery sector, water transport, 
and chemicals and pharmaceuticals sec-
tors are expected to grow most, but electri-
cal machinery and motor vehicle produc-
tion may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant in-
crease in production of machinery by 
firms in the Netherlands (+1.5 percent). 
Exports are poised to increase most for 
the chemicals sector (+€1.5 bn);
•	 For the Dutch the price for an average car 
could go down by 1.1 percent because of 
TTIP, and the price of electrical machin-
ery by 0.9 percent.
The Netherlands has a strong economic relationship 
with the US, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, more investments and lower prices for consumers. 
The Netherlands and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.5 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 14 percent and consumer prices will go down 
marginally by 0.1 percent.
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summary
TTIP’s proposed investment protection standards and dispute settlement 
mechanism have provoked debate among governments, private industry 
and civil society on its implications in four areas: (1) the protection of the 
right to regulate; (2) the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribu-
nals; (3) the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS; and, 
(4) the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism. Ad 1. 
Regarding the protection of the right to regulate, this is clearly an impor-
tant issue, as evidenced by heightened interest on the part of civil society. 
There is limited evidence that earlier versions of ISDS have curtailed it or 
caused “regulatory chill” – but it is important that the right to regulate is 
upheld. ISDS provisions should explicitly detail states’ rights to regulate in 
specified areas of public interest (e.g. social, environmental, human rights) 
– such that ISDS risks can be mitigated. Ad 2. Regarding arbitral tribunals, 
it is imperative that there is a code of conduct, a roster of qualified arbi-
trators, and a set of transparency guidelines – based on the UNCITRAL 
Rules. Ad 3. Because of time, costs, and in order to curb investors options 
to pursue claims, the fork-in-the-road provision seems more desirable than 
sequentially exhausting first the host state’s courts and then an interna-
tional tribunal. Ad 4. An appellate body would provide the option for ei-
ther party in an ISDS case to appeal a ruling. In fact, provisions should be 
included as to the exact role of the appeal body – whether it is to correct 
original decisions or whether it is to remand the case back to the original 
tribunal. Appropriate risk mitigation options should be included in TTIP, 
striking a balance between protecting foreign investment as well as the 
public interest.
insert 6:
ttip and investor proteCtion
By Dr. Freya Baetens7 and Prof. Dr. Christian Tietje8
7 Dr. Freya Baetens is associate professor of Law, director of studies at Leiden University 
College (LUC) and head of the LUC Research Centre at Leiden University. She is also an 
associate professor at the Europa Institute of the Leiden Law School.
8 Prof. Dr. Christian Tietje is professor in Public Law, European Law and International 
Economic Law, director of the Institute for Economic Law, and director of the Trans- 
national Economic Law Research Center (TELC) at the Faculty of Law, Economics 
and Business at the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany.
“There is limited evidence that earlier versions of ISDS have 
curtailed regulation or caused ‘regulatory chill’ – but it is 
important that the right to regulate is upheld.”
129128 TTIP and The eU MeMber STaTeSTTIP and The eU MeMber STaTeS
•		There	is	no	scientific	evidence	(beyond	anecdotal	un-
proven assertions) that any government has changed 
a policy position or refrained from acting in a pol-
icy area primarily for fear of potential ISDS claims. 
The Establishment and Functioning
of Arbitral Tribunals
With regard to ISDS tribunals, the adoption of a code 
of conduct of arbitrators addressing conflicts of inter-
est and ethics as well as the establishment of a roster 
of arbitrators which are pre-selected by the states are 
two further options to improve legitimacy. The for-
mer are not entirely new as several codes of conduct 
already exist and are frequently relied upon, for exam-
ple to decide on disclosure obligations and arbitrator 
challenges. 
With regard to the latter, it remains to be seen wheth-
er a fixed roster of arbitrators would contribute to 
achieving the desired result. Looking at the list of ar-
bitrators of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), 
for example, it is clear that a number of listed persons 
were not nominated because of any relevant expertise 
despite the stipulation that arbitrators should have 
competency in questions of international law and be 
of the highest moral reputation. This is not a problem 
in the context of the PCA given that parties to a dis-
pute are not obliged to select an arbitrator from the 
PCA list. On the contrary, the roster of arbitrators 
currently designed by the European Commission will 
have to be employed in case the investor and the re-
spondent state do not agree on the appointment of a 
Chairperson. Thus, the PCA experience should serve 
as a cautionary tale for similar endeavours under TTIP. 
 
 
The functioning of arbitral tribunals should be sub-
ject to high standards of transparency. The UNCI-
TRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Inves-
tor-State Arbitration (effective date: 1 April 2014) and 
the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based In-
vestor-State Arbitration (“Transparency Convention”), 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 
2014 but not yet in force, provide clear guidelines in 
this regard.
 
lation, especially since regulations impacting are-
as such as the environment and natural resourc-
es usually involve continuous policy debates; and 
•	 	A	 legal	analysis	of	 the	new	generation	of	BITs	and	
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) sug-
gests that tribunals and states have already begun 
minimising potential regulatory chill by incorporat-
ing a “right to regulate” clause in substantive defini-
tions, general exception clauses and preamble lan-
guage in new investment agreements. This is also 
the case in the ICS proposal submitted by the EU. 
These conclusions are supported by the analysis of 
cases from NAFTA and CAFTA, which is a useful com-
parative tool since they are the most often used ISDS 
mechanisms for US investors. When examining rele-
vant cases related to policy space under NAFTA and 
CAFTA, one can draw three primary conclusions:
•		Investor	claims	that	succeed	in	ISDS	have	not		
directly challenged any government’s authority or abil-
ity to regulate within a given policy space. Instead, tri-
bunal awards requiring governments to pay out large 
sums to investors usually do not involve (in)direct chal-
lenges to government regulation and instead involve 
individual contractual, tax or export control issues;
•	 	 Investor	claims	that	directly	challenge	government	
regulations, and thus the government’s policy space, 
have never succeeded; and 
The Current Debate on
Investor Protection in TTIP
TTIP’s proposed investment protection standards 
and dispute settlement mechanisms have raised ques-
tions from governments, private industry and civil 
society. Of particular concern is the inclusion of an 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, 
whereby individual foreign investors may bring claims 
against host state governments for breach of TTIP’s 
investment protection standards. This ISDS system is 
comparable to what has been included in agreements 
such as the CETA between the EU and Canada, and 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAF-
TA-DR). In reaction to the public debate on ISDS, the 
European Commission initiated a public consultation 
in 2014. Reactions from the public were overwhelming; 
the Commission received around 150,000 replies. Al-
though around 97 percent of the replies were submitted 
through automatic on-line platforms of interest groups, 
containing pre-defined negative answers, the Europe-
an Commission was able to identify the following four 
topics on which further discussion was necessary: 
•		The	protection	of	the	right	to	regulate;
•		The	establishment	and	functioning	of	arbitral		 	
tribunals;
•	 	 The	 relationship	 between	 domestic	 judicial 
systems and ISDS; and
•	 	 The	 review	 of	 ISDS	 decisions	 for	 legal 
correctness through an appellate mechanism.
As is clear from a comparison of the investment chap-
ter of CETA with “older” bilateral investment treaties, 
these four topics have already been taken up in recent 
negotiations and treaty practice of the EU. Even so, the 
Commission and stakeholders identified the need for 
open consultation and communication with civil so-
ciety on this matter. In its latest negotiating proposal 
to the US, the EU proposes to drop ISDS and instead 
create an Investment Court System (ICS). The ICS al-
ternative has already been included in the concluded 
trade negotiations between the EU and Vietnam. A 
closer look at ISDS/ICS topics prompts the following 
conclusions:
The Right to Regulate
There are few, if any, cases to support the theory that 
investment arbitration has caused states to halt, cur-
tail, or roll back regulations aimed at legitimate poli-
cy concerns – even though there are examples where 
countries have acted to suspend agreements, such as 
Australia suspending a Bilateral Investment Trea-
ty (BIT) because of a US tobacco company. Although 
such “regulatory chill”, by its very nature, is difficult to 
prove, there is a considerable paucity of even anecdotal 
evidence for such a phenomenon despite various ISDS 
claims over the past twenty years. This is probably for 
a variety of reasons:
•		The	vast	majority	of	ISDS	claims	challenge	adminis-
trative decisions affecting single investors rather than 
legislative or regulatory acts per se; 
•	 	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 pinpoint	 ISDS	 as	 the	 sole	 cause	
or tipping point in preventing progressive regu-
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arbitration towards an Investment Court”, and in its 
latest negotiating proposal where the inception of an 
Investment Court System is envisaged.  Although the 
establishment of an entire Court might seem rather 
excessive in view of the fact that it will most likely have 
very few cases, this proposal could remove the odium 
that is currently attached to the term “arbitration”, 
while fulfilling the need for an independent interna-
tional dispute settlement body capable of deciding on 
individual claims.
Conclusions
As a result of the public consultation on ISDS in 2014, 
the European Commission has identified four topics 
for further study and discussion that are now included 
in the EU proposal to conceive an Investment Court 
System (ICS). These topics concern the right to regu-
late, certain aspects of the establishment and function-
ing of the arbitral tribunals, the relationship between 
domestic judicial systems and ISDS and the possibility 
of an appellate mechanism. The right to regulate has 
already been recognized in BITs and arbitral practice, 
while mechanisms to ensure the impartiality of arbi-
trators and the transparency of arbitral proceedings 
are currently available. This, of course, does not mean 
it could not be useful to discuss possible further re-
forms. As to the relationship of domestic courts and 
ISDS, requiring for the exhaustion of local remedies 
without any time limit could create severe problems, 
as recognised in the Madrid proposal. While bearing in 
mind potential downsides in terms of additional costs 
and time involved, the creation of an appellate mecha-
nism and an Investment Court System should certainly 
be considered.
Appellate Body’s existence, this was certainly the case 
(also out of a motivation to “create precedents”) but 
after a number of years, far fewer decisions were ap-
pealed. However, when discussing a possible ISDS ap-
peal mechanism in TTIP, one should be aware that any 
appeal institution might become a de facto law maker 
as its decisions would have influential effects as prec-
edents. 
 
Areas for Further Improving ISDS 
An ISDS mechanism has been included in most BITs 
over the past decades and has been extensively tested 
in arbitral practice. Although problematic issues do oc-
cur, TTIP could serve an important role in improving 
the existing ISDS mechanisms by raising the threshold 
to access international arbitration and affording the 
entire system with the required legitimacy. Interna-
tional investment law already recognises both the in-
dividual economic interests of investors and the public 
interests of host states. Arbitral tribunals have under-
lined the importance of “policy space” in several cases. 
This, however, does not mean that there is no room 
for improvement of the system. Any potential risks 
ISDS may pose for the EU and its Member States can 
be mitigated through careful and progressive drafting 
of the agreement. It is possible to include provisions to 
filter claims, to allow for greater protection for the pol-
icy choices of states parties, and to utilise procedural 
safeguards such as more transparent arbitration rules. 
These risk mitigation options serve to enhance the 
benefits of ISDS while striking an appropriate balance 
between protecting foreign investment as well as the 
public interest.
An interesting proposal was put forward on 2 March 
2015 by Social Democrats from various EU Member 
States (the so-called Madrid proposal), which incorpo-
rates almost all suggestions listed here and advocates 
the creation of an International Trade and Investment 
Court: “The choice of arbitrators should be limited to 
fixed pools of highly qualified arbitrators appointed 
by the EU, Canada and EU Member States, as far as 
possible qualified professional judges and academics, 
while seeking to secure specialist legal expertise”. A 
similar proposition was made by the European Com-
mission in its concept paper of May 2015 “Investment 
in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform: Enhancing 
the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc 
The Relationship between Domestic
Judicial Systems and ISDS
Several proposals exist concerning the relationship 
between domestic judicial systems and ISDS. One of-
ten-heard proposal is to require the exhaustion of local 
remedies before initiating international arbitral pro-
ceedings. Such a requirement has not been common 
practice in International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
(neither the US nor the current EU Member State’s 
BITs include it), although international investment law 
permits parties to reserve the right to set the exhaus-
tion of local remedies offered by the host state’s courts 
as a condition of consent to arbitration.
If the rule of exhaustion of local remedies were to be 
included, international arbitration would function in 
effect as a second-level remedy, an “appeal” at an inter-
national level after domestic redress has been sought. 
However, this requirement would result in significant 
delays (as parties would have to go through two, pos-
sibly more, levels of litigation in the host state, taking 
several years) as well as entail significant additional 
costs for both the investor and the state.
A fork in the road provision, as a further possibility to 
protect the domestic judicial system, aims at prevent-
ing concurrent or subsequent proceedings before dif-
ferent international or domestic tribunals or courts. 
According to the fork in the road provision, an inves-
tor must choose between bringing its claim before the 
host state’s courts or an international tribunal, such a 
choice being irreversible. The main rationale of this 
provision is to avoid contradictory results and to con-
fine the investor to one remedy by forestalling recourse 
to others. This option seems more desirable than the 
previous one because it does not entail extra costs and 
time, while most importantly, it obstructs foreign in-
vestors from having a wider range of fora available to 
pursue a claim, compared with domestic investors.
One intermediate option could be to require the inves-
tor to first seek a remedy with the local courts, thereby 
allowing the state to correct its own errors (if any), but 
if no satisfactory remedy is forthcoming within a de-
fined period of time (e.g. two years), the investor could 
launch international proceedings.
Appeal Mechanism
Regarding a possible appeal mechanism, the experience 
with the WTO Appellate Body is instructive. Practical 
questions in need of addressing concern the election 
process of the members of the appeal body as well as its 
financing. Provisions should be included on whether 
the appeal body would have the power to correct the 
original decisions itself or just to remand the case to 
the original tribunal (under the CETA text the latter 
option seems to be the most likely to be employed – 
further adding to the cost and time delay). 
The risk exists that as soon as an appeal mechanism 
is available, the losing party might be pressured by its 
citizens (in the case of states) or its shareholders (in the 
case of companies) to appeal the decision, regardless of 
the chances of success.
WTO experience shows that at the beginning of the 
the Current situation and 
expeCted ttip eFFeCts 
For 
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Changes in Polish production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Poland
due to TTIP (%)
Poland and the US – The current situation
Poland is predominantly a services economy. Around 
510.000 Polish jobs come from US controlled firms 
active in Poland. The US is the 2nd main (extra-EU) 
goods export destination (13 percent of goods exports) 
and the main services export destination (20 percent of 
services exports) for Poland. The main export sectors 
for Poland to the US are machinery, non-ferrous 
metals, transport equipment, and transport services. 
For Poland, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, wood products, and man-
ufacures sectors are expected to grow most, 
but also agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
and the other primary sector are expected to 
grow (and see wage increases). The electrical 
machinery sector may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of machinery (+3.2 percent). 
Exports are expected to increase most 
for the metals and metal products sector 
(+€547 m);
•	 For Polish firms, the price for transport 
equipment could go down by 1.4 percent 
because of TTIP. For consumers, the price 
of an average car is expected to decrease by 
0.9 percent.
Poland has a strong economic relationship with the 
US, and TTIP would contribute to additional income, 
higher wages for both low- and high-skilled workers, 
more investments and lower consumer prices. 
Poland and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
26 percent and consumer prices will go down by 0.3 
percent.
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Changes in Portuguese production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Portugal
due to TTIP (%)
Portugal and the US – The current situation
Portugal is predominantly a services economy, 
but it also has a sizeable manufacturing sector. 
Slightly over 50.000 Portuguese jobs come 
from US controlled firms active in Portugal. 
The US is the 2nd main (extra-EU) goods export 
destination (15 percent of goods exports) and main 
(extra-EU) services export destination (24 percent) 
for Portugal. The main export sectors for Portugal to 
the US are air transport, other transport services, and 
petrochemicals. 
For Portugal, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The motor vehicles, machinery, and man-
ufactures sectors are expected to grow 
most, but electrical machinery production 
may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate an increase in pro-
duction and export of motor vehicles by 
firms in Portugal (+1.9 percent, +€335 m). 
Exports could increase for manufactures 
as well (+€223 m);
•	 In Portugal, the prices for an average car 
and transport equipment could go down 
by 0.8 percent and 0.9 percent respectively 
because of TTIP.
Economic relations with the US are important for 
Portugal, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, and more investments. 
Portugal and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
26 percent and consumer prices will not change.
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Changes in Romanian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Romania
due to TTIP (%)
Romania and the US – The current situation
Romania is predominantly a services economy. 
Around 162.000 jobs in Romania come from US 
controlled firms active in Romania. The US is the 3rd 
main (extra-EU) goods export destination (9 percent 
of goods exports, after Turkey with 20 percent) and 
 
the main services export destination (23 percent of 
services exports) for Romania. The main export sectors 
for Romania to the US are machinery, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, business and ICT services, and iron 
and steel. 
For Romania, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, personal services and wa-
ter transport sectors are expected to grow 
most, but electrical machinery and motor 
vehicles may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of machinery (+1.1 percent). 
Most significant export expansions are ex-
pected in manufactures (+€139 m);
•	 For Romanian citizens the price for an av-
erage car could go down by 0.9 percent be-
cause of TTIP, and the prices for transport 
equipment by 0.6 percent.
Romania has a strong economic relationship with 
the US, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for high-skilled workers, more 
investments and lower consumer prices. 
Romania and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.2 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 18 percent and consumer prices will go down 
marginally by 0.1 percent.
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Changes in Slovakian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Slovakia
due to TTIP (%)
Slovakia and the US – The current situation
Slovakia is predominantly a services economy but with 
signifi cant value added in manufacturing as well. Just 
under 44.000 Slovakian jobs come from US controlled 
fi rms active in Slovakia. The US is the 3rd most 
important (extra-EU) goods export destination (12 
percent of goods exports, after China with 26 percent) 
and the main (extra-EU) services export destination 
(18 percent of services exports) for Slovakia. The main 
export sectors for Slovakia to the US are motor vehicles, 
machinery, air transport services, and iron and steel. 
For Slovakia, by reducing tariff  and non-tariff  
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The motor vehicles sector, but also the ma-
chinery, air transport, personal services and 
construction sectors are expected to grow, 
but electrical machinery may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of car parts and components 
by firms in Slovakia (+5.1 percent) and ex-
ports in this sector are expected to increase 
by €860 m;
•	 For Slovakians, prices would be lower for 
transport equipment (-1.8 percent) and 
cars (-0.8 percent).
Economic relations with the US are important for 
Slovakia, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-skilled 
workers, and more investments. 
Slovakia and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.5 
percent, and exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 116 percent (the largest increase of all EU Member 
States). Consumer prices remain the same.
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summary
EU consumers are concerned that mutual recognition of food standards 
may erode existing regulations in the EU, such as the ban on the use of 
growth promoters in meat production, GM food labelling and animal wel-
fare standards. Negotiators have repeatedly stated that TTIP is about 
making regulations more compatible, rather than aiming for the lowest 
common denominator. Meanwhile, consumers stand to benefit from TTIP 
in terms of extra disposable income as increased market access should re-
sult in lower prices. Consumers could also benefit from a greater variety of 
products and services to choose from. Given the differences between the 
EU and the US approaches to food and animal safety issues, it is impor-
tant that negotiating parties on both sides state clearly for the public that 
regulatory coherence would take place within the regulatory frameworks 
set in the EU and US, and would not lead to a weakening in standards of 
consumer protection.
insert 7:
ttip and Food saFety
By Dr. Siemen van Berkum9
9 Dr. Siemen van Berkum is a senior researcher/project manager for International Trade 
and Markets in the International Policy research unit of LEI Wageningen UR.
“Given the differences between the EU and the US approaches 
to food and animal safety issues, it is important that 
negotiating parties on both sides state clearly for the public 
that regulatory coherence would take place within the 
regulatory frameworks set in the EU and US, and would not 
lead to a weakening in standards of consumer protection.”
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Differences in regulations pertaining to
food safety between the EU and the US
Before looking at differences in regulations pertaining 
to food safety, it is important to explain the concept 
of the “precautionary principle”. The precautionary 
principle entails that in the absence of a clear under-
standing that something is safe, caution should be ex-
ercised. It is commonly thought that the EU applies the 
precautionary principle and the US does not. However, 
as Wiener shows, the precautionary principle is used 
on both sides of the Atlantic, not just on the EU-side.75 
What is more, one cannot say that one nation is “more 
precautionary” than the other; just that the precau-
tionary principle is applied in different sectors with 
varying degrees of force by the two respective partners. 
In the realm of agro-food, the concept of food safety 
in the US is relatively more based on “reasonable cer-
tainty of no harm” and not on the “precautionary prin-
ciple” as is relatively more the case in the EU. The US 
requires “scientific evidence” to justify restrictions on 
the use of a particular technique. The difference in ap-
proaches shows variance in the perception of risk that 
reflect differences in cultural and institutional frame-
works on both sides of the Atlantic. Three examples 
that illustrate the current debate on food safety are 
discussed below. 
in terms of product qualities and production/process-
ing methods. Handled correctly, regulatory coopera-
tion therefore can add to food safety in both regions 
alongside more international trade.
While there are potential consumer benefits, including 
in terms of regulatory protection of consumers, EU 
consumers and other NGOs are nonetheless worried 
that TTIP may pose a number of risks to food con-
sumption.74 The fear is that TTIP’s regulatory frame-
work could lead to a system of mutual recognition of 
food standards between partners, which could lead to 
a weakening of food safety standards in the EU and 
a “race to the bottom”. This claim warrants further 
analysis. First, this insert will examine the notion of 
differences in regulatory approaches – specifically in 
the field of food safety – followed by three examples of 
concerns that are present in the general TTIP and food 
safety debate, and finally this insert will observe what 
will be the likely outcomes from TTIP with regard to 
these cases. 
TTIP aims at removing barriers to transatlantic trade. 
When it comes to the effects of TTIP on consumers in 
the context of the elimination of these barriers, it is 
important to state clearly that regulatory cooperation 
would take place within the existing regulatory frame-
works set in the EU and the US. As a consequence, 
an ambitious TTIP agreement would not lead to any 
weakening of standards or consumer protections (and 
is expected to follow through on these statements in 
the final text).
Economic consumer gains
The welfare effects of TTIP are expected to be posi-
tive. Import tariff reductions and greater alignment 
of regulations and standards will reduce the prices of 
imports and, through increased competition, of do-
mestic goods, and hence increase consumers’ purchas-
ing power. In addition to the economic gains spelled 
out in the CEPR study regarding positive total welfare 
effects, consumers will have greater choice on how to 
spend their income because increased competition is 
expected to result in a greater variety of products and 
services. In general consumers would also spend less 
on goods and services, because of lower production 
costs. For example, EU consumers are likely to ben-
efit from lower prices for motor vehicles, and similar 
gains can be expected for chemicals (including both 
cosmetics and pharmaceuticals), electrical and elec-
tronic products, engineering, medical devices and tex-
tiles. More specifically, with regard to the benefits of 
lower prices and a wider variety of traded food prod-
ucts, European consumers may benefit from increased 
market access and imports of US dairy products, 
fruit and vegetables, and white meat in particular. 73 
 
 
Gains from regulatory cooperation can be twofold. 
First, to pursue, as appropriate, harmonised, equivalent 
or compatible solutions will reduce transaction costs 
to the potential benefit of consumers in terms of lower 
prices for imported goods. Second, regulatory cooper-
ation allows regulatory agencies on both sides of the 
Atlantic to develop common traceability and alert sys-
tems for food products. This may actually improve the 
ability of regulators to protect consumers, where such 
systems facilitate the rapid exchange of information on 
animal and ingredient identification (traceability sys-
tem) and sources of food contamination (alert system). 
Common traceability and alert systems can promote 
both trade and food safety by enhancing transparency 
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The regulatory cooperation chapter in TTIP is not like-
ly to lead to lowering of EU food standards or levels of 
consumer protection. It has been repeatedly stated that 
such an outcome is not and could not be considered. It 
is not the goal of the negotiations. Nor can the EU and 
US domestic regulatory systems be ignored – processes 
including notification and consultation must be ad-
hered to. In other words, regulatory cooperation can-
not just be negotiated in a trade agreement outside ex-
isting domestic regulatory frameworks. Apart from the 
information available on what will not be discussed, 
food safety standards cannot even be discussed in any 
case; these are subject to the sovereign right of the EU 
Member States and US authorities to change or adopt. 
Given the differences between the US and the EU con-
cerning food and animal safety issues, it will be an im-
portant and challenging task for negotiators to identify 
areas of compatibility between the EU and the US. In 
this sense, TTIP will likely lead to the establishment 
of processes for facilitating future cooperation, rather 
than major changes in existing regulatory objectives.
and subject to a risk assessment carried out by EFSA. 
European consumers have shown a preference for the 
labelling of products which contain GMOs, so that 
they can make an informed choice. Labelling also al-
lows for traceability. The labelling requirement is set 
in EU regulations, whereas in the US it is not.78 US 
authorities have always rejected GMO labelling and, 
in particular, their inclusion in trade agreements. 
Likely outcomes for food safety and 
consumer protection from TTIP
EU and US citizens have different perceptions of food 
safety risks. This has led to different regulatory sys-
tems, using sometimes different means to protect con-
sumers, although both can be effective. In response to 
consumer worries about existing EU standards, the 
European Commission underlines that TTIP will not 
be a race to the bottom, but rather offers an opportu-
nity to make regulations more compatible which “does 
not mean going for the lowest common denominator, but 
rather seeing where we diverge unnecessarily”.81 
 
In its position papers and textual proposals, the EU 
makes clear that TTIP will not change existing food 
safety rules. This message implies that the EU will 
keep its restrictions on hormones or growth promoters 
in livestock farming just as the US will keep its rules 
on microbial contaminants. This means that in areas 
where differences are deliberate in reflecting different 
views on safety, those differences in regulation will re-
main. Moreover, TTIP will not change the EU’s GMO 
authorisation process and will not affect EU animal 
welfare.82  During the February 2015 negotiation round, 
EU and US negotiators confirmed that “any work in 
the regulatory area would not do anything that would 
undermine domestic measures aimed at public policy 
objectives such as consumer and environmental protec-
tions”.83 At the same time, both sides pointed out their 
willingness to examine pragmatically whether regula-
tion can be enhanced and carried out in a more coor-
dinated fashion in relevant areas. Each side will keep 
the right to regulate environmental, safety and health 
issues at the level each side considers appropriate. 
Growth promotors 
Following increasing consumer concerns over the safe-
ty of artificial hormone use in cattle raised in the EU 
(following a series of hormone scandals in Italy in the 
late 1970s), the European Commission excluded the use 
of all hormone growth promoters in the early 1980s in 
the EU. Since 1988, the EU also banned the imports of 
meat produced with growth hormones for health and 
safety reasons. Consequently, the EU does not accept 
US beef that has been treated with growth-promoting 
hormones, effectively closing the EU as a destination 
for most US beef exports (though a market has devel-
oped for high end, grass fed beef from the US). 
An estimated 60 to 80 percent of US pigs are fed with 
ractopamine, a feed additive that promotes feed effi-
ciency. Ractopamine is, however, not allowed in the EU 
based on the 2009 EFSA Opinion on safety evaluation 
of the drug.76 The EFSA report concluded that there 
was insufficient data available to derive a safe residue 
level for human consumption. Besides the EU, large 
pork producing countries such as China and Taiwan 
and more than 100 other countries have (long) banned 
its use in livestock farming because of concerns about 
the effect of ractopamine residues in meat on human 
health. 
Animal welfare
Animal welfare groups have also expressed concern to-
wards TTIP. They fear that regulatory cooperation will 
be used to resist the strengthening of EU standards. 
However, the latter issue is complex, in particular be-
cause US legislation is not always less animal-friendly 
than in the EU, and differs across US states with Cal-
ifornian legislation being more animal-friendly than 
legislation adopted in most EU Member States.80
Genetically modified food products
Another concern relates to genetically modified (GM) 
foods. US authorities, companies and (most) farmers 
say that genetically modified products are proven safe 
by scientific studies, but consumers – according to a 
Eurobarometer survey – in the EU maintain the be-
lief that GM foods might be unsafe or even harmful, 
and are not in favour of genetically modified food.77 
In addition to the worries about the consequences 
of GMOs on human health, the impact of GMOs on 
the environment is a concern, particularly their ef-
fect on biodiversity and existing species. The Euro-
barometer survey reveals an overall strong suspicion 
of GM foods among the European public. The intro-
duction of GM plants, food and animal feed is per-
mitted in the EU but restricted since the early 1990s 
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Changes in Slovenian production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Slovenia
due to TTIP (%)
Slovenia and the US – The current situation
Slovenia is a services economy with a significant 
manufacturing sector as well. Around 8.000 Slovenian 
jobs come from US controlled firms active in Slovenia. 
The US is the 2nd largest (extra-EU) goods export 
destination (10 percent of goods exports) and 2nd 
 
largest (extra-EU) services export destination (10 
percent of services exports) for Slovenia. The main 
export sectors for Slovenia to the US are machinery, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, and 
business and ICT services.
For Slovenia, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The manufactures and machinery sectors 
are expected to grow most, but electrical 
machinery and motor vehicle production 
may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of manufactures (+1.0 per-
cent) and machinery (+1.0 percent), and 
exports in especially metals and metal 
products (+€51 m) are expected to increase;
•	 For Slovenians, the price for an average car 
could go down by 0.8 percent because of 
TTIP.
Slovenia does not have a very strong economic 
relationship with the US. Nonetheless, TTIP would 
contribute to additional income, higher wages for both 
low- and high-skilled workers, and more investments. 
Slovenia and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP and investments are each expected to increase 
permanently by 0.4 percent, exports to the US are 
expected to increase by 19 percent while consumer 
prices will remain the same.
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Changes in Spanish production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Spain
due to TTIP (%)
Spain and the US – The current situation
Spain is a services economy with a significant 
manufacturing sector as well. Around 264.000 
Spanish jobs come from US controlled firms active 
in Spain. The US is the main (extra-EU) goods export 
destination (11 percent of goods exports) and services 
 
export destination (20 percent of services exports) 
for Spain. The main export sectors for Spain to the 
US are business and ICT services, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, machinery and petrochemicals.
For Spain, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The machinery, water transport, and man-
ufactures sectors are expected to grow 
most, but electrical machinery production 
may decline;
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in the production of machinery (+1.5 per-
cent). Exports in chemicals and pharma-
ceuticals are expected to rise by €655 m;
•	 For Spanish consumers, the price for an 
average car could go down by 1.1 percent 
because of TTIP and the price for transport 
equipment by 0.8 percent.
Spain has a strong economic relationship with 
the US, and TTIP would contribute to additional 
income, higher wages for both low- and high-
skilled workers, more investments and lower prices. 
Spain and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 13 percent and consumer prices will go down 
marginally by 0.1 percent.
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Changes in Swedish production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in Sweden
due to TTIP (%)
Sweden and the US – The current situation
Sweden is predominantly a services economy. Around 
135.000 Swedish jobs come from US controlled fi rms 
active in Sweden. The US is the 2nd main (extra-
EU) goods export destination (14 percent of goods 
exports, after Norway with 21 percent) and 2nd main 
(extra-EU) services export destination (15 percent of 
services exports, after Norway with 26 percent) for 
Sweden. The main export sectors for Sweden to the US 
are machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and 
business and ICT services.
For Sweden, by reducing tariff  and non-tariff  
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The motor vehicles, water transport, and 
insurance services sectors are expected to 
grow most, but electrical machinery pro-
duction may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of car parts and components 
by firms in Sweden (+3.1 percent). Exports 
are poised to increase most for motor vehi-
cles (+€1.5 bn); 
•	 For Swedes the price for an average car 
could go down by 1.1 percent because of 
TTIP.
Sweden has a strong economic relationship 
with the US, and TTIP would contribute to 
additional income, higher wages for both low- 
and high-skilled workers, and more investments.
Sweden and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.5 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase by 
48 percent and consumer prices will not change.
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Changes in UK production
for top sectors (%)
Macro-economic changes in UK
due to TTIP (%)
United Kingdom and the US – The current situation
The UK is predominantly a services economy. 
1.700.000 jobs in the UK come from US 
controlled firms active in the UK. The US is the 
main (extra-EU) goods export destination (24 
percent of goods exports) and services export 
 
destination (34 percent of services exports) for the 
UK. The main export sectors for the UK to the US 
are financial services, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
machinery, and business and ICT services. 
For the UK, by reducing tariff and non-tariff 
measures in TTIP, without lowering standards:
•	 The financial services, insurance services, 
and water transport sectors are expected 
to grow most, but electrical machinery 
may decline; 
•	 TTIP could facilitate a significant increase 
in production of financial services (+1.3 per-
cent) and insurance services (+0.9 percent). 
The most significant export expansions are 
expected in motor vehicles (+€5.2 bn), and 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (€3.2 bn);
•	 For UK citizens the price for an average 
car could go down by 1.3 percent because 
of TTIP. 
The UK has a very strong economic relationship 
with the US, and TTIP would contribute significantly 
to additional income, higher wages for both low- 
and high-skilled workers, and more investments. 
United Kingdom and TTIP – Expected effects
GDP is expected to increase permanently by 0.4 
percent, exports to the US are expected to increase 
by 18 percent while consumer prices will remain the 
same.
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These estimates are based on NTB estimates from Ecorys (2009) and an ambitious scenario from CEPR (2013)
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summary
The regulatory cooperation chapter in TTIP may affect socio-economic 
variables, but it is not expected to lead to the lowering of employees’ 
rights. Regulatory cooperation will be focused on measures that directly 
affect goods and services traded between the EU and US, not on 
domestic policies (such as the minimum wage, unemployment benefits, 
unemployment protection). These issues will remain the exclusive domain 
of the respective legal and institutional domestic frameworks of the EU 
and EU Member States and the US. Regulatory cooperation may affect 
a country’s attractiveness to investors and thus affect wages, jobs and 
growth – however this is an investment induced effect, not a regulatory 
aspect. Moreover, this effect is likely to be positive because of a lower 
cost base for EU and US firms. Overall, the traditional free trade (market 
access) elements of TTIP are likely to have a positive social impact. 
Economic studies point to rising wages for many low- and high-skilled 
workers in key sectors, although there is also risk of falling wages in other 
sectors. Although there will be labour shifts between sectors, they are 
likely to be less than two percent of any likely labour reallocation due to 
other factors such as technological progress and domestic policies. For 
the sake of mitigating short-term pressures arising for EU Member State 
labour forces, domestic labour and education policies will be important.
insert 8:
ttip and soCial proteCtion
By Dr. Christopher Hartwell and Mr. Jan Teresiński10
10 Dr. Christopher Hartwell is President of CASE Management Board.
Mr. Jan Teresiński is a senior researcher at CASE.
“Regulatory cooperation will be focused on measures that 
directly aff ect goods and services traded between the EU 
and US, not on domestic policies (like the minimum wage, 
unemployment benefi ts, unemployment protection).
These issues will remain the exclusive domain of their 
respective legal and institutional domestic frameworks.”
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What are the potential effects of TTIP
in terms of social impact?
TTIP is likely to lead to labour and capital shifts be-
tween sectors, as well as income redistributions 
amongst workers of different skills. These effects can 
be especially significant depending upon the sector in 
which workers are employed. While these are impor-
tant to those immediately affected, they are short term 
effects. The CEPR study finds that, economy-wide, 
both low- and high-skilled workers can be expected to 
gain in the long run via wage increases (although the 
effect will be small – equal to or less than 0.5 percent of 
the wage rate).86 Similarly, Ecorys finds that wages for 
unskilled workers can be expected to rise by between 
0.4 percent (US) and 0.8 percent (EU), with similar ef-
fects for skilled workers.87 The rise in wages will occur 
due to lower tariffs and (especially) reduced regulatory 
differences, leading to cost savings, scale economies 
and productivity gains.
Regarding labour reallocation, according to the CEPR 
study, EU employment in the automotive sector will 
expand by 1.3 percent for high-skilled and 1.3 percent 
for low-skilled workers, while employment is expected 
to contract in electrical machinery (by 7.0 percent) and 
metal sectors (by 1.6 percent). In the US we also expect 
a reduction in employment in electrical machinery (by 
2.1 percent – the same direction as in the EU) and pro-
cessed foods (by 1.2 percent). These reflect productivity 
gains, and one should expect that these changes will 
lead to a more efficient allocation of the labour force 
(and of capital investment), because workers will be 
drawn to sectors able to pay higher wages (as reflected 
in estimated overall gains in wage levels). This means 
an increase in productivity. Overall, no more than 0.7 
tpercent of the labour force is expected to shift be-
tween sectors as a result of TTIP. This should not be 
a problem for three key reasons. First, over any likely 
implementation period, this is far outweighed by basic 
labour market turnover with new entry and retirement 
from the labour force. Second, with wage increases, 
labour displacement implies workers moving to areas 
in the economy where they can earn more and have 
better opportunities. Studies point to a pull of labour 
into higher paying sectors, rather than a push because 
of falling overall labour demand. Third, with its high 
levels of social protection, the EU is well placed to 
mitigate a lot of the short-run labour mobility effects. 
This last point does not mean the EU can ignore such 
adjustment costs. Rather it means the institutional 
mechanisms are largely in place to handle them and 
the EU and its Member States should use them.
commonly thought that a reduction in regulatory dif-
ferences will lead to a reduction in social (or any oth-
er kind of) protection in one country and a rise in the 
other. Some authors argue that in order to bridge regu-
latory differences, there may be a decrease in the levels 
of social or consumer protection and food safety in one 
of the trade blocs, at least in the short-term.85 This idea 
is supported by the view of the US trade unions that 
TTIP would help raise the level of social protection in 
the US, because an average with the (higher) EU level 
will be found – implying the EU would “lower” its lev-
els of social protection to a(n) (lower) average with the 
US. It is not plausible, however, that such an outcome 
would actually be realised. This is because regulatory 
cooperation will focus on measures that directly affect 
goods and services traded between the EU and US, 
not on domestic policies (e.g. minimum wage, unem-
ployment benefits, unemployment protection). These 
issues will remain the exclusive domain of the respec-
tive legal and institutional domestic frameworks of the 
EU (its Member States) and the US. To the extent that 
globalisation and related integration mechanisms put 
pressure on domestic decisions in these areas, one ex-
pects this type of pressure to be more important where 
there is wide disparity in social norms and incomes. 
However, the EU and the US in fact have very similar 
norms, standards and protections – especially in com-
parison to many other countries in the world.
Finally, the third part of TTIP relates to rules. This part 
is, among other things, devoted to sustainable devel-
opment and in particular workers’ rights and environ-
mental protection. An ambitious chapter in TTIP on 
these matters is envisaged by the negotiators.
TTIP aims at fostering economic growth and job cre-
ation in the EU and US via greater trade liberalisation 
and the alignment of regulatory differences. As with 
any FTA, it has social implications, which may include 
income redistribution and labour reallocation between 
sectors. In the case of TTIP, the regulatory chapter may 
cause additional effects that go beyond those of a more 
traditional FTA. Therefore, this insert will also inves-
tigate whether TTIP could affect employee rights, and 
the levels of social protection. 
Current issues concerning the social
implications of TTIP
A universal concern surrounding all forms of trade lib-
eralisation is that jobs will be “taken away” or that real 
incomes may diminish due to low-wage competition. 
In the case of TTIP these issues may arise – since trade 
agreements have winners and losers – although they 
are likely to be much less prevalent given the similar 
standards of living between the EU and the US. Even 
so, the social impact of TTIP is a matter of serious de-
bate on both sides of the Atlantic. Although policymak-
ers in the EU and the US recognise the important eco-
nomic benefits of the agreement (i.e. increases in trade, 
competitiveness, economic growth, and job creation) 
many valid concerns regarding social protection have 
been manifested in the public debate. 
Perhaps the more important social issue of TTIP re-
lates not to tariff removal, but to non-tariff measures, 
and in particular regulatory cooperation. This facet 
of the agreement has been seized upon as potential-
ly creating a “race to the bottom” in labour standards 
and environmental and safety norms harmonised to 
the lowest common denominator (as claimed by e.g. 
Hillary, 2014, and The Greens – European Free Al-
liance). For example, there is a fear that EU levels of 
social protection will be lowered through TTIP to US 
levels. Indeed, American trade unions are not as vehe-
mently opposed to TTIP as they are to other US FTAs, 
exactly because EU social protection is considered to 
be of a higher level.
Social protection elements and TTIP 
According to the European Commission, the final 
TTIP agreement will consist of three pillars: market 
access, regulatory cooperation and rules. It is possible 
that these components have social implications, but if 
so through different transmission channels. This sec-
tion will focus on market access, regulatory coopera-
tion, and rules.
Market access relates to traditional barriers to trade 
like customs duties. Although tariffs between the EU 
and the US are already low, because of particular differ-
ences (e.g. tariffs on cars) and because some tariff lines 
are amplified due to trade in parts and components of 
final products in value chains, there is still scope for 
further trade liberalisation. Removing tariffs that will 
facilitate trade can create temporary income redistri-
bution effects and labour shifts between sectors. With 
tariffs already low, it is believed, however, that the 
key social challenge (and thus also a key potential for 
gains) in EU-US trade relations lies in the differenc-
es in definitions, norms and regulations which may 
prevent a better flow of goods and services through 
so-called behind-the-border measures. The majority 
of economic gains from TTIP are likely to come from 
regulatory alignment – EU exports to the US are ex-
pected to increase by 28 percent (€ 187 billion), consti-
tuting 80 percent of total export growth. US exports to 
the EU are also expected to increase, by 37 percent (€ 
159 billion), accounting for 58 percent of total export 
growth.84 Thus, similar to the removal of formal tar-
iff barriers, regulatory cooperation can facilitate trade 
through lower transaction costs, which in terms of so-
cial impact may again result in income gains, income 
redistribution and labour reallocation. The size effect, 
however, of the impact of regulatory cooperation on 
social variables could differ from the traditional (mar-
ket access) tariff effect.
Regulatory cooperation may yet have another social 
impact. Reducing regulatory barriers to trade is in 
many ways envisioned as a process of alignment of 
regulatory systems between the two trade blocs. It is 
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One must also remember that changing the level of 
social protection in EU Member State labour markets 
can actually be beneficial for society in the long term. 
An example is labour market regulation, where a move 
towards improved labour market flexibility may also 
lead to better allocation of labour resources and more 
employment. This, however is an issue that is not reg-
ulated through TTIP, but by the domestic EU Mem-
ber States in their dialogues with social partners and 
through their own domestic systems. 
To conclude, we expect that in the majority TTIP is 
likely to have a positive social impact. Trade liberali-
sation in the long run 
will result in high-
er wages for both 
skilled and unskilled 
workers and higher 
productivity for the 
labour force. In our 
view, labour and em-
ployee rights will not 
decline, assuming 
that TTIP focuses on 
measures impacting 
cross-border trans-
actions. Similarly, 
high levels of social 
protection, consumer 
protection and food 
safety need not be 
lowered. TTIP offers 
the potential for ben-
efits both in economic and in social terms. However, 
to achieve such a mix of outcomes, it is vital that the 
EU negotiators take the concerns of different stake-
holders into account. They must listen to stakeholders, 
maintain transparency in the negotiations, and speak 
on behalf of the EU citizens they represent. It is also 
vital that labour market and education policies in the 
EU and its Member States are put to use to address any 
short-term labour market pressures.
•	 Third	–	though	not	through	the	regulatory	chap-
ter, but through investment – TTIP could affect soci-
eties in terms of wages, jobs and growth. It is an EU 
Member States’ right – through separate legal and 
institutional domestic frameworks – to decide on is-
sues like workers’ rights, unemployment benefits, 
unemployment protection, social security and so on. 
This, however, may make an EU Member State more 
or less attractive to (foreign) investments. While such 
decisions are not specifically linked to individual trade 
and investment agreements between the EU and third 
countries, the level of social protection does have an 
effect if investments are amplified through TTIP.
•	 Fourth,	 in	 light	 of	 evidence	 from	 other	 trade	
agreements, we believe that these are typical concerns 
that always arise before trade liberalisation. They are 
very often based on unsubstantiated claims that are 
not borne out in the final agreement. In our opinion, 
careful negotiation and open public disclosure of key 
negotiating positions and carve-outs for the domestic 
policy space can help to mitigate many of these con-
cerns. As with the example of the ILO, it is highly un-
likely that the EU will forsake its international obliga-
tions. 
As noted above, the key social concern of TTIP relates 
to the harmonisation of norms and standards. Many 
believe that labour markets in the EU are characterised 
by higher levels of regulation (focused on safeguarding 
security of employment and income) than its US coun-
terpart. It is often said, for example, that the EU has 
ratified all core labour conventions of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), while the US has only rati-
fied two – implying that the EU’s levels of social protec-
tion are higher than in the US. On the other hand, oth-
ers argue that the US upholds labour standards in an 
equivalent yet different (domestic) way. These differ-
ential preferences are unlikely to be affected by TTIP. 
It is highly implausible that the EU will withdraw from 
its ILO obligations or remove working regulations ap-
proved and adopted by the EU Member States. 
There also other social concerns related to TTIP im-
plementation as mentioned in the previous section. 
First, despite the fact that current norms in both trans-
atlantic economies in terms of social and consumer 
protection and environmental protection are among 
the world’s highest, differences in their approaches to 
regulation could result in a lower effective coverage 
if harmonised. Examples here include personal data 
protection differences, worker protection, consumer 
protection in financial markets, and renewable energy 
regulations. 
Even though the abovementioned developments are 
heavily debated as possible social impacts, we do not 
expect them to materialise for several reasons.
•	 First,	 we	 need	 to	 distinguish	 carefully	 between	
reducing trade barriers and reducing levels of social 
protection. Those are largely different things and we 
believe that a reduction in one should not also imply a 
reduction in the other. For example, labelling mistakes 
are the cause of over 22 percent of all detentions of 
products in US Customs.88 Reducing this barrier does 
not mean any TTIP trade partner lowers standards or 
levels of social protection. In the cosmetics chapter, 
the EU aims to reach an agreement with the US for the 
Cosmetics Annex on the following: “[That] both sides 
could work on further aligning labelling requirements on 
the basis of the International Nomenclature for Cosmetic 
Ingredients (INCI system) in particular as regards trivial 
names [e.g. acceptance of the term aqua as alternative 
to water]”.89 Reducing this barrier does not mean any 
TTIP trade partner lowers standards or levels of social 
protection.
This would not affect any cosmet-
ics standard, and thus not affect 
consumer protection levels, in the 
EU or US, but it would reduce un-
necessary trade barriers in the sec-
tor significantly.
•	 Second,	 TTIP	 is	 not	 ex-
pected to lead to a lowering of 
workers’ rights or levels of protec-
tion through the regulatory coop-
eration pillar, because regulatory 
cooperation will be focused on 
measures that affect goods and ser-
vices traded between the EU and 
US. TTIP is not to focus on issues 
that EU Member States and the EU 
choose – and have the full democratic right – to regu-
late domestically (e.g. workers’ rights, unemployment 
benefits). These rights form part of their separate legal 
and institutional domestic frameworks. The conse-
quence of this view is that in the EU one should not 
be worried about “lowering” the level of EU social pro-
tection. At the same time, given expressed civil society 
concerns and the general risk of special interest lob-
bying, it would probably help the public perception of 
the agreement if clear carve-outs for domestic policies 
(worker safety, public health, etc.) are made explicit. 
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ConClusions and
reCommendations
This study set out to contribute valuable and new 
information to the ongoing debate on TTIP in three 
ways. First, by exploring the economic relationship 
between individual EU Member States and the US. 
Second, by disaggregating the potential effects of TTIP 
on the economies of each EU Member State. Last but 
not least, the study sought to give in-depth insights 
into specific TTIP-related issues and concerns relevant 
to EU citizens. 
Based on the analysis provided in Insert 1 (p. 46) which 
compares the various methodological approaches used 
by economists to analyse the potential effects of TTIP, 
and other analyses of economic modelling, we conclude 
that the chosen Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model (including assumptions) in this WTI-
led study is the best approach available to date – an 
approach also used in similar but not identical ways 
by Ecorys, CEPR and CEPII over the past few years. 
This view is also shared by the European Parliament, 
outlined in its independent study of the literature 
on TTIP, and many other economists including, for 
example, Professor Dani Rodrik, in his blog of May 4th, 
2015, “The War of Trade Models.” 90 
Main conclusions of the study
Our research confirms the view that TTIP is not a 
traditional free trade agreement – it goes beyond 
the classic aims of market access and reducing or 
eliminating tariffs to include and arguably make 
its focal point regulatory and rules components. In 
contrast to traditional free trade agreements the main 
economic effects in TTIP are expected to come from 
addressing regulatory differences between the EU 
and US – by reducing unnecessary overlaps, reducing 
regulatory burdens, and aligning certification and 
conformity assessment procedures. In addition, TTIP 
is envisaged to contain separate chapters dedicated to 
both sustainable development and SMEs – placing a far 
greater emphasis on these two horizontal issues than 
in previous trade agreements. With that in mind, and 
also taking into account the combined weight of the 
transatlantic economy which can be further enhanced 
under an ambitious free trade agreement between the 
EU and the US, TTIP should be seen in the context of 
its potential – both as a driver for economic gains, but 
also as a model for future free trade agreements around 
the world and as a rules-setter in the global economy. 
 
As in any trade agreement – at sectoral level, especially 
in the short-run – there are winners and losers. It is 
imperative that through flanking and mitigating 
measures those that lose out are helped and supported 
as much as possible, while potential positive effects are 
enhanced. For this – both in the EU (and its Member 
States) and the US ample policy tools are available that 
can be put to use.
Current economic relations between
EU Member States and the US
Some EU countries are already well integrated 
economically with the US, while others are somewhat 
less affiliated in terms of trade in goods and services, 
FDI, and employment with their US counterpart. 
In analysing the relationships between individual 
Member States and the US, the following conclusions 
are drawn:
•	 For	 11	 out	 of	 the	 28	 Member	 States,	 the	 US	 is	
the most important extra-EU (i.e. excluding intra-EU 
trade flows) goods export destination (from Ireland 57 
percent of goods exports go to the US; from the UK 24 
percent and from The Netherlands 22 percent), and for 
10 out of 28 EU Member States, the US is the second 
most important extra-EU goods export destination. 
This makes the US by far the most important extra-EU 
export destination for goods.
•	 For	almost	two-thirds	(18	out	of	28)	of	EU	Member	
States, the US is the most important extra-EU services 
export destination (for example, in the case of Ireland, 
some 44 percent of Irish services exports go to the 
US, for Luxembourg 38 percent and Italy 27 percent); 
while for another quarter of EU Member States, the 
US is the second most important extra-EU services 
export destination. This makes the US by far the most 
important extra-EU export destination for services.
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in consumer prices, and Belgium benefits from a 
combination of export and production increases, and 
reduced consumer prices.
In macro-economic terms, TTIP is expected to lead to:
•		 Increases in GDP for 27 out of the 28 EU   
 Member States. 
	 •	 Lithuania	is	expected	to	see	the	largest		
 increase, of +1.6 percent;
	 •	 Crisis-hit	countries	including	Greece,	Italy,
 Spain, Portugal and Ireland are expected to see  
 significant economic gains; while
	 •	 Malta	is	the	only	EU	country	forecasted
 to see a contraction in GDP, of approximately
 0.3 percent once TTIP is fully implemented.
•	 Significant increases in total exports for all 
28 EU Member States, ranging from +5 percent for 
Cyprus and +9 percent for Croatia to +48 percent for 
Sweden, +64 percent for Austria, and +116 percent for 
Slovakia.
•	 Increases in wages in all 28 EU Member States 
wages for high-skilled workers, ranging from +0.03 
percent in Czech Republic, and +0.1 percent in 
Romania and Estonia to +1.0 percent in Belgium, +1.3 
percent in Lithuania and +1.4 percent in Ireland. 
•	 Increases in wages for low-skilled workers in 25 
out of 28 EU Member States, ranging from +0.1 percent 
in Hungary to +1.5 percent in Ireland. In Romania 
(-0.02 percent), Czech Republic (-0.07 percent) and 
Estonia (-0.2 percent) wages for low-skilled workers 
are expected to decrease marginally.
•	 A reduction in income inequality in 16 out of 28 
EU Member States, since wages of low-skilled workers 
are expected to grow faster than wages for high-skilled 
workers in those countries.
•	 For 20 out of 28 Member States, consumer
prices are expected to decrease because of TTIP.
Lithuania (-0.9 percent), Poland (-0.3 percent), and 
Malta (-0.2 percent) see the most significant drops in 
prices.
• In 8 EU countries, consumer prices are expected 
to remain the same or rise marginally, notably in 
Bulgaria (+0.2 percent) and Austria (+0.2 percent).
Expected economic gains from TTIP are the product of:
•	 Lower	 prices,	 since	 regulatory	 cooperation	 and	
coherence will lead to lower production costs and 
lower bottlenecks in global value webs. This – in turn – 
leads to higher levels of competitiveness for EU and US 
firms, to lower prices and/or higher returns; 
•	 Countries	 reaping	 the	 benefits	 of	 specialisation	
and scale economies from enhanced trade, exploiting 
“comparative advantage” leading to higher levels of 
productivity; 
•	 More	 choice	 and	 variety	 of	 goods	 available	 to	
consumers.
•	 The	investment	relationship	between	the	EU	and	
the US is very strong, but differences in the depth of 
the investment relation between EU Member States 
and the US is high, as Table 2 shows. Countries 
including the The Netherlands, the UK, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Ireland have very strong investment 
relationships (both in terms of inward and outward 
FDI) with the US, while several of the newer Member 
States, including Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Romania, and Czech Republic, have (almost) 
no investment relationship with the US.
•	 Of	all	 jobs	created	by	foreign-controlled	firms	in	
the EU, 63 percent of jobs come from other Member 
States, 19 percent from US-controlled firms, and 19 
percent from all other firms together. This makes US-
controlled firms by far the most important extra-EU 
job creators in the EU. As with investments, however, 
the figures differ somewhat per Member State. In Ireland 
(40 percent), the UK (31 percent), Italy (23 percent) 
and France (23 percent) the shares of jobs created by 
US-controlled firms are the highest. In countries like 
Croatia (3 percent), Cyprus (4 percent), Latvia (4 percent) 
and Lithuania (5 percent), shares are much lower. 
 
Macro-economic effects of TTIP
TTIP is expected to lead to significant economic 
gains for the EU and the various EU Member States – 
however, these gains: 
•	 Are not equally spread between EU Member 
States: some Member States gain relatively more than 
others; and 
•	 Come in different forms: for example, Austria 
gains relatively more in terms of export and production 
increases, while Lithuania gains most from a reduction 
Table 2. Bilateral investment relationship of the top- 
and bottom-five Member States and the US 
(cumulative € billion, 2009-12)
Member 
States
Member 
State
US investments in 
EU Member States
EU Member State 
investments in US
the netherlands 1,763.18 1,340.42
0.13 -0.00
1,560.18 727.34
0.13 -0.00
961.87 619.50
0.01 -0.01
527.72 602.02
0.00 -0.02
348.59 348.59
0.00 -0.04
the netherlands
estonia romania
Top-5 Member States Top-5 Member States
Bottom-5 Member States Bottom-5 Member States
uk
Croatia Croatia
luxembourg
latvia lithuania
ireland
lithuania estonia
germany
germany
France
luxembourg
slovenia Czech republic
uk
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meets either the EU or US standard and/or regulations 
will have access to the transatlantic market, not just EU 
or US firms), and TTIP (in the future) must be open for 
other countries to join – creating an incentive for third 
countries to want to go by the same standards and 
regulations, setting similar levels of consumer, social 
and environmental levels of protection as is the case in 
the EU and US.
•	 Sixth,	from	an	environmental	protection	perspec-
tive, fears of regulating downwards environmental 
protections in the EU are unfounded, since the focus 
for negotiators is on upholding protections while en-
hancing regulation in compatible areas, and also be-
cause TTIP does not seek to legislate. In addition, the 
risk of a supposed “regulatory chill” on governments’ 
“right to regulate” on environmental issues because of 
ISDS is low, since the EU negotiating mandate explic-
itly states that the pursuit of “legitimate public policy 
objectives” will remain the prerogative of national gov-
ernments (Insert 4 TTIP and environmental protection).
•	 Seventh,	 the	 overall	 environmental	 impact	 of	
TTIP could prove to be negative, but hinges on the 
net balance of three effects: additional emissions (i.e. 
the scale effect) stemming from increased welfare and 
production, sectoral effects (i.e. the composition effect) 
from growing and declining sectors, and improvements 
in efficiency and technology (i.e. the technique effect). 
While increased trade may lead to rising emissions, this 
may be partially offset by better regulatory practices 
and increases in the trade of environmental goods. 
Moreover, the stronger the environmental protection 
provisions in TTIP, the larger the possibility for a 
positive net balance (Insert 4 TTIP and environmental 
protection).
•	 Eighth,	TTIP	could	deliver	particularly	important	
benefits for SMEs, who make up 99 percent of businesses 
in the EU. Lower regulatory burdens and improved 
market access through exports matter relatively the 
most for SMEs who are less able to overcome the many 
regulatory barriers to trade with the US (according to 
the European Commission/Ecorys SME survey) than 
are big companies. For SMEs, administrative and other 
requirements often pose prohibitive barriers to trade 
that can be addressed through TTIP, such as tariffs, 
rules of origin certification, duty-free exemptions for 
small shipments, and visa flexibility (Insert 5 TTIP and 
SMEs).
Our findings also demonstrate a clear link between 
the level of integration of an EU Member State with 
the US and the level of economic gains arising from 
TTIP for that Member State: that is, the deeper 
the economic relationship of a Member State with 
the US, the higher the expected gains from TTIP. 
Countries including Ireland, the UK, Austria and the 
Netherlands are deeply integrated with the US and 
are expected to gain significantly from TTIP. For less 
integrated Member States, such as Croatia or Cyprus, 
the potential gains from TTIP are relatively lower. 
 
Main conclusions from thematic inserts
The thematic inserts cover various aspects of TTIP in 
more depth. From these, we can draw some interesting 
conclusions.
•	 First,	TTIP	is	not	expected	to	harm	the	EU	
Internal Market and could even give it a significant 
boost. This is expected because:
	 •	 Trade	diverted	away	from	the	EU	
Internal Market to the US will be minimal, since 
manufacturing tariffs are already low and higher 
agricultural tariff removals can be spread out over 
time; 
	 •	 the	EU	Internal	Market	is	still	fragmented	in	
key TTIP areas, and therefore TTIP cannot erode EU 
preferences that barely exist (for example, norms of 
goods, public procurement); 
	 •	 significant	benefits	are	expected	to	accrue	
from mutual equivalence in regulatory cooperation; 
it would incentivise regulators to focus on the 
multilateral dimension of regulations which would 
help integrate the EU Internal Market (see Insert 2 on 
TTIP and the EU Internal Market). 
•	 Second,	 for	 TTIP	 to	 deliver	 significant	 benefits	
from regulatory cooperation, it should look not only 
at harmonisation, but also at developing the concept 
of “equivalence”. In areas where standards between 
the EU and the US are similar but the regulations that 
govern them are different, mutual equivalence can lead 
to a “race to the top” by making regulations in these 
areas more compatible. In these areas, each domestic 
regulator’s regulations must meet the standards set for 
equivalence and each regulator must work together 
with its counterparts to establish the highest standards 
possible. Crucially, this would be without recourse 
to amending in any way domestic laws, which would 
be politically undesirable (see Insert 2 on TTIP and the 
EU Internal Market and Insert 3 on TTIP and regulatory 
cooperation).
•	 Third,	 regulatory	 coop-
eration through TTIP could lead 
to a more integrated and stream-
lined transatlantic regulatory en-
vironment that would contribute 
to higher levels of safety, increased 
consumer choice and significantly 
reduced costs for producers and 
consumers on both sides of the 
Atlantic. This would be beneficial 
for consumers and it could have a 
significant positive effect on the 
competitiveness of the EU and US 
economies in today’s globalised 
world (Insert 3 on TTIP and regula-
tory cooperation).
•	 Fourth,	 because	 TTIP	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 legislate	
and because it aims to enhance regulatory cooperation 
by avoiding unnecessary regulatory overlap, reduction 
of administrative burdens, improvements in the quality 
of regulation, and the safeguarding of consumer 
rights, TTIP is expected to achieve economic and 
geopolitical gains while at the same time focusing 
on and maintaining the highest provisions for social, 
environmental and consumer protection on both sides 
of the Atlantic (Insert 3 TTIP and regulatory cooperation).
•	 Fifth,	 for	 TTIP	 to	 have	 a	 global	 economic	 and	
rules-based impact and lead to positive spill-over 
effects for third countries, TTIP must be designed 
as open as possible. An ‘open’ TTIP will have few if 
any rules of origin provisions, will have open mutual 
recognition agreement elements (i.e. any firm that 
•	 Ninth,	 there	 is	 little	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 show	
that ISDS has caused so-called “regulatory chill” on 
governments at national or EU level, but irrespective 
of this lack of evidence, it is essential that the right to 
regulate is upheld by including appropriate safeguards 
in the final treaty text. This could be achieved, for 
example, by explicitly detailing states’ right to regulate 
in sensitive areas (Insert 6 TTIP and investor protection).
•	 Tenth,	TTIP	provides	an	opportunity	to	enhance	
investment protection and the ISDS mechanism in 
free trade agreements. Modern trade agreements 
retain ISDS as an option for investors while also more 
explicitly detailing states’ right to regulate in certain 
legitimate public interest areas, providing more 
objective arbitrage, and acting against frivolous claims. 
An enhanced ISDS/ICS in TTIP could therefore set a 
model for similar instruments around the world. In 
order to address public concerns relating to ISDS and 
to ensure that the mechanism is applied appropriately, 
provisions in TTIP should be clear, unambiguous 
and well-defined so that a balance between investor 
protection and public interest is achieved. Interestingly, 
a lot of these issues are addressed in the most recent EU 
proposal on ICS (Insert 6 TTIP and investor protection). 
•	 Eleventh,	for	consumers,	TTIP	could	lead	to	lower	
prices and a greater variety of products and services to 
choose from. This is the traditional outcome associated 
with reducing barriers: lower costs of production and 
lower consumer prices, and more varieties of goods 
available across the trading nations (Insert 7 TTIP and 
food safety).
•	 Twelfth,	 in	 the	 area	 of	 food	 safety,	 TTIP	 could	
be made into an opportunity to make regulations 
more compatible without affecting the high standards 
enjoyed by consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The EU and US have the highest food standards in the 
world, but their citizens have different perceptions 
of food safety risks which has led to the creation and 
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→ Devote particular attention to formulating and 
implementing policies that support the enhanced 
education of their workforces, including at both the 
low- and highly-skilled levels. TTIP is expected to 
enact changes, albeit moderate, in the economies of 
individual EU Member States, including by impacting 
on production and labour. Highly educated workforces 
across the EU will be better equipped to adapt to the 
changing demands on their economies from both 
TTIP and from external factors such as technological 
progress. 
We recommend the following to the
European Commission:
→ Seek to (gradually) phase out tariffs in the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors to minimise 
the trade diversion effects that could arise from TTIP;
→ Continue to deepen the Internal Market in parallel 
to TTIP, since the more integrated it is, the greater the 
effects from TTIP. Our analysis, also confirmed by other 
studies, demonstrates that spill-over gains arising from 
TTIP are likely to occur faster and more beneficially 
the more integrated the EU Internal Market is;
→ Maximise the potential gains from regulatory 
convergence, in particular by emphasising the 
importance of “equivalence” and “joint assessments” 
that would avoid complications associated with 
harmonisation, encourage integration of the 
transatlantic market, and promote a “race to the top” 
on regulation. To ensure that the benefits of regulatory 
cooperation continue to be felt long after an agreement 
is concluded, a Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB) 
should be established in TTIP that empowers 
regulators to continually assess areas where regulatory 
cooperation could be enhanced;
→ Define clear provisions and guarantees within 
both the sectoral and horizontal chapters in TTIP to 
ensure that the high standards enjoyed by citizens 
on both sides of the Atlantic are resolutely upheld. 
application of different regulatory systems. While 
recognising that both systems can be effective, TTIP 
provides an opportunity to identify areas in which 
standards are similar but the methods to achieve them 
can be different. In those areas, regulations can be 
made more compatible to facilitate transatlantic trade 
(Insert 7 TTIP and food safety).
•	 Thirteenth,	TTIP could have a 
significant positive social impact. 
Wages for many low- and high-
skilled workers will rise in key 
sectors, and wages for low-skilled 
workers are likely to rise marginally 
faster than for high-skilled workers 
in the majority of EU Member 
States. The regulatory cooperation 
chapter in TTIP may affect socio-
economic variables, but it is not 
expected to lead to the lowering 
of employees’ rights. In the short-
term there are, however, winners 
and losers, and social policies must 
be used to flank TTIP (in the short-
term). (Insert 8 TTIP and social 
protection).
•	 Finally,	 limited	 labour	 mobility	 should	 be	
expected between sectors, with some sectors growing 
while others may contract. However, any such mobility 
is likely to be limited in comparison to external factors 
such as technological progress, and independent 
domestic and EU policies; and will in any case lead 
to increases in wages and a small decline in wage 
inequality. Meanwhile, because regulatory cooperation 
is focused on measures that directly affect goods and 
services traded between the EU and US, domestic 
policies will remain the exclusive domain of the 
respective legal and institutional domestic frameworks 
(Insert 8 TTIP and social protection).
Recommendations
Our findings demonstrate that a transatlantic free 
trade agreement between the EU and the US is 
expected to bring economic and social benefits to the 
EU and to the EU Member States. TTIP is a means to 
improve the welfare of EU citizens, to enhance the 
transatlantic relationship which defines the values and 
standards held by citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, 
and to help establish the rules and standards of the 
future global trading environment.
We recommend the following to
the EU Member States:
→ Pursue a TTIP agreement that will boost income 
levels and investment in the EU Member States, 
increase competitiveness and consumer choice, and 
resolutely uphold standards. Although the EU Member 
States explicitly mandated the European Commission 
to conclude the negotiations on their behalf, there 
is significant scope for EU countries to play an 
active and constructive role in the negotiations. By 
providing feedback and guidance to EU negotiators 
and stakeholders, and by communicating about 
TTIP to their citizens through regular and active 
engagement with stakeholders at all levels of society, 
EU governments can help to define and shape an 
agreement fit for today’s modern, globalised world;
→ Enhance their economic relationships with the 
US through domestic policies of their own. TTIP 
is expected to result in more significant economic 
benefits for those EU Member States that are relatively 
more integrated with the US. Therefore, enacting 
policies independent of but flanking TTIP that 
encourage trade between their countries and the US 
could further boost growth, reduce income inequality 
and modernise their economies;
→ Conduct a thorough exploration of the effects 
of TTIP on their own countries, so that they can reap 
the many potential benefits of TTIP and mitigate any 
possible negative effects on their economies. TTIP will 
result in different outcomes both at the horizontal and 
at the sectoral levels. Therefore, economic, social and 
environmental policies that account for the expected 
impacts of TTIP will bring benefits to the individual 
EU Member States and also a net benefit to the EU as a 
whole;
 The stronger the provisions, the greater the 
opportunity for TTIP to set a template for future trade 
agreements and for standards at the global level;
→ Devote particular emphasis to increased 
opportunities for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
in TTIP, since they lack the resources of big companies 
to overcome the many burdensome regulatory and 
other barriers to trade. TTIP will be the first EU free 
trade agreement that devotes a specific chapter to 
SMEs. However, negotiators should ensure that the 
fundamental importance of SMEs to TTIP is embedded 
across the agreement. This could for example, include 
the creation of an “SME Test” within TTIP that would 
analyse the potential effects on SMEs arising from any 
TTIP element;
→ Use TTIP as an opportunity to reform mechanisms 
that have been used to safeguard investors’ rights and 
create a new standard for these instruments globally. 
The European Commission, in its November 2015 
negotiating proposal, put forward constructive 
proposals for a reform of ISDS called ICS, to provide 
a balance between investment protection and the 
public interest. It should continue to engage with 
EU policymakers and stakeholders on this issue and 
ensure that investment provisions in TTIP safeguard 
governments’ right to regulate, provide guarantees to 
investors, and serve as a model for similar instruments 
in EU free trade agreements and in investment treaties 
around the world;
→ Make TTIP an open trade agreement with 
very few Rules of Origin provisions and with the 
possibility for third countries to join in the future. 
The first element of an ‘open’ TTIP means that mutual 
recognition in TTIP should apply to any producer that 
adheres to the set standards and regulations, not just 
EU and US producers. The second element of an ‘open’ 
TTIP means that TTIP should be open for accession 
by countries that want to do so and that commit to 
maintaining equivalent high standards and levels of 
protection;
→ Maintain an ambitious transparency agenda and 
explore further opportunities to engage with the public. 
Already, the European Commission has initiated an 
unprecedented level of transparency in its approach 
to the TTIP negotiations, by publicising negotiating 
documents and by engaging in regular consultation 
with stakeholders and policymakers. This approach 
will ensure that the EU delivers an agreement that best 
meets the needs of EU citizens and business.
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A.1 Model Non-Technical Annex
The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
employed for this publication is based on the widely 
used GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), with added features 
from the Francois, van Meijl, and van Tongeren (2005) 
model, following closely the implementation in the 
CEPR (2013) study of TTIP. More technical details of the 
model are provided in the technical annex. The most 
important aspects of the model can be summarised as 
follows:
•	 It	covers	global	world	trade	and	production
•	 It	allows	for	scale	economies	and
 imperfect competition
•	 It	includes	intermediate	linkages	between	sectors
•	 It	allows	for	trade	to	impact	on	capital	stocks		
 through investment effects which allows us to
 obtain longer-run impacts on the economy 
 
In the model, there is a single representative composite 
household in each region, with expenditures allocated 
over personal consumption and savings. The 
composite household owns endowments of the factors 
of production and receives income by selling these 
factors to firms. It also receives income from tariff 
revenue and rents accruing from import/export quota 
licenses. Part of the income is distributed as subsidy 
payments to some sectors, primarily in agriculture. 
Taxes are included at several levels in the modelling. 
Production taxes are placed on intermediate or primary 
inputs, or on output. Tariffs are levied at the border. 
Additional internal taxes are placed on domestic or 
imported intermediate inputs, and may be applied at 
differential rates that discriminate against imports. 
Where relevant, taxes are also placed on exports, and 
on primary factor income. Finally, where relevant (as 
indicated by social accounting data) taxes are placed on 
final consumption, and can be applied differentially to 
consumption of domestic and imported goods. 
On the production side, in all sectors, firms employ 
domestic production factors (capital, labour and land) 
and intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign 
sources to produce outputs in the most cost-efficient 
way that technology allows. Perfect competition is 
assumed in all sectors except heavy manufacturing 
sectors. In sectors where perfect competition is 
assumed, products from different regions are assumed 
to be imperfect substitutes. 
Heavy manufacturing sectors are modelled with 
imperfect or monopolistic competition. Monopolistic 
competition involves scale economies that are internal 
to each firm, depending on its own production 
level. An important property of the monopolistic 
competition model is that increased specialisation at 
intermediate stages of production yields returns due 
to specialisation, where the sector as a whole becomes 
more productive the broader the range of specialised 
inputs. These gains spill over through two-way trade 
in specialised intermediate goods. With these ‘spill-
overs’, trade liberalisation can lead to global scale 
effects related to specialisation. Similar gains follow 
from consumer goods specialisation. 
In the standard GTAP model, tariffs and tariff revenues 
are explicit in the GTAP database, and therefore in 
the core model. However, NTBs affecting goods and 
services trade, as well as cost savings linked to trade 
facilitation, are not explicit in the database and hence 
a technical coefficient must be introduced to capture 
these effects. For this, we instead model NTBs as a mix 
of dead weight or iceberg costs1 , and rents generated by 
NTBs. In formal terms, dead-weight costs capture the 
impact of non-tariff measures on the price of imports 
from a particular exporter due to destination-specific 
changes in costs for production and delivery. 
The model incorporates GTAP v9 data. The GTAP data 
are benchmarked to the year 2011, but this is projected 
to the base year 2030. Tariffs reflect the most recent 
applied rates, as incorporated in the GTAP database. 
While the GTAP database has 57 sectors and 140 
different regions available, for the purpose of this 
study we have aggregated sectors and regions to allow 
us to concentrate on the key results. The sectoring and 
regions scheme follows the CEPR (2013) and Ecorys 
(2009) studies, with a further breakout of individual 
Member States.  
 
1  We follow the standard approach to modelling iceberg or 
dead-weight trade costs in the GTAP framework, originally 
developed by Francois (1999, 2001) with support from the 
European Commission to study the Millennium Round (now 
known as the Doha Round). This approach has grown from 
an extension in early applications to a now standard feature 
of the GTAP model, following Hertel, Walmsley and Itakura 
(2001). It has featured in the joint European Commission-
Canadian government study on an EU-Canada FTA, as well 
as the 2009 Ecorys study on EU-US non-tariff barriers and the 
CEPR (2013) study.
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methodology
key features of the model
Model simulations are based on a multi-region global CGE model. Sectors 
are linked through intermediate input coefficients (based on national social 
accounts data) as well as competition in primary factor markets. The model 
includes imperfect competition, short-run and long-run macroeconomic 
closure options, as well as the standard static, perfect competition, 
Armington-type of model as a subset. It also allows alternative labour 
market closures. On the policy side, it offers the option to implement tariff 
reductions, export tax and subsidy reduction, trade quota expansion, input 
subsidies, output subsidies, and reductions in trade costs. International trade 
costs include shipping and logistic services (the source of fob-cif margins) 
but can also be modelled as Samuelson-type deadweight costs. This can 
be used to capture higher costs when producing for export markets, due to 
regulatory barriers or NTBs that do not generate rents (or where the rents 
are dissipated through rent-seeking).
In 1995, failed efforts towards a transatlantic 
marketplace (the “New Transatlantic Marketplace” 
or NTM) were followed by the adoption of the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the creation of 
the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). 
Dialogues between consumer organisations (TACD), 
environmental groups (TAED) and labour unions 
(TALD) were also started but only the former two still 
exist.
In 1997, the then EU-US Summit adopted a joint 
statement on regulatory cooperation, calling for 
enhanced cooperation whenever possible in the early 
stages of drafting regulations, greater reliance on 
each other's technical resources and expertise, and 
harmonisation of regulatory requirements or mutual 
recognition. 
In 1998, the EU-US developed a Mutual Recognition 
Agreement (MRA) of conformity assessment 
certificates (i.e. without alignment of the relevant 
regulations). Subsequently, an "enhanced MRA" (i.e. 
one that concerns mutual recognition of certificates 
based on equivalent or common requirements) was 
agreed in the area of marine safety equipment.
In 1998, the EU and the US launched the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP). The related TEP Action 
Plan called for action to address technical barriers 
to trade in goods, including improving the dialogue 
between EU and US regulators. 
On the basis of the TEP Action Plan, and following 
some three years of negotiations, the European 
Commission and the US Government developed a 
key document: the EU-US Guidelines on Regulatory 
Cooperation and Transparency, endorsed by the 
EU-US Summit in 2002. The Guidelines have several 
objectives, including to "improve the quality and level 
of technical regulations and pursue, as appropriate, 
harmonized, equivalent or compatible solutions, 
and take appropriate steps to minimize or eliminate 
unnecessary divergence in regulations…" They offer 
practical guidance on how regulatory cooperation 
could take place for each step of the regulatory process. 
The Guidelines apply to the regulators of the US 
Federal Government and the services of the European 
Commission on a voluntary basis and as broadly as 
possible. The regulatory activity concerned is the 
planning and development of technical regulations 
relating to goods in the entire field of application of the 
WTO/TBT Agreement (except agricultural products), 
and apply both to future technical regulations, as well 
as to amendments to existing technical regulations, 
that regulators of either side believe may have 
significant trade effects.
The Guidelines are particularly relevant since they 
enjoy “regulator buy-in”: they were developed in close 
cooperation with regulators on both sides – and were 
even “approved” in internal inter-service (European 
Commission) and interagency (US) procedures - to 
ensure that they make sense to those who would apply 
them. They also carry particular legal importance: 
following a challenge in the European Court of Justice 
by an EU Member State (France), the Court confirmed 
inter alia the right of the Commission to conduct 
regulatory dialogues with third country governments 
in this form as part of its process of preparing 
regulatory proposals.
The Guidelines were “implemented" by a series of 
annual Roadmaps, recognised by successive EU-US 
Summits between 2004-2007 (the first Roadmap is 
noted in the "EU-US Declaration on Strengthening 
our Economic Partnership", adopted by the EU-US 
Summit in 2004 as one of the areas where concrete 
progress has been made in the work to create a 
seamless Transatlantic Economic Partnership). These 
Roadmaps created a concrete work programme to be 
implemented during the year following its adoption, 
and attempted to support a move towards a more 
systematic approach in regulatory cooperation. 
Roadmaps outlined a broad range of activities intended 
to expand market opportunities and help minimise EU-
US regulatory divergences – both horizontally and in a 
number of sectors. 
Jan E. Frydman is special advisor to EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and 
a partner of the law firm Ekenberg & Andersson in Stockholm, Sweden. He was until 
recently the European Commission’s Head of Unit for International Regulatory Affairs at 
its Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry and was, for many years, in charge of 
transatlantic relations, notably of the development of the EU’s regulatory cooperation 
efforts for goods with the US, Canada and other non-EU countries. 
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a summary history oF eu-us
regulatory Cooperation: 1995-2015
By: Mr. Jan Frydman
Horizontally, a dialogue between the European 
Commission and the White House's Office of 
Management and Budget/Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OMB/OIRA), the so called 
OMB-EC Dialogue, addressed, through a series of 
meetings and high calibre seminars, the foundational 
issues of regulation, i.e. "how we regulate": regulatory 
policy, impact assessment, risk assessment, risk 
management and regulatory processes, including 
transparency. The Roadmap also suggested an 
informal exchange programme between regulators 
to enhance understanding and cooperation where 
useful. The most recent Roadmap (from 2007, as 
no Roadmaps were developed following the start of 
TEC) also included sectoral dialogues in no fewer 
than 13 different areas: pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices, cosmetics, chemicals, automobiles, electrical 
equipment, consumer product safety, ICT standards, 
telecommunications equipment, marine equipment, 
energy efficiency, eco design and nutritional labelling.
In 2002, the EU-US Summit adopted the Positive 
Economic Agenda (PEA), and a related Roadmap 
to it. First among its items was the implementation 
of the Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and 
Transparency.
In 2004, the EU-US Summit adopted the EU-
US Declaration on strengthening our economic 
partnership, which supported the Guidelines and its 
Roadmap. 
In 2005, the then EU-US Summit launched an Initiative 
to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration 
and Growth. One of the priorities of this initiative 
was to promote EU-US regulatory cooperation with 
the creation of the EU-US High Level Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum. The main purpose was to offer 
regulators on both sides the necessary senior level 
support and direction as to the implementation of the 
Guidelines and its Roadmap, i.e. how and on what to 
cooperate. The overarching objectives of the Forum 
are to promote better quality regulation, in particular 
through the exchange of best practices on general or 
cross-cutting regulatory approaches, and to minimise 
unnecessary regulatory divergences to facilitate 
transatlantic trade. 
The Forum provides a platform for Commission 
and US senior government officials to address cross-
cutting regulatory cooperation topics of common 
interest to regulators, such as regulatory policy 
matters. Importantly, it also addressed the future 
EU-US cooperative agenda by exchanging the annual 
Commission and US regulatory work programmes to 
serve the two-fold purpose of identifying possible areas 
of cooperation and provide "early warning" on new 
regulatory initiatives of interest to the other side. 
The Forum also addresses best cooperative practices 
("what works in our cooperation, what does not work, 
what can be improved and how"). The document "EU-
US Best Cooperative Practices" was developed and 
adopted by the Forum in 2006 to be attached to the 
Guidelines as further support to regulators wishing 
to cooperate. The Forum has met several times, and 
systematically involves stakeholders in public sessions 
which form part of its regular meetings. The Forum 
has achieved important results to date by significantly 
improving the common understanding of each side’s 
regulatory system and by facilitating cooperation on 
cross-cutting regulatory issues, as well as early dialogue 
in key emerging sectors.
In 2007, the EU-US Summit adopted (and European 
Commission President Barroso, US President Bush and 
Chancellor Merkel of Germany that held the rotating 
EU presidency, signed) the Framework for Advancing 
Transatlantic Economic Integration between the 
EU and the US. The Framework established the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), consisting, 
for the first time, of the political level on both sides, to 
inject political support to the process in a number of 
areas. The Framework highlighted the need to “foster 
cooperation and reduce regulatory burdens”, and 
reiterated the joint support of the implementation of 
the Roadmap for regulatory cooperation, including its 
sectoral dialogues and the OMB-EC Dialogue as well 
as the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, to 
consist of the heads of the relevant regulatory bodies.
In 2012, the work towards a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, TTIP, started…
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